Emergency Preparedness & Disaster Management Plan

‘Plans are nothing; planning is everything’.

Dwight D. Eisenhower
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1. Purpose

This plan describes how CTC will respond effectively to accidents/unexpected incidents and emergencies/disasters and that the environmental, health and safety impacts of such events are minimised. Furthermore it describes CTC's operational capability that enables CTC to continue to function in relation to its business lines and that Directors can be assured that there is sound management and governance in the absence of key staff.

The plan documents CTC's arrangements, systems, strategies and procedures relating to the response and management of emergencies. The EPC in collaboration with CTC and tenants determine which type of emergencies warrant specific emergency response procedures within this plan.

The EPC, ECO, ERT, management of the facility and nominated staff shall participate in the implementation and maintenance of the emergency plan as appropriate to their role within the organisation.

Critical to the success of the surviving an emergency with the optimal outcome is to have an effective response based on the following:

- Leadership and in many cases followership;
- Ability to adapt and respond as a situation arises;
- Ability and willingness to act in a team;
- Cool head under pressure;
- Having the available resources to meet the task head-on;
- Good communication;
- Situational awareness;
- The ability to think ahead and call for additional help/resources as required;
- Reliance on the problem solving ability of team members; and
- An eye on the safety of personnel (first) and property (second).

Much of this cannot be delivered through a plan, no matter how comprehensive it is. Critical to the success of CTC in an emergency will be the ability for CTC staff to think on their feet and this can only be achieved through creating a culture of self-reliance, resilience, commitment, tenacity and mental toughness. This can only be achieved through the empowerment of each individual staff member.
2. Scope

Pretty much everything that CTC does in relation to emergencies is designed to be included in the plan. This document is to be designed to cover the following:

- Emergency prevention;
- Emergency preparedness;
- Emergency mitigation;
- Activities for preparing for and prevention of emergencies such as training and maintenance;
- Overall control and coordination arrangements for emergency response. This includes evacuation strategies for occupants with a disability.

3. Applicability

This plan applies to the CTC precinct only as individualised plans are in place for each SQW project as these vary significantly one to the other and may require liaison with the project beneficiary and their principal contractors etc.

The Precinct is located at 460-492 Beaudesert Road Salisbury 4107 Queensland. Appendix C indicates the extent of the boundary and identifies the three distinct portions or sectors of the precinct:

- Northern – north of Rocky Water Holes Creek;
- Central – south of Rocky Water Holes Creek and north of the railway line;
- Southern – south of the railway line.
4. Definitions

- **Assembly Areas** – The designated place or places where people assemble during the course of an evacuation. Also known as muster point.

- **Bomb** – A device or any size or shape, which can look obvious or be camouflaged, may vary in its sophistication, and may not necessarily explode (i.e., incendiaries, toxic/noxious substances, sharps, animals/reptiles). May be referred to as an improvised explosive device (IED).

- **Bomb Threat** – A threat, written or verbal, delivered by electronic, oral or other medium, threatening to place or use an explosive, chemical, biological or radiological device at a time, date, place or against a specific person or organisation. It is not necessary for any other action to be taken by the offender.

- **Business Continuity Plan** – A plan written to assist an organisation recover from an emergency or catastrophic event that can be natural, man-made or technological. It details what measures are needed to get the business functioning again as well as mitigation measures that can reduce the impact of incidents on business operation and improve business sustainability and resilience.

- **Competent Person** – A person who has acquired through training, education, qualification, experience, or a combination of these, the knowledge and skill enabling him/her to correctly perform the required task.

- **Disaster Management Team (DMT)** – A cohort of staff mainly drawn from CTC who manage the progress of emergency response to emergencies (other than fire) that might have a prolonged activation.

- **Emergency** – An event that arises internally or from external forces (and sometimes from both), which may adversely affect the occupants or visitors in a facility, and which requires an immediate and programmed response.

- **Emergency Control Organisation (ECO)** – A person or persons appointed by the Emergency Planning Committee to direct and control the implementation of the facility’s emergency response procedures. Their deployment is generally of a limited duration.

- **Emergency Mitigation** – Measures taken to decrease the likelihood of emergencies occurring and the associated impacts on people, the facility and the environment. It also deals with measures that limit the extent of the impact caused when an emergency does occur.

- **Emergency Plan** – The written documentation of the emergency arrangements for a facility generally made during the planning process. It consists of the
preparedness, prevention and response activities and includes the agreed emergency roles, responsibilities, strategies, systems and arrangements.

- **Emergency Planning Committee (EPC)** – Persons responsible for the documentation and maintenance of the emergency plan.

- **Emergency Preparedness** – The arrangements made to ensure that should an emergency occur, all those resources and services that are needed to cope with the effects can be efficiently mobilised and deployed.

- **Emergency Prevention** – The measures taken to eliminate the incident of emergencies.

- **Emergency Response Exercise** – A site specific exercise implemented to determine the effectiveness of the emergency response procedures. There are five types of exercise that are further described in this plan.

- **Emergency Response Procedures** – A documented scheme of assigned responsibilities, actions and procedures within a designated section of the plan to respond to and manage emergencies.

- **Emergency Response Team (ERT)** – Specialist or specially trained personnel to attend to specific incidents to contain, control or eliminate the emergency using emergency response equipment. The ERT may be in place longer than the ECO which is primarily focussed around evacuation.

- **Employee Assistance Scheme** – A process made available to staff whereby they can receive confidential specialist counselling to help them deal with a range of psychological challenges including trauma.

- **Evacuation** – The orderly movement of people from a place of danger.

- **Evacuation Diagram** – emergency and evacuation information about the facility, comprising a pictorial representation of a floor or area and other relevant emergency response information.

- **Evacuation Exercise** – An emergency response exercise in which the exercise simulates an emergency that requires an evacuation.

- **Facility** – A building, structure or workplace that is, or may be, occupied by people (occupants).

- **Facility operational incidents** – Non life-threatening incidents that generally do not require the activation of the ECOs.

- **Fire and Evacuation Plan** – The plan required to be written for high occupancy buildings to be compliant with the Fire Safety Regs.

- **Incident** – An event that may significantly impact CTC’s people or its ability to deliver required services.
• Incident Management - This is the response of CTC to an incident. It may include evacuation, shelter in place, and initiating a disaster recovery plan.

• May – Indicates the existence of an option.

• Muster Point – Used inter-changeably with Assembly Area. There are two types primary and secondary. Primary being the place of first assembly following activation of an alarm. The secondary muster point is a place designated by the Disaster Management Team, or the Chief Warden, or Precinct Manager where evacuees will need to move to from the primary assembly area because of the threat of danger.

• Occupant – A person attending a facility on a permanent or temporary basis, such as an employee, contractor, student or resident, but not a visitor.

• Occupant Warning Equipment – Systems and devices that operate to alert people within a facility to an emergency.

• Occupant/Visitor with a Disability – A person who requires more time or different forms of communication, compared to other occupants to respond to an emergency or assistance to respond to an emergency or evacuate from a facility.

• Personal Emergency Evacuation Plan (PEEP) – An individualised emergency plan designed for an occupant with a disability who may need assistance during an emergency.

• Population – Reference to the general mass of persons on the Precinct at any one time making no differentiation between staff, students, visitors and contractors.

• Precinct – The area of 460-492 Beaudesert Road in Salisbury Qld 4107.

• Recovery Plan - A pre-defined, pre-tested and management approved plan to restore normal operations of CTC.

• Refuge – An area on a floor or area that is specifically designed to protect people from heat, smoke and toxic gases and which provides direct access to an exit.

• Shall – Indicates that a statement is mandatory

• Should – Indicates a recommendation.

• Staging Area – An area in a facility where occupants and visitors are intended to gather in preparation for an evacuation.
• **Structure** – A building (fixed or transportable), mast, tower, a steel or reinforced concrete construction, structural cable or telecommunications structure, underground works including shafts and road, rail, telecommunications and interconnecting tunnels.

• **Test** – Confirmation of correct function or performance of a component or system.

• **Visitor** – A person who is within a facility who is temporarily visiting the facility and is not employed at or for the facility, either on a permanent, casual, temporary, contracting basis, a resident or inmate or studying at the facility. Visitor implies that the person has not received an induction to the Precinct.

• **Warden Intercommunication Point (WIP)** – The location on a floor or evacuation zone, that includes a handset provided through which instructions can be received from the intercommunication panel via the emergency intercom system. In the case of CTC this is the FIP.

• **Workplace** – Any place where work is, or is to be performed.

## 5. Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are commonly used in emergency planning literature and may be found in this document. Also included are acronyms recognised within the CTC team.

- **ABDC** – Australian Bomb Data Centre
- **AED** – Automated External Defibrillator
- **APIC** – Australian Poisons Information Centre
- **AS** – Australian Standard
- **AS/NZ** - Joint New Zealand/Australian standard
- **BCA** – Building Code of Australia
- **CWA** – Chemical warfare agent
- **DDA** - Disability Discrimination Act 1992 Cmth
- **DMT** – Disaster Management Team
- **ECO** – Emergency Control Organisation
- **ECP** - Emergency Call Point
- **ECR** - Emergency Control Room
- **EPC** – Emergency Planning Committee
- **ERT** – Emergency Response Team
- **EWIS** – Early warning and intercommunication system
- **FIP** – Fire indicator panel
6. Key Considerations

A number of considerations have been taken into account in compiling this plan and responses to particular emergencies. Traditional or ‘text-book’ solutions are in many cases not applicable and application thereof is potentially dangerous. In devising this plan the following particulars have been taken into account:

- Recognition that CTC has a large transient population (e.g. tenants’ students and those attending short courses);
- There may at any one time be a significant number of first time attendees to the precinct;
- Not all tenants (i.e. their staff or management are regular attendees at the precinct);
- No reliance can be placed on some tenants to play a role in an emergency situation as they may not have a presence on a particular day;
- Given the nature of training i.e. delivered on the Precinct or the workplace there is a reasonable likelihood of a person who is given a particular role to fulfil not being able to do so;
- Given the nature of tenancies located at CTC, a significant number of tenants employees/staff may be in attendance outside of normal working hours (as defined by 7.30-5.30 Monday to Friday). This is particularly true of those who choose to work in the weekends and after hours;
- One discreet building may well split between a number of tenants making it difficult to specify areas for sweeping through in the event of an alarm going off. For example shared amenities (toilets/showers etc.) are likely to not be
considered as part of a tenant’s tenanted area and therefore there is a high
degree of likelihood that these will be overlooked;

- The precinct at any one time has a disproportionately large number of young
males aged between 18-25. The behaviour of this cohort is likely to skew the
overall reaction of the precinct population in terms of the standard deviation of
fear/panic and reckless behaviour. This cohort are also less likely to comply
with instructions and therefore additional reinforcement of instructions will be
necessary;

- The precinct has a mix of ground floor and two storey buildings. This means
that there is a blend across the precinct of vertical and horizontal evacuation
routes;

- The size of the precinct (12.2 hectares) means there is, necessarily, a
significant number of muster points that poses extra challenges in the event of
roll calls and accounting for personnel;

- Given the transient nature of the precinct population, it is difficult to effect
accurate accounting for all personnel without a very strict application of a roll
call procedure;

- Given proximity to vehicles and the over-whelming number of the precinct
population who have vehicles the ability of the ECO/ERT to retain personnel in
situ for a head-count is significantly challenged;

- With a widely fluctuating precinct population at any one time, the CTC staff
numbers will be severely stretched in dealing with particular emergencies on
some occasions given that CTC is a small organisation running a large
precinct with at time up to half its staff numbers out of the precinct;

- The facility is by its nature (a mix of low, medium and high standard buildings,
offices and workshops) creates additional complexity. Refer Appendix D for
facility breakdown.

- The age of the facility means that while adequate, latest state of the art fire
prevention and suppression measures are not in place;

7. Prevention and Mitigation

Prevention and mitigation against and during a crisis is important. In terms of the
ability of CTC to be proactive this is limited by the actual event. There are some
aspects that fall within CTC’s control and many that do not. Natural disasters
cannot be controlled and there may be short notice in terms of storm events etc.
CTC can however mitigate the impact of such events through:
• Storage of potentially airborne items within the buildings (e.g. rubbish bins);
• Ensuring Rocky Water Holes Creek is kept clear of debris especially at the culvert and the railway bridge;
• Maintaining the levees;
• Periodic structural reviews of the facilities to ensure integrity in a major storm event;
• Good housekeeping around the precinct;
• Ensuring that trees/bushes are pruned accordingly;
• Removal of cars and other important/expensive assets to higher ground in the event of heavy rains that may lead to flooding;
• Storage of flammable liquids in the appropriate location and container;
• Storage of gas cylinders in appropriate location and containers;
• Maintenance of the facility to a high standard including repair of damaged/deteriorated buildings in an urgent manner;
• Maintenance of the roadways and car parks;
• Maintenance of CTC’s fire detection and fire-fighting equipment in line with the Australian Standards;
• Close observation of weather patterns;
• A preparedness to evacuate from the precinct early enough to allow staff a safe as possible journey home;
• Maintaining a means to alert tenants of an impending crisis;
• Maintaining access to dry storage in the Southern precinct;
• Provision of monitored cameras in the CEO’s office which captures recorded footage of the entry to CTC, the entry to Ian Barclay Building and the area around the CTC office;
• Having a well-equipped first aid room and trained staff to complement this;
• Having a well-drilled plan and staff who are familiar with its application.

8. Closure of the Precinct

There may be occasions where it is necessary to close the Precinct, e.g. in a flood, bomb threat, following a fire or in the event of a pandemic. This decision is not taken lightly given that denying access could cause tenants to compromise aspects of their business. For this reason only the CEO of CTC or someone deputising for the CEO may formally close the Precinct.
In order to effect the closure, the three main gates (Gate 1, Gate 2 and Gate 3 – see precinct map below) are locked deploying the specially made lockable notices that are stored in the TRAW.

There is also a prepared pro forma to use when shutting the precinct (see overleaf) which provides information alerting the tenants and visitors that the precinct is closed. It is recognised that this only prevents vehicular access but the notice is clear in its intent (see photo) that there is to be no access to the precinct.

The Gate Closure devices are located in the TRAW as shown in the photo.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Construction Training Centre</th>
<th>Version – 4.0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PLN-ASM-308</td>
<td>Issue Date: 01/11/13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# Emergency Preparedness & Disaster Management Plan
CLOSED

This precinct is closed until (insert ‘date’ or ‘Further Notice’) due to (insert reason).

DO NOT ENTER

For further information call (insert name and phone number)

By order of (insert name, CEO)

9. Hierarchy of Plans

The CTC Disaster Management Framework is aligned with the key concepts integrated into local disaster management plans (i.e. at the local government area level). Under this framework, the CTC centre, facility and office is required to develop their own plan (Disaster Management Plan), which contains all relevant information to effective disaster management. In turn, these plans will contain sub-plans for locally identified risks (Contingency Plans), and for detailed instructions on specific disaster management tasks (Specialist Plans).
Local Disaster Management Plan (Local Government Area) and Neighbours

CTC provides a copy of its plan to local authorities (BCC, QFRS, SES) and also its neighbours (Nyanda State High School, Orrcon and Alstom).

Disaster Management Framework
Described in and known as Emergency Preparedness & Disaster Management Plan EMDMP

Document detailing CTC's comprehensive approach to disaster management across all levels.

Disaster Management Plan
Is incorporated within CTC's EMDMP

Plan that details the local service-level approach to disaster management (at centre, facility or office site). This plan includes contingency and specialist plans.

Contingency Plans
These are based on CTC's Emergency Identification and Analysis Tool

Plan focusing on a single identified hazard or its consequences, which presents a high risk of impacting essential services.

Specialist Plans

Plan that instructs detailed actions or response, to convey specific/specialist information to staff and consumers, which could be applied to a variety of events.

EXAMPLES: Loss of power, flood, fire, gas leak, staff shortage, heatwave, pandemic, food supply loss, data/information loss

EXAMPLES: evacuation, media management, site relocation, building shutdown/reoccupation, data recovery plan
FIRE
- Induction of staff
- Tenant/Contractor Induction
- Drills – Logs – Action Requests
- Wardens/PPE
- Evacuation Diagrams
- Evacuation Plan
- Fire Control
- Fire Safety Advisers
- Fire Extinguisher Training/Fire Awareness
- Fire Warden Training
- Crib Sheets in helmets
- Equipment
- Fire Extinguishers etc.
- Records of fire protection maintenance
- Fire regulations
- Notification of FSA to QFRS
- Annual Occupiers Statement

INJURY
- First Aid Room
- First Aid Code of Practice
- Occupational First Aider
- Cylinder Cracking
- First Aid Boxes updated
- Staff First Aid trained
- Defibrillator
- Incident Reports

BUSINESS CONTINUITY PLAN
- Business Continuity Plan
- Data backup
- Insurance

DISASTER & EMERGENCY RESPONSE
- Emergency Response Team (ERT)
- Shutting down of Precinct
- Emergency Control Room (ECR)

DISASTER PLANNING
- Emergency Planning
- Emergency Control Organisation
- Consultation

NON-FIRE RESPONSES
- Specific plans for each non-fire emergency
10. In the event of an Incident or Pending Incident

When an incident occurs the following activities should be undertaken:

- Convene the Disaster Management Team (DMT)
- Determine the gravity of the situation
- The CEO declares if an “emergency” notification is warranted
- Establish an Emergency Control Room (ECR) (CTQ lunchroom is the default) and establish comms.
- Deploy the ECR Box which has necessary items enclosed to enable a rapid mobilisation of the plan
- Assign a responsible person to keep a log of all activities (critical!)
- Review section Emergency Management Checklist
- Activate the Emergency Control Organisation (ECO) or the Emergency Response Team (ERT) as appropriate
- Document the tasks to be performed in the short and medium term – use the resources and memory joggers contained in this plan.
- Assign tasks and timeframes for updates to Disaster Management Team (DMT)
- DMT members brief the Emergency Response Team and delegate tasks
- Monitor information in and out.
11. Emergency Declaration Process

Problem / Event Occurs

Is preservation of life or major assets threatened?

Perform Damage assessment

Monitor Problem, Issue Status reports

Does problem Meet Emergency Criteria?

Advise CEO

Problem Resolution, process

Y

Commence Emergency Response

CEO declares emergency?

Convene Disaster Management Team (DMT)

Establish Control Room

Alert tenants

DMT hand over to Tenants

DMT stand down

Follow Business Continuity Plan

Follow Incident Management Plan

Incident Passed?

Y

Emergency Response Team (ERT) activated

Recover & checking as necessary

Return to normal operations

N

Emergency Preparedness & Disaster Management Plan
12. Emergency Management Checklist

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Issue/Action</th>
<th>Assigned To</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#1</td>
<td>Incident Management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assess actual or potential threat and its impact on services required to be provided</td>
<td>CTC staff member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assess staff, contractors, suppliers, tenants, participants and customer safety/well being</td>
<td>CTC staff member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Notify CEO of threat</td>
<td>CTC staff member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Receive Executive approval to invoke Emergency Plan</td>
<td>CEO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Invoke facility incident management plan and contact staff, tenants, contractors, participants</td>
<td>CEO/Facility Manager/Customer Support Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Convene Disaster Management Team (DMT)</td>
<td>CEO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appoint Incident Controller</td>
<td>CEO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commence Log</td>
<td>Facility Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appoint roles and responsibilities as per IMP</td>
<td>Facility Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Continuously assess threat level and decisions on possible evacuation. Liaise with CEO at all times.</td>
<td>Facility Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assess security situation</td>
<td>Facility Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Implement Specialist and Contingency Plans as necessary to respond to assessed threat(s)</td>
<td>Facility Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hold checkpoint meetings</td>
<td>Facility Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prepare incident management team rosters</td>
<td>Facility Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Record expenditures</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#2</td>
<td>Precautionary Measures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Take precautionary measures – consider personnel safety</td>
<td>EMT/Safety Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#3</td>
<td>Staff, tenant, participant and contractor support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ensure staff, tenant, participant and contractor welfare</td>
<td>EMT/Safety Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#4</td>
<td>Communications</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liaise with Executive Team</td>
<td>Communications Delegate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communicate to staff</td>
<td>Communications Delegate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#5</td>
<td>Incident site(s) management and site restore</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secure site(s) – ensure safety of staff/tenants/participants/assets</td>
<td>CEO/Facility Manager/Maintenance Supervisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Undertake comprehensive site damage assessment</td>
<td>Delegate of CEO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Determine salvaged/restoration requirements</td>
<td>Delegate of CEO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Identify document/equipment restoration options</td>
<td>Delegate of CEO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
13. **Severe Weather**

Severe weather events are the most common hazard likely to affect CTC services and facilities. Thunderstorms, cyclones and severe weather events cause more damage each year than any other group of disasters. Severe thunderstorms, including tornadoes and large hail, are our most frequent, damaging natural hazard, and occur frequently across the Australian East Coast. Every year between November and April, the coastal regions of Queensland are at also at risk of being hit by cyclones.
14. Severe Weather Warnings

These warnings are provided when severe weather is expected that is not directly related to severe thunderstorms, tropical cyclones or bushfires. Examples include land gales, squalls, flash-flooding, dangerous surf or tides.

15. Severe Thunderstorm Warnings

These warnings are provided when thunderstorms are expected to produce dangerous or damaging conditions.

FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT CYCLONES AND SEVERE WEATHER CONTACT BUREAU OF METEOROLOGY – www.bom.gov.au and LISTEN to LOCAL RADIO BRISBANE 612 for news. SES Number is 132500

16. Internal Contacts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective:</th>
<th>Owner:</th>
<th>Implementation Deadline:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Co-ordinate the response and recovery effort at the facility level</td>
<td>CEO/FACILITY MANAGER</td>
<td>All possible staff/contractors/tenants/participants to be notified of role within 2 hours of emergency being identified.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response Strategy:</th>
<th>Operational Documents Ref:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Convene at control room or for Fire at Fire Panel (IBB)</td>
<td>- Tenant Emergency Contact Lists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Manage Emergency</td>
<td>- Contractor Sign-on sheets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Precinct Maintenance Manager is to contact staff/contractors/tenants/participants and advise their roles during the incident and delegate logistics, resource, recovery and support tasks to the relevant persons.</td>
<td>- Safety Notification Board at CTC which has whereabouts of Contractors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Staff contacts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Mobile contacts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actions:</th>
<th>Assumptions:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Train key staff on the requirements contained in this document.</td>
<td>- All packs will need to be regularly maintained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Documentation to be strategically placed in</td>
<td>- Tenants will have their own</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Crisis Cupboard and in Control Room (CTC Lunchroom)
- Set Customer Support Officer monthly task to ensure the latest update documents are in place (consider Outlook tasking)
- Liaise with tenants to ensure there is consistency of response across the precinct

Emergency Preparedness & Disaster Management Plans which will be a sub-set of an overall Precinct-wide response.

Contact Details:
- For 2-way radio and satellite phone
- Local Disaster Management Co-ordinator
- CEO
- Local police

Contact Numbers:
- Moorooka Police
  Phone 000 first, or 3362 9962
  Police link 131 444

Contact details for CTC personnel are provided to CTC staff on a frequent basis. These are included in the folder that includes the Emergency Preparedness and Disaster management Plan.
17. External Contacts

Consider whether to stay or go

IMMEDIATE CONSIDERATIONS

BACKGROUND CONSIDERATION

Relationship With ESO

Managing Human

Staffing

Alternative Staffing

Transport Availability

Warning

Threat

Supply-Chain Security

Power & Water Security

Proxim Supply Chain Security

Managing Human

Infrastructure

Road & Environmental Conditions

Staff

DECISION TO EVACUATE, RELOCATE OR SHELTER-IN-PLACE

Relationship With ESO

Communications

Consider whether to stay or go
## 18. Specialist Plans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective:</th>
<th>Owner:</th>
<th>Implementation Deadline:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To secure the precinct in the event of a low level threat</td>
<td>CEO/Facility Manager</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response Strategy:</th>
<th>Operational Documents Ref:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It is preferred to shelter in situ unless services are unable to be provided to staff for a prolonged period of time, e.g. fire.</td>
<td>Refer, contingency plans for no electricity and air conditioning, waste contingency plan, generator sourcing plan.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actions and Prior Arrangements:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>See checklist, organise according to BoM warnings current at the time. Consider actions relating to the Business Continuity Plan Consider recovery needs as soon as possible.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## 19. Insurance and Assessor Liaison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective:</th>
<th>Owner:</th>
<th>Implementation Deadline:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To insure all our rights and obligations under the relevant insurance policy are met and all losses are claimed.</td>
<td>Finance &amp; Risk Manager</td>
<td>During and post the incident.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response Strategy:</th>
<th>Assumptions:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Consider the person allocated to review facility prior to re-commencement. Is there sufficient knowledge to effect a credible report?</td>
<td>- Limited, if any, communications and computing will be available in first week.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Prevention of further loss.</td>
<td>- Availability of camera.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Maintaining a safe work environment – access by staff must only be where it is safe to do so.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actions and Prior Arrangements:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Phone insurer and discuss what has happened</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Make an inventory and take photos of damage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Maintain the list as new items are discovered</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Periodically send the list to the CEO.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
20. **Loss of Power, Water and HVAC**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective:</th>
<th>Owner:</th>
<th>Implementation Deadline:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To ensure continuity of service provided and disruption is minimised.</td>
<td>Facility Manager</td>
<td>During and post the incident.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Response Strategy:**
Liaise with external suppliers/contractors.

**Actions & Prior Arrangements:**
Consider the profile of the tenants. This may alter the timeframe for response, or escalate activities.

- Loss of power will mean loss of fire systems if prolonged.
- Water re-connection is a priority. Without water precinct must continue to remain closed.
- Air conditioning is less of an issue except where climatic conditions are such that it is unsafe to work without it. Electricity will need to be reconnected before the Air Conditioning company can be called.

**Assumptions:**
- If CTC is affected, then so will surrounding businesses and suburbs and CTC will be prioritised by both Energex and Urban Utilities.
- Delays may be caused by the restricted access to CTC’s substation which may mean it takes longer to restore power.
- That the electricity will come on without tripping when it is restored by Energex.

See elsewhere for the generator operation.

21. **First Aid Provision**

CTC maintains a first aid facility in line with the [First Aid Code of Practice](#). The First Aid Facility is located in Building 1 adjacent to BIGA. The following features of the First Aid Room are worthy of additional mention:

1. The name and contact details of the Person in Charge are affixed to the side of the entry point;
2. CTC maintains a high ratio of Basic First Aid/CPR trained staff;
3. The First Aid room is equipped to deal with minor and intermediate medical trauma and emergencies and includes:
   a) Medical oxygen which is checked [*fortnightly*](#), it is maintained in line with standard practice and all empty cylinders are identified as such.
with an MT sign. Instructions for the maintenance of the cylinders is displayed in the First Aid Room;

b) Stretcher for trauma/suspected C Spine injuries;

c) Visible charts for dealing with common issues that might be encountered;

d) Contaminated (Clinical and Quarantine) Waste Bin and Bin Liners. Note that Veolia should be called with reference to how this waste (clinical and quarantine) should be disposed of.

e) Stocks as per the Code of Practice. These are checked periodically.

4) Items not included in the First Aid Room, but of a first aid nature, include:

a) The AED (defibrillator) is stored within the CTC office in the Crisis Cabinet and the battery is checked **fortnightly**. This allows rapid deployment when necessary. All new staff are trained in the use of the **defibrillator**. Instructions are included within the defibrillator bag as well as the machine itself provides a step by step procedure when activated;

b) Blood pressure monitor and stethoscope which are located in the CEO's Office (left hand side middle bookshelf).

5) Staff who are First Aid trained are recognised as such on their helmets. A Register of First Aid qualifications is maintained by the Customer Support Officer.

6) A list of First Aid/CPR trained personnel is included on the website [http://www.ctc.qld.edu.au/team-firstaid.htm](http://www.ctc.qld.edu.au/team-firstaid.htm)

7) Because of the need for specialist equipment and trained instruction CPR is not a regular drilled feature of CTC drills. There is periodic refresher training during the year and staff attend their required validation course through CTC’s First Aid provider (refer Preferred Provider list).
22. Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT)

CTC maintains a Hazardous Materials register which is stored in the Red HAZMAT container at the entrance of Ian Barclay Building. The identification of hazardous materials is done through an information request to tenants. This information is added to with each successive tenant as this information is raised at the induction of the Tenant. In addition CTC has a series of Hazard Maps which highlight sensitive issues on the site. These are included in the Clipboard that contains this Plan.
23. Spills and Spill Management

Not all spills are hazardous and not all hazardous chemical issues arise as a result of spills. In the event of a spill, the major concern is the protection of waterways as CTC does not allow or contain chemicals where release to the atmosphere is a particular concern in terms of an acute risk to health. CTC has four main issues to address with respect to spills:

1) Deliberate release of chemicals to sewerage e.g. washing of paint brushes down drains;
2) Accidental release of chemicals into stormwater;
3) Accidental release of chemicals directly into Rocky Water Holes Creek.
4) As per 2 & 3 but done deliberately.

In the event of a spill being reported (i.e. tenant to CTC team member) or when a spill occurs (by a CTC team member) rapid deployment of measures to protect the environment are necessary. The following actions are to be taken:

- Ensure safety of personal; CALL FOR HELP
- Use appropriate PPE as required;
- Deployment of the Spill Kit as a matter of urgency;
- Prevention through bunding or other measures to prevent chemicals escaping down drains;
- Using spill kit contents to soak up excess chemical;
- Identify substance if possible from container. If a lorry has shed the chemical there should be a transportation label to the rear of the vehicle and an emergency number to ring;
- Locate the Safety Data Sheet as required and take action as appropriate from there. In the case of CTC there is a manual of complete Safety Data Sheets held in the First Aid Room;
- Contact Emergency services as required (Dial ‘000’). This may be ambulance and/or Queensland Fire and Rescue Service;
- For advice (24/7) on how to deal with the spill once immediate containment measures - contact Veolia on 1300 134 364
- For notification to the relevant authorities about a spill contact the Department of Environment and Heritage Protection on 1300 130 372
- For clean-up assistance contact Veolia on 1300 134 364 and advise them that CTC is a customer. Say you are after the ‘Qld Emergency Response’.
24. **Summary of Actions in the Event of a Spill**

- **Step 1**: PPE
- **Step 2**: Assess
- **Step 3**: Contain
- **Step 4**: Absorb
- **Step 5**: Dispose
- **Step 6**: Report (refer below for Department of Environment and Heritage Protection)
- **Step 7**: Restock via Ecospill Phone 1800 009 665
25. **International Classification of Hazardous Substances**

1. **EXPLOSIVES**

2.1 **FLAMMABLE GASES**

2.2 **NON-FLAMMABLE NON-TOXIC GASES**

2.2 **OXIDIZING GAS**

5.1 **(NITROUS OXIDE & OXYGEN ONLY)**

2.3 **TOXIC GASES**

3. **FLAMMABLE LIQUIDS**

4.1 **FLAMMABLE SOLIDS**

(AND OTHER REACTIVE SUBSTANCES)

4.2 **SUBMERGED LIQUIDS**

5.2 **ORGANIC PEROXIDES**

6.1 **TOXIC SUBSTANCES**

6.2 **INFECTIOUS SUBSTANCES**

7. **RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL**

(CATEGORY I)

7. **RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL**

(CATEGORY II or III)

8. **CORROSIVE SUBSTANCES**

9. **MISCELLANEOUS DANGEROUS**

---

26. **Locations**

- **Spill Kit located in the TRAW 1**
- **Spill Kit located in the TRAW 1**
- **Instructions are included inside the lid 2**

In the event of an industrial incident, it is necessary to contact Workplace Health and Safety to advise them what has happened. An incident is notifiable if it arises out of the conduct of a business or undertaking and results in the death, serious injury or serious illness of a person or involves a dangerous incident.

When is an injury or illness serious? The Work Health and Safety Act 2011 sets out that a serious injury or illness of a person is:
an injury or illness requiring the person to have:
- immediate treatment as an in-patient in a hospital
- immediate treatment for:
  - the amputation of any part of his or her body
  - a serious head injury
  - a serious eye injury
  - a serious burn
  - the separation of his or her skin from an underlying tissue (such as degloving or scalping)
  - a spinal injury
  - the loss of a bodily function
  - serious lacerations or medical treatment (treatment by a doctor) within 48 hours of exposure to a substance
- any infection to which the carrying out of work is a significant contributing factor, including any infection that is reliably attributable to carrying out work:
  - with micro-organisms; or
  - that involves providing treatment or care to a person; or
  - that involves contact with human blood or body substances; or
  - that involves handling or contact with animals, animal hides, skins, wool or hair, animal carcasses or animal waste products.

A dangerous incident is an incident in relation to a workplace that exposes a worker or any other person to a serious risk to a person’s health or safety emanating from an immediate or imminent exposure to:
- an uncontrolled escape, spillage or leakage of a substance
- an uncontrolled implosion, explosion or fire
- an uncontrolled escape of gas or steam
- an uncontrolled escape of a pressurised substance
- electric shock that is not a serious electrical incident or a dangerous electrical event
- the fall or release from a height of any plant, substance or thing
- the collapse, overturning, failure or malfunction of, or damage to, any plant that is required to be authorised for use in accordance with the regulations
- the collapse or partial collapse of a structure
- the collapse or failure of an excavation or of any shoring supporting an excavation
the inrush of water, mud or gas in workings, in an underground excavation or tunnel
the interruption of the main system of ventilation in an underground excavation or tunnel.
The responsibility rests with the Person in Control of the Business or Undertaking and the call to WHS should be made on 1300 369 915 or via Fax on 3247 0297
Note! A serious electrical incident or dangerous electrical event is notifiable under the Electrical Safety Regulation 2000. For more information refer to the electrical safety incident notification webpage or contact the Electrical Safety Office on 1300 650 662.

- Environment
Beyond safety we have an obligation to the environment. The Environmental Protection Act 1994 states that we all have a general environmental duty. This means that we are all responsible for the actions we take that affect the environment. We must not carry out any activity that causes or is likely to cause environmental harm unless we take all reasonable and practicable measures to prevent or minimise the harm.
For example, we must not pour oil and other wastes down the stormwater drain or cause unreasonable noise. To decide what meets our general environmental duty, the following must be considered:
- the nature of the harm or potential harm;
- the sensitivity of the receiving environment;
- the current state of technical knowledge for the activity;
- the likelihood of successful application of the different measures to prevent or minimise environmental harm that might be taken;
- the financial implications of the different measures as they would relate to the type of activity.
Where we breach this obligation we have a legal duty to report a notifiable incident.
The duty of a person who is an employee, contractor, or agent to notify their employer.
A person who is an employee, contractor, or agent (for simplicity referred to as an employee), who causes or becomes aware of a notifiable event, must notify the person who employs them or engaged them as a contractor or agent (for simplicity referred to as an employer) within 24 hours of becoming aware of the event.

The notice given to the employer does not have to be in writing, but must contain sufficient details to provide notice of the event, its nature, and the circumstances in which it happened (for simplicity referred to as the details of the event). An employee should always keep a record of when and to whom they gave notice of a notifiable event.

If notice is given to the employer it is then the employer’s responsibility to give the administering authority written notice with details of the event no later than 24 hours after becoming aware of the event. If the employer cannot be contacted, then the employee must give the administering authority written notice with details of the event no later than 24 hours after first becoming aware of the event.

The duty of an employer to notify the administering authority and affected owners and occupiers

If an employee reports a notifiable event to their employer, then the employer has a duty to give written notice with details of the event to the administering authority no later than 24 hours after becoming aware of the event. As soon as possible the employer must also either:

• give written notice with details of the event to any combination of the occupiers or registered owners of affected land; or
• give public notice of the details of the event.

Public notice could be by radio or television announcement or the erection of appropriately sized signs in the vicinity of the affected land.

The contact number is **1300 130 372**

27. **Training for Spills**

All staff are inducted as to the location, contents and what to do in the event of a spill. A crib sheet (aide memoire) is also affixed to the lid of the spill kit.
28. Safety Data Sheets

CTC maintains a comprehensive list of Safety Data Sheets. These are kept in hard and soft copy format. A copy is kept in the Crisis Cupboard as well as the First Aid Room. In the event that someone is contaminated with a poisonous or corrosive substance, or ingests a poison or corrosive substance/chemical the Safety Data Sheet of the product, where applicable, should be accessed. The following points should be noted:

1) In many cases the receptacle (Bottle/tin etc.) will have Safety Data Sheet information on it and this may be the quickest means to effecting the appropriate action;
2) There may be cases where the chemical has been decanted into another receptacle that has safety information therefore that is spurious (this is illegal but needs to be taken into account) so consideration of this if the smell/appearance or properties of the chemical seems at odds with the description on the container;
3) If in doubt about any poisonous/corrosive agent further advice aside from the information contained in the Safety Data Sheet should be sought from the National Poisons Information Centre on 13 11 26. Always remember to take the container in question with you to the phone.
4) In administering first aid always consider your own safety and use PPE as appropriate.
5) The First Aid Room has a hazardous waste bin where chemicals/ bodily fluids can be stored prior to disposal.

29. Security Management

In the event of civil unrest, or when crowd control may be required CTC has available its security arrangements. CTC engages two security companies.

1) Alarm monitoring is undertaken by Alarm Industries 3941 9999
2) Patrols are undertaken by Waterloo Security 3725 9999

In addition to this CTC has its own CCTV system that monitors and records four separate locations. Police will normally be called when there is an immediate and credible risk of trespass, attack, theft or vandalism. In the event of needing to plan responses to civil or other unrest where Police resources might be stretched, then CTC’s own security company (Waterloo) may be able to provide some
assistance. In terms of planning, CTC has a tenant, (BLP), who may be able to provide some specialist advice/guidance (contact Dave Woodman of BLP on 0403584402).

30. Fall from Roof

Given the height of CTC’s roofs and the reasonable frequency at which CTC staff are on the roof there is a likelihood that a fall from the roof may occur. CTC has a fall arrest system fitted to a number of the roof areas of buildings within the precinct. Given the dangers associated with deployment of the fall arrest and harness system e.g. orthostatic intolerance (better known as suspension trauma) a work method statement has been designed. To recover someone safely when they have fallen CTC has a rescue kit and system which is the basis of the safety plan. The Harness System with lanyards and Fall Restraint system are inspected every 6 months by CTC’s Safety at Heights contractor.

CTC has trained and drilled rescue at heights staff (at least three). To ensure that they are able to deploy the rescue system in an emergency, regular and periodic run-throughs are undertaken. These are noted on the Drill Form that is located in the Safety Area adjacent to the Testing Repair and Assessment Workshop (TRAW). Drills are of two types:

1) Live drills in situ on the roof using a manikin; and
2) Simulated drills in the TRAW.

The Safety Area also has a series of photos highlighting the key information for deployment of the rescue system.

Members of the Safety team are identified in the foyer team board and also on the website with a Heights Rescue Team logo.

To ensure the safety of CTC staff and any contractors who access the roof, the rescue kit will be transported to the roof on each and every access to the roof.

31. Safe Work Method Statement

- Risk assessment must be undertaken prior to accessing the roof. A pre-start will be conducted where a visual check of the equipment is undertaken and other issues can be raised e.g. fatigue concerns etc. Where a member of the team accessing the roof is not comfortable then the ‘Good to Go’ clearance cannot be issued and access to the roof where
each member of the team is considered necessary for the safe completion of the activity then the activity MUST be postponed. This overrides any other issue.

- No access to the roof is allowed where a harness and fall restraint/fall arrest system is not in place, unless it is from within an elevated work platform operated with the appropriate PPE and by an operator with a current license and only if the personnel remain safely within the elevated work platform.

- The location board is written up with the building and specific (or general as required) location of where the activity is to take place. This allows for the rescue personnel to easily identify where a rescue is to be effected. When accessing the roof the rescue kit is left in the vicinity at the top of the access point but out of the way of access/egress so as not to cause a hazard. This allows the rescue team to gather the kit and take it to the scene of the retrieval. When an actual rescue has been effected an incident form is to be completed and a full investigation undertaken (FOR-COM-025) Any equipment including PPE deployed in the rescue is inspected and replaced as required on the advice of the supplier. No access to the roof can be made in the interim unless an alternative system or kit is used.
32. **Rescue Kit Deployment:**

There is a pictorial Step approach that is on display in the TRAW (see photo). There is also a smaller version, in booklet form, in the rescue kit bag.

![Rescue Kit Deployment](image)

33. **Contractor Induction, Sign-In and Whereabouts**

One means by which safety is provided to contractors who work for CTC, is to know when and where they are on the precinct. This information is available to CTC team members from both the sign-in book (who and when) and the Safety Notification Board that hangs in the CTC Precinct management Office foyer (where). The Safety Notification Board acts as a visual aid to identify where various contractors are working and the relevant coloured identifier is placed on the precinct map by the person conducting the sign-in. When the contractor signs out the CTC team member then removes the magnet from the board. In the event of a fire or other emergency this board provides an approximate location of these staff. The Chief Warden takes note of this information before leaving the CTC Office to go to the FIP. The obligations of Contractors are spelled out to them at their induction and within the [Contractor's Induction Handbook](#). The induction
of the contractor provides the opportunity to ensure that they know how to operate within the overall parameters of our plan.

34. Tenant Induction Process

Tenants are inducted into the Precinct through a formal induction which is covered by a checklist and Induction Book. This orientates the Tenant to the overall operation of the Plan. The latest controlled version of the plan is accessed through the CTC website under Tenants tab. It is uncontrolled when printed off.

35. The Planning Framework

CTC follows the Australian Standard AS 3745-2010 Planning for Emergencies in Facilities in devising its total emergency response. Recognising that emergencies encountered may not be limited to Fire a holistic approach is adopted that incorporates fire within the overall emergency planning response and framework.

- **Emergency Planning Committee (EPC)**
  The CEO determines who is on the Emergency Planning Committee (EPC). This is the lead planning body for the emergency planning and response for CTC and its tenants. It applies to the CTC Salisbury precinct only. It is the CEO's responsibility to ensure that the EPC is adequately resourced and meets with the frequency required to deliver its objectives. The EPC has a Charter that is agreed by its members. Specialist advice will be provided as required.

- **EPC Goals**
  To ensure that the CTC precinct has the optimal response in place to handle emergencies as they arise through best practice planning to secure life and property.

- **Objectives**
  The EPC shall develop, implement and maintain the emergency plan, emergency response procedures and related training to realise its goals.
• **Duties**
  - Identification of events that could result in emergency situations;
  - Develop an emergency plan;
  - Ensure that resources (time, finance, equipment and personnel) are provided to enable the development and implementation of the emergency plan;
  - Determine the validity of the plan;
  - To ensure the availability and identifiability of the plan;
  - Establishment of the Emergency Control Organisation to operate the plan;
  - To establish a specialist emergency response team (ERT)
  - Providing for the implementation process for the plan including:
    - Awareness of the emergency response procedures;
    - Training in the procedures;
    - Testing of procedures; and
    - Review of procedures.
  - Establishing the arrangements for the continued operation of the ECO;
  - Establishing strategies for ensuring visitors are aware of emergency response procedures;
  - Ensuring emergency response procedures remain viable and effective by reviewing and testing emergency response procedures at least annually;
  - Ensure that the plan is reviewed at the end of the validity period, after an emergency, exercise or changes that are implemented to iterate the plan;
  - Ensuring that a permanent record for each emergency is compiled and retained; and
  - Identifying and rectifying deficiencies and opportunities for improvement in the emergency plan and emergency response procedures.

• **Membership of EPC**
  The EPC shall consist of at least seven members drawn from CTC and tenants. There will be a representative from each part of the precinct (northern, central and southern). The membership therefore includes:
  - Tenants from all three sectors of the precinct;
  - Chief & Deputy Chief Fire Warden;
  - Chief and Deputy Precinct Manager;
  - Precinct Maintenance Manager;
  - Fire Safety Adviser;
– Someone with Managing First Aid in the Workplace qualification;
– A representative from the Heights Rescue Team;
– Someone with disaster planning experience.
Other specialists can be co-opted in as required. Where not included within the above skill sets/roles the CEO of the precinct is an ex officio member.

• Meetings
The EPC meets at least annually and on an as required basis thereafter. Records are kept of meeting agendas and minutes and attendance is logged in the minutes. The records are retained in the G Drive under the folder EPC. Records are held for a period of 10 years.

• Indemnity
All CTC staff serving on the EPC are indemnified in line with the Management Liability Insurance taken out by CTC. Other serving EPC members will need to secure their own assurance around indemnity from their own organisation.

36. Fire
CTC as the owner/manager of the Precinct has an obligation to produce a plan that reflects the evacuation requirements of a High Occupancy Building (see Appendix A).

• Fire Factsheet
In Case of Fire: Dial '000'

R emove or Rescue occupants from the area of immediate danger. Stage 1 of Evacuation.
A larm Raise the alarm and alert; Fire Services by activating a Manual Call Point, other staff in the area (verbally).
C ontain the fire by closing windows and doors to minimise the danger of the fire and smoke spreading.
E xtinguish the fire if: you have been trained in the use of a fire extinguisher, it is safe to do so or you have someone in support.
• Classification of Fire:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS A</th>
<th>Ordinary Combustibles</th>
<th>CLASS B</th>
<th>Flammable Liquids</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paper</td>
<td>Wood</td>
<td>Petrol</td>
<td>Paint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plastics</td>
<td>Fabric</td>
<td>Methylated Spirits</td>
<td>Alcohol</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS C</th>
<th>Flammable Gases</th>
<th>CLASS D</th>
<th>Combustible Metals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liquid Propane gas</td>
<td>Natural Gas</td>
<td>Sodium</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydrogen</td>
<td>Methane</td>
<td>Magnesium</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS F</th>
<th>Cooking Oils and Fats</th>
<th>(E) Energised Electrical Field</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Butter</td>
<td>Margarine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Electricity provides a heat source and will cause a burn, it does not itself catch fire. Therefore, electricity is not shown as a class of fire. The symbol (E) is placed on certain fire extinguishers to indicate that the extinguishing agent will not conduct electricity and use near energised electrical fields is safe.

• Extinguisher Usage:

**Pull** the safety pin and **Test** the extinguisher to ensure that it is fully charged.

** Aim** at the fire.

**Squeeze** the handles together to activate the extinguisher.

**Sweep** the base of the fire to ensure complete coverage.

It should be noted that when using the Foam extinguisher, the sweep method is not used. Instead, the foam is directed past the fire and onto a wall or similar surface, allowing the foam to roll back onto the fire and smother it.

The initial attack on the fire should not be any closer than 2 metres, moving forward aggressively as the flames are extinguished. **Sweep the base of the fire, never turn your back on a fire or use an extinguisher unless you have been trained. Always have someone in support and ensure that an escape route is maintained.**
- **Portable Fire Extinguisher Guide**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Water</th>
<th>Wet Chemical</th>
<th>Foam</th>
<th>Dry Chemical Powder</th>
<th>Carbon Dioxide (Co2)</th>
<th>Vapourising Liquid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In all cases, Call the Fire Brigade</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In all cases, Call The Fire Brigade
## Emergency Preparedness & Disaster Management Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>Ordinary Combustibles (Wood, paper, plastics etc)</th>
<th>Water</th>
<th>Wet Chemical</th>
<th>Foam</th>
<th>Dry Chemical Powder</th>
<th>Carbon Dioxide (CO2)</th>
<th>Vapourising Liquid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>AB(E)</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES Limited Effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most suitable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B</th>
<th>Flammable Combustible Liquids</th>
<th>Water</th>
<th>Wet Chemical</th>
<th>Foam</th>
<th>Dry Chemical Powder</th>
<th>Carbon Dioxide (CO2)</th>
<th>Vapourising Liquid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C</th>
<th>Flammable Gases</th>
<th>Water</th>
<th>Wet Chemical</th>
<th>Foam</th>
<th>Dry Chemical Powder</th>
<th>Carbon Dioxide (CO2)</th>
<th>Vapourising Liquid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(E)</th>
<th>Fire involving Energised Electrical Equipment</th>
<th>Water</th>
<th>Wet Chemical</th>
<th>Foam</th>
<th>Dry Chemical Powder</th>
<th>Carbon Dioxide (CO2)</th>
<th>Vapourising Liquid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>F</th>
<th>Fire involving Cooking Oils and Fats</th>
<th>Water</th>
<th>Wet Chemical</th>
<th>Foam</th>
<th>Dry Chemical Powder</th>
<th>Carbon Dioxide (CO2)</th>
<th>Vapourising Liquid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td></td>
<td>AB(E)</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO Limited Effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size</th>
<th>9 Litres</th>
<th>9 Litres</th>
<th>9 Litres</th>
<th>9 Kgs</th>
<th>5 kgs</th>
<th>5 kgs</th>
<th>3.5 kgs</th>
<th>3 kgs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>60 Seconds</td>
<td>45 Sec</td>
<td>45 Secs</td>
<td>20 – 25 sec</td>
<td>20 sec</td>
<td>10 sec</td>
<td>9.5 sec</td>
<td>9 sec</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
37. Emergency Evacuation Documentation

- Fire Event Log - Review
Emergency Evacuation Procedure

1. PURPOSE
This procedure describes the process to prepare for and safely evacuate during an emergency such as a fire, bomb threat, chemical spill, threat of personal injury, etc. including drills that may be conducted in preparation for this.

2. SCOPE
This procedure applies to CTC operations that occur at its Salisbury precinct. Emergency Evacuation procedures for external sites are detailed in Site Safety Management Plans (FOR-FRO-272).

3. APPLIES TO
This procedure applies to all:
- Management
- Employees
- Project participants
- Sub-Contractors
- Visitors to the centre
- CTC tenants and their customers/students

4. DEFINITIONS
- ECO – is the Emergency Control Organisation which is the overarching body that effects changes to the fire strategy and is represented by Deputy Chief Fire Warden and all area and floor wardens
- EPC – is the Emergency Planning Committee which designs overall fire strategy and is represented by the Chief Fire Warden (currently the Chief Executive Office), the Deputy Chief Fire Warden (currently Precinct Maintenance Manager) and two – three tenants
- QFRS – is the Queensland Fire & Rescue Service.
5. MAIN RESPONSIBILITIES

- The Precinct Maintenance Manager (PMM) is the owner and is responsible for the review and update of this procedure. He is also responsible for the implementation of this procedure ensuring management, employees, tenants, participants and sub-contractors adhere to the guidelines of this procedure without exception.
- CEO is responsible to ensure the document complies with legal requirements.
- Management Representative is responsible for approving this document for adequacy prior to issue.
- Quality & Compliance Officer is responsible for ensuring this document complies with other requirements (ISO standards, Procedures and policies defined within the IMS)
- Employees, tenants, participants & Sub-Contractors are responsible for following the guidelines outlined in this procedure.

6. LEGAL & OTHER REQUIREMENTS

- Building Fire Safety Act & Regulation 2008
- Fire and Rescue Service Act 1990
- ISO14001 (4.4.7 Emergency preparedness and response)
- AS/NZS4801 (4.4.7 Emergency preparedness and response)
- Building Act 1975
- AS 3745-2010 Panning for Emergencies in facilities
- Building Codes of Australia
- Queensland Development Code MP 6.1 (Lift Maintenance)
# General Policies

**Fire and Other Emergency Hierarchy**

CTC precinct is a multi-occupier site, so it is necessary to have a well-defined Fire Hierarchy. Fundamentally the precinct is under the control of the Chief Fire Warden when any emergency or drill is called including a fire or fire-related emergency (including drill) or underway. The authority of the Chief Fire Warden is only subordinated to the QFRS or other emergency related agency. The strategic body for designing the overall strategy and making strategic changes is the Emergency Planning Committee (EPC) and the over-arching body to effect these changes is the Emergency Control Organisation (ECO).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Roles and membership of Emergency Planning Committee (EPC)</th>
<th>ROLE RESPONSIBLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Membership is Chair – Chief Fire Warden (CEO); Deputy Chair – Deputy Chief Fire Warden (PMM); 2-5 tenants as required.</td>
<td>CEO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meets annually in August, oversees precinct-wide response to emergency planning, coordinates dove-tailing of Fire &amp; Evacuation Plans, establishes strategy for fire and other emergencies, identifies issues of over and under-laps to be dealt with by the ECO. It also determines the communication of emergency response plans and how consultation is achieved prior to the finalisation and implementation of plans.</td>
<td>CEO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Roles and membership of Emergency Control Organisation (ECO)</th>
<th>ROLE RESPONSIBLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Membership is Chair – Deputy Chief Fire Warden (PMM); all area and floor wardens</td>
<td>PMM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meets bi-annually in February and August and as required; organises evacuation drills, makes amendments to Fire &amp; Emergency Plans, addresses issues raised by the Emergency Planning Committee, addresses other matters as required.</td>
<td>PMM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fire Safety Advisers</th>
<th>ROLE RESPONSIBLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The CEO will ensure CTC has properly qualified Fire Safety Advisers on staff. Currently both the CEO (who is the Chief Fire Warden) and the Precinct Maintenance Manager (who is the Deputy Chief Fire Warden) are qualified Fire Safety Advisers. When one or both of these personnel are no longer available to fulfil these roles, replacements are trained as soon as practicable.</td>
<td>CEO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evacuation Drill</th>
<th>ROLE RESPONSIBLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evacuation drills will be held at least annually and will be programmed in the Planned Maintenance Schedule (FOR-ASM-</td>
<td>PMM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policies</th>
<th>Role Responsible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>282 A record of the Drill is maintained on FOR-ASM-160 Evacuation Drill Checklist and actions arising therefrom are included on an Action Request.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actual Fire/Emergency Event or Alarm Activation (Non Drill)</strong> A record is kept of all fire events and alarm activations that are not drills. This comprises two forms: FOR-ASM-119 Fire Event Log – Real Time. This is filled in by the Warden who remains at the fire panel and oversees the tasking of CTC’s resources and the liaison with the QFRS and other agencies. FOR-ASM-118 Fire Event Log – Review. This is an evaluation form that looks at lessons learnt and enables an Action Request (FOR-COM-219) to be generated to effect changes as necessary. These records are retained for future reference. In the event of the alarm sounding the qualified wardens or warden available at the time will take the number 1 allocated position and takes the equipment, PPE and instructions allocated to position 1 in the Crisis Cupboard and proceed to the fire panel. At the panel 000 will be called confirming to the QFRS that an alarm has activated. In the case of neither the Chief Fire Warden nor Deputy Chief Warden being available the senior remaining personnel within the CTC Precinct Management Office will assume the roles on a stand-in basis. The allocation of roles is based on the duties associated with the allocated numbering system within the crisis cabinet. That is, number 1 assumes Chief Fire Warden, Number 2 assumes Deputy Chief Fire Warden and so on. It is acknowledged that the availability of staff at the time may determine just how many pre-specified roles that are allocated within the Crisis Cupboard can be allocated. All staff are trained in assuming each role as necessary. Recognising that infrequent performance in the role will result in knowledge decay, a summary sheet of the duties specific to each specific role is included in each pigeon hole in the Crisis Cupboard.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Fire Emergencies:</strong> It is recognised that there will be other emergencies involving the precinct from time to time that are not fire related. The most likely will be bomb threat and threat of personal injury. Both are dealt with through the mechanism and structure of the Fire and Evacuation response personnel.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bomb Threat:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLICIES</td>
<td>ROLE RESPONSIBLE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muster as usual and secondary muster as required. The default secondary must point is the playing fields at Brothers St Brendan's Rugby League Club. An alternative muster point is assigned by the Chief Warden in conjunction with the relevant authorities.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hazardous Chemical Spill:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muster as usual and secondary muster as required. The default secondary must point is the playing fields at Brothers St Brendan's Rugby League Club. An alternative muster point is assigned by the Chief Warden in conjunction with the relevant authorities.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat of Personal Injury:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follow advice of Queensland Police Service. Default action prior to their advice is to lock staff, students and visitors within existing tenanted areas.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compliance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTC complies with its obligations under the various pertinent legislation and regulation operating from time to time. This includes:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Maintenance testing of all required plant and fire detection and fire fighting equipment as determined in the Australian Standard</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Advising the QFRS of any changes to Fire Safety Adviser personnel and their new contact details</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Maintenance of annual evacuation practice records</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Despatch annually to the Commissioner of the Occupier's Statement. This is programmed in the Planned Maintenance Schedule (FOR-ASM-282)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Retention of Fire and Evacuation Instruction Records (Staff Checklist FOR-COM-108)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Back-up copies of all documents are held in another place.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. FLOWCHART

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Activities Description</th>
<th>Role Responsible</th>
<th>Control of Risk</th>
<th>Documents/Records Related</th>
<th>Legal and other requirements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Start</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Audible alarm sounds and evacuation commences</td>
<td>Chief Warden</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>CTC Wardens proceed to Fire Control Centre in CTC luncheon and collect respective</td>
<td>Deputy Chief</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>equipment from relevant pigeon-hole. Tenant wardens collect equipment from relevant</td>
<td>Warden</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>area.</td>
<td>QFES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Is this a real emergency or a drill?</td>
<td></td>
<td>PPE</td>
<td>Building Fire &amp; Safety Act &amp; Regulation 2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes, go to Activity 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ISO14001 (4.4.7 Emergency preparedness and response)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No, go to Activity 6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>AS/NZS4801 (4.4.7 Emergency preparedness and response)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Chief Warden phones 000 to confirm that QFRS are aware of alarm activation.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Chief Warden collects White Hard Hat, Hi Viz vest, Walkie-Talkie, First Aid Box</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and relevant documentation contained on Clipboard and proceeds with Deputy Chief</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chief Warden to the Fire Panel located near the entrance to Level 1, Ian Barlow</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Building.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Ian Barlow Building</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Emergency Preparedness & Disaster Management Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Activities Description</th>
<th>Role Responsible</th>
<th>Control of Risk</th>
<th>Documents/Records Related</th>
<th>Legal and other requirements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Deputy Warden collects White Hard Hat, Hi Vis vest, Walkie-Talkie and megaphone and accompanies Chief Warden to Fire Panel</td>
<td>Chief Warden, Deputy Warden, area Warden, GFRS, CTC staff, tenants etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Chief Warden and Deputy Warden identify location of fire by reading the panel and await the arrival of the Fire Service. At this point it is important to determine whether the issue is one of a fire or some other emergency. It may be a bomb threat or personal injury threat. In the case of these a different response is required. A procedure for dealing with these is described in the Emergency Instruction Booklet which is kept by each phone. (FOR-ASM-247)</td>
<td>Chief Warden, Deputy Warden, area Warden, GFRS, CTC staff, tenants etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>If a real emergency, Chief Warden may make the following announcement over the public address system: “This is not a drill, evacuate immediately.” The decision to do so is based on his/her assessment of the fire risk. Further instruction may be passed on at this time based on a risk/threat assessment. For example in the case of Bomb threat the need for secondary mustering or personal injury the need for lockdown.</td>
<td>Chief Warden, Deputy Warden, area Warden, GFRS, CTC staff, tenants etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Activities Description</td>
<td>Role Responsible</td>
<td>Control of Risk</td>
<td>Documents/Records Related</td>
<td>Legal and other requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Chief Warden advises Area Wardens location of fire and Area Wardens proceed to determine the location and severity of the fire, to oversee the evacuation, i.e. clear rooms, workshops etc.</td>
<td>Chief Warden</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Deputy Chief Wardens</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Area Wardens</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>QFRS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CTC staff, tenants etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Can the fire be safely contained using portable extinguisher?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes, go to 12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No, go to 13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Area warden gets assistance to contain or extinguish the fire using a suitable method depending on the type of fire involved. This may or may not involve the use of a portable extinguisher.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Staff/tenants/students/visitors assist in the evacuation to the closest assembly points that has been underway since the sounding of the alarm.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Area wardens from the affected area tenants commence a headcount against staff/student/sign-in lists (appropriate to their organisation) and checks everyone has been accounted for at assembly points. In the case of non-fire emergencies Area Wardens may assist with secondary muster or lockdowns. Everyone accounted for? Yes – go to Activity 19. No – go to Activity 16.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Contractor Sign-on sheets</td>
<td>Contractor Sign-on sheets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Attendance Registers</td>
<td>Attendance Registers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Emergency Preparedness & Disaster Management Plan

<table>
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<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>QFRS personnel arrive, check the panel and fire location. Deputy Fire Warden escorts them to the location of the fire. Chief Warden remains at the Fire Panel.</td>
<td>Chief Warden</td>
<td>- Fire panel &lt;br&gt; - QFRS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Area warden advises Deputy Chief Warden that someone is unaccounted for and Deputy Chief Warden advises QFRS Chief who takes over control, checks there is no-one in the relevant building, and extinguishes the fire. The Area Warden where possible would advise the Chief Warden as Communications Officer of any unaccounted persons.</td>
<td>Deputy Chief Warden</td>
<td>- QFRS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Other Area Wardens assist by checking other Assembly Points for location of missing person/s. This information is reported where possible to the Communications Officer (Chief Warden) at the Fire Panel if it is not practicable to advise the QFRS.</td>
<td>Area Warden</td>
<td>- Attendance Registers, etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>Once the QFRS Chief gives the “All Clear”, Deputy Fire Warden radios the Chief Fire Warden to give the “All Clear” over the public address system. Deputy Warden also uses Megaphone to give all clear to more remote locations.</td>
<td>QFRS</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>Chief Warden completes Fire Event Log – Real Time</td>
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<td>Fire Service personnel isolate area where alarm was activated.</td>
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<td>FDR-ASM-222 Precinct Emergency Contacts</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>Deputy Chief Warden contacts FirePro to check area and clear Fire Panel. In his absence the senior CTC manager contacts Fire Pro (number available on the Precinct Emergency Contacts (FDR-ASM-222)</td>
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<td>FDR-ASM-118 Fire Event Log - Review</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>Chief Fire Warden completes Fire Event Log Review</td>
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<td>FDR-ASM-160 Evacuation Drill Checklist</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>If an Evacuation Drill – Chief Fire Warden completes Evacuation Drill Checklist; Action Requests are completed as necessary for follow-up actions that were determined from either the conduct of the Drill or the actual fire event/alarm activation.</td>
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- Fire Event Log – Real Time

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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• Evacuation Diagrams
EVACUATION DIAGRAM
THE CONSTRUCTION TRAINING CENTRE - SALISBURY
38. How to isolate and de-isolate alarms – FIP

Unlock door to fire panel.

Make sure red light for the fire Alarm is on.

The box on the top right of the screen has isolated areas highlighted.

This one reads:

\[
\begin{align*}
A &= 0 \quad (\text{Alarm}) \\
F &= 1 \quad (\text{Fault}) \\
I &= 22 \quad (\text{Isolate}) \\
N &= 0 \\
\end{align*}
\]

Phone ADT on 1300 360 575 (the number is on the back of the glass door)
Quote FCA # 50752
Ask for ½ hour to de-isolate panel.

Wait until red panel shows "Isolate Mode"
INSTRUCTIONS TO ISOLATE FIRE PANEL AND DEISOLATE FIRE ALARMS

1. Turn Evacuation Control knobs to OFF on both panels.

2. Press “Service Menu” on right of screen.

3. Press Number 2 – “Zone” on screen.
Press “Select” to display all isolated points.

Press “Deisolate” on each point, except for Fault point.

If you mistakenly press deisolate on the fault point do the following 3 points:

Select Menu 1 – List Point Information.
INSTRUCTIONS TO ISOLATE FIRE PANEL
AND DEISOLATE FIRE ALARMS

Select Menu 2 – Display Faults

At this point you will also see a Warning. Do not remove this, it is not a fault, it is telling you that the Fire Panel itself is in fault. Press isolate and then press acknowledge.

The Fault light will flash until the evacuation control knobs are turned back to auto. It will then stay on.
INSTRUCTIONS TO ISOLATE FIRE PANEL AND DEISOLATE FIRE ALARMS

Turn Evacuation Control Knobs Back to Auto and phone

Phone ADT again and have panel reactivated.

Wait until red panel reactivates and "Isolate Mode" light goes out.

Lock the Fire Panel
39. Emergency Response Exercises and Training in Responses

CTC has a program of precinct-specific emergency response exercises that are conducted with relevant personnel (this may or may not involve tenants as required). At times the exercises will involve the ECO and at times the ERT may be deployed. Exercises vary in type. The categories are as follows:

1) Orientation Exercise - Involves bringing together the people who are involved in the emergency plan, or part of the emergency plan and orientate them to it. It can be useful in inducting new members to the Team as step one of a more comprehensive approach. No previous experience of the plan, a new plan or new staff, are generally the conditions under which CTC conducts an orientation exercise.

2) Drills – These test a single emergency response function and involve an actual field response. Drills are generally practiced or tested under realistic conditions. Running through the process by which the CTC staff leave the office and make their way to the FIP, or their other roles, for example, may be considered a drill.

3) Table-top Exercise – This is a means to undertake some problem solving and team building and familiarises team members with what they might need to do as an emergency scenario unfolds. It is very useful in developing what ifs and responses to these in a way an exercise which tends to be more linear cannot.

4) Functional drill – this is used to assess the allocation of resources and manpower. It also evaluates the communication between different groups and assesses the adequacy of current procedures and policies. The exercise is a simulation and while it covers the complete extent of the deployment of resources at the simulated level it does not go beyond the exercise room.

5) Full Scale exercise – evaluates the operational capability of the system in an interactive manner, allows for coordination of information, communication capabilities to be explored, inter-tenant and tenant landlord cooperation to be explored and for negotiation skills to be deployed. Full scale exercises will have a number of observers. CTC may at its discretion invite the relevant government agency to attend (e.g. QFRS to a fire evacuation exercise). Observations will be recorded and actions will be implemented based on learning points that are discussed at the review session. Where necessary
actions are attributed to the tenants and this information is shared through the ECO network as well.

CTC will deem whether its exercises are prefixed by an announcement that it is an exercise only as part of the planning of a particular exercise.

An exercise schedule is determined and is recorded in the Planned Maintenance Register to ensure that there is a regular pattern of exercises and that the legal requirements are met i.e. a Fire Evacuation Exercise at least annually. CTC at its discretion may count a false alarm as an exercise. In such cases observations shall be made by wardens and fed-back and a review session conducted as though it was a real exercise and not a false alarm.

The exercises and training schedule is as follows

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Exercise Category</th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Who</th>
<th>How</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fire Evacuation Exercise</td>
<td>1,2,3,4,5</td>
<td></td>
<td>Annually</td>
<td>TK</td>
<td>Planned or false alarm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPR/Defib</td>
<td>1,4</td>
<td>1,4</td>
<td>Annually</td>
<td>TK</td>
<td>CPR refresher &amp; drill with manikin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fall Rescue</td>
<td>2,4</td>
<td></td>
<td>6 monthly</td>
<td>TK</td>
<td>Ground and roof</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire Extinguisher</td>
<td>1,2</td>
<td></td>
<td>6 monthly</td>
<td>TK</td>
<td>1 by external RTO &amp; 1 by FSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spills</td>
<td>1,4</td>
<td></td>
<td>Annually</td>
<td>TK</td>
<td>Use of spill kit practical demo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety Data Sheets</td>
<td>1,4</td>
<td></td>
<td>Annually</td>
<td>TK</td>
<td>Table-top run through with testing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Plan</td>
<td>1,3</td>
<td></td>
<td>Annually</td>
<td>TK</td>
<td>Table-top</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warden role</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Annually</td>
<td>TK</td>
<td>By external RTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilisation of Emergency</td>
<td>1,3</td>
<td></td>
<td>Annually</td>
<td>TK</td>
<td>Drilled and observed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Room</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bomb threat</td>
<td>3,4,5</td>
<td>1,2</td>
<td>6 monthly</td>
<td>TK</td>
<td>Wide range of exercises. Important is ECO ability to search for suspect package.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Objectives of Exercises

Drills are conducted within the normal operating hours of the Precinct to test the response of staff, visitors, contractors, the ECO, the ERT (where appropriate) and the emergency response procedures. By observation it is to identify and correct any deficiencies in communication systems, training, emergency response procedures and/or their implementation. The outcomes for the Fire drill includes (as appropriate):

- ECO initiates the emergency response without waiting for instructions;
- ECO responds to alarms;
- ECO searches the their allocated area without delay;
- ECO reports the location of any occupants and visitors with a disability;
- Simulated calls to the emergency service 000
- Effective ECO communication;
- Roll calls are taken and information communicated quickly when not all personnel can be accounted for;
- The designated location for controlling the emergency (the FIP) is staffed immediately by the Chief Warden;
- The Chief Fire Warden has all necessary information and First Aid kit and torch;
- CTC staff take-up roles as allocated within the Crisis Cupboard;
- The evacuation sequence is carried out in accordance with the procedures;
- A CTC staff member accompanies the Fire Service;
- Wardens are allocated to the designated seat of the fire and report back;
- Where available a warden (the deputy) goes to the Gate to direct the Fire Service and other traffic as necessary;
- Information is reported back to the Chief Warden as soon as possible;
- Information (handover) is passed from the Chief Warden to the Fire Service including:
- Location of fire;
- Whether all have been accounted for;
- The safe to return notification is announced appropriately via Loud Hailer.

When conducting the drill observers take notes for reporting back.

Drills for Non-Fire Events are designed along the same lines as a fire drill but the assessment criteria may be different. This is drawn up at the time of planning the exercise and this information is shared with the observers.
• **ECO Briefing**
  When planning any emergency exercise consideration is given to how the ECOs are briefed. The briefing may address but not be limited to the following:
  • The location of the planned scenario;
  • The identity of the wardens or ERT;
  • The type of alarms and alarm systems;
  • Actions required by the ECO on alarm sounding;
  • Method of reporting the emergency;
  • Evacuation routes;
  • Location of assembly areas, secondary muster points or designated safe refuge (internally or externally);
  • Any approved exemptions from participating;
  • Notification of any hazards which need to be taken into account;
  • How the drill will be completed and how this is notified;
  • What is required when the drill is complete.

• **Debriefing**
  The debriefing will be conducted by the Chief Warden and Deputy Chief Warden as soon as possible after the drill. The planning of the drill should take into account the time necessary to debrief immediately thereafter. The observer's checklists will be analysed during debriefing and any deficiencies from the overall exercise will be reported to the EPC. Once the EPC have taken a view as to whether changes to procedures are required these are then disseminated through to the ECO.

• **Real Emergencies during Exercises**
  There is always the potential for a real emergency to arise during the conduct of a drill. This situation calls for an immediate cessation of the exercise/drill and ECO members should stand by for further instructions. This is communicated by the following means:
  Radio communication to those wardens with two-way radio repeating three times:
  ‘CODE PINK, CODE PINK, CODE PINK Standby for further instructions’. 
Training across all aspects of Fire and Emergencies is provided. CTC and Tenants provide training to their own staff in:

- First Response and General Evacuation including use of fire fighting equipment (hose reels, fire extinguishers and fire blankets).

CTC, annually provides Fire Warden training to the ECO recognising that this list changes as personnel change within both CTC and the tenants.

40. Bomb Threat

- General

This information is in line with advice provided by the Australian Bomb Data Centre (ABDC). Refer to Appendix D of this document – Defusing a Bomb Threat a detailed information booklet prepared by the Australian Federal Police that provides advice on how to deal with bomb threats including suspicious mail.

- Bomb Threat Evacuation Guide

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THREAT</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>EXPLOSIVE QTY</th>
<th>MIN (m)</th>
<th>MAX (m)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pipe Bomb Small</td>
<td>100g</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>575</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pipe Bomb Medium</td>
<td>500g</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>860</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pipe Bomb Large</td>
<td>2.5kg</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>1,135</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Briefcase/Suitcase</td>
<td>23kg</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>1,520</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compact Sedan</td>
<td>230kg</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>1,915</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sedan</td>
<td>450kg</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>2,030</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passenger/Cargo Van</td>
<td>1,800kg</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>2,410</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
41. Secondary Muster in the Event of Bomb Threat

Evacuation to a safe muster point is important in the event of a bomb. Where there is credible evidence of the size of a bomb based on visual confirmation or alert from the person making the bomb threat then the secondary muster point can be chosen on the basis of the likely blast zone. The default secondary muster point is Brothers St Brendan’s (see photo overleaf). Important points to note are to consider that secondary explosive devices may be placed at the logical secondary muster point to maximise casualties. Consideration should be given to suspicious vehicles/packages at the secondary muster point. The initial mustering as per the Fire and Evacuation plans may also constitute an issue if they are close to buildings and particularly if they are close to buildings with significant levels of glass e.g. Ian Barclay Building. Further consideration needs to be given to transferring to a secondary muster point when the route of transfer would take the evacuees past the suspected bomb or building in which the bomb is believed to have been placed.

- In the Event of a Bomb Going Off or an Explosion

In cases of bombings it is not uncommon for the initial blast to be smaller to attract further bystanders to the area to effect a much larger second explosion to increase the number of casualties. NEVER assume that after an initial blast the way is then clear to re-approach the area. However it may be necessary to apply immediate first aid and remove casualties to a safe area.
• First Aid

Only do so if you feel SAFE to do so. Do NOT attend to casualties in location. They will need to be taken to an area safe from the bomb zone. In terms of First Aid bombs mainly cause what is known as Blast Injuries. In terms of those within the radius of the blast zone it is possible that the casualty can be as high as 70%. Note that there is always the possibility of an explosion occurring that is a result of vessel failure or exploding fuel tank that is not associated with terrorism. There are three phases involved in an explosion and different injuries are incurred in each phase:

1) Primary;
2) Secondary; and
3) Tertiary.

• Primary Injuries

These are caused by the pressure wave of the blast. They usually occur in the gas-containing organs of the body such as the lungs and the gastrointestinal tract. The primary injuries are therefore pulmonary bleeding, pneumothorax (collapsed lung), air emboli, or perforation of the gastrointestinal organs. Burns may also occur from the heat wave associated with the explosion. The vessels in the lungs in particular are vulnerable to tearing and there may also be central nervous system damage. This type of injury is most likely of the three types to cause death and serious injury.

• Secondary Injuries

These occur when the victim is struck by flying glass and other debris. These are likely to cause lacerations, fractures and burns.

• Tertiary Injuries

These occur when the victim becomes a missile and is thrown against an object. Injury then occurs at the point of impact. The injuries arising from this are fairly apparent and appear similar to the trauma seen in car accidents or falls from heights. In applying first aid consideration MUST be given to treating the Primary Injury which is likely to be less obvious than the secondary or tertiary. The primary injury will kill the victim quicker than the secondary or tertiary. The importance of a secondary survey before rushing
headlong into an aggressive treatment of abrasions and fractures is vital. In these situations the basic ABCDE is as applicable as it is for other first aid situations. Also be aware of the effects of shock that may set in soon after the explosion.

It may be dangerous to move to the default secondary muster point (Brothers St Brendan’s). In this case there is a fall back secondary muster point which is Assembly Street Park which allows access to Assembly Street and then onto Evans Road. This is not ideal given access to it requires walking through uneven terrain at the rear of the Precinct. The issue of PEEPS needs to be taken into account for this option.
Preferred Secondary Muster Point - Photo

Move further west as required.

Bros St Brendan’s Rugby League Club
Alternative Secondary Muster Point
• On Receipt of a Bomb Threat - Questions to Ask
  – Where did you put it?
  – When is the bomb going to explode?
  – What does it look like?
  – Exact wording of threat

• General questions to ask
  – How will the bomb explode?
  or
  – How will the substance be released?
  – Did you put it there?
  – Why did you put it there?
  – Bomb threat questions
  – What type of bomb is it?
  – What is in the bomb?
  – What will make the bomb explode?

• Chemical/biological threat questions
  – What kind of substance is in it?
  – How much of the substance is there?
  – How will the substance be released?
  – Is the substance a liquid, powder or gas?

For immediate or emergency advice please contact your local police service.

• Australian Bomb Data Centre

  Other questions to ask
  – What is your name?
  – Where are you?
  – What is your address?

• Notes for after the call
  – Caller's voice
    o Accent (specify):
Emergency Preparedness & Disaster Management Plan

- Any impediment (specify):
  - Voice (loud, soft, etc):
  - Speech (fast, slow, etc):
  - Dictation (clear, muffled):
  - Manner (calm, emotional, etc):
  - Did you recognise the caller?
  - If so, who do you think it was?
  - Was the caller familiar with the area?

  - Threat language
    - Well spoken:
    - Incoherent:
    - Irrational:
    - Taped:
    - Message read by caller:
    - Abusive:
    - Other:

  - Background noises
    - Street noises:
    - House noises
    - Aircraft:
    - Voices:
    - Music:
    - Machinery:
    - Local call noise:
    - STD:

- Other
  - Sex of the caller: Estimated age

- Call taken
  - Duration of call: Number called:

- Action (Obtain details from supervisor)
  - Report call immediately to:
  - Phone number:
  - Who received the call
42. Specific Emergency Events

This section deals with responses to a range of emergencies identified through the use of the Emergency Identification and Analysis Tool.
## Emergency Identification and Analysis Tool

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Specific Emergency Event Source</th>
<th>Consequences</th>
<th>Vulnerability of Personnel</th>
<th>Vulnerability of Property</th>
<th>Outside CTC</th>
<th>Within CTC</th>
<th>Yes/No</th>
<th>Include in EP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Earthquake</td>
<td>Outside CTC</td>
<td>Catastrophic</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Low Level</td>
<td>I ndex Level</td>
<td>Yes Level</td>
<td>Low Level</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flood</td>
<td>Outside CTC</td>
<td>Catastrophic</td>
<td>Minor</td>
<td>Low Level</td>
<td>I ndex Level</td>
<td>Yes Level</td>
<td>Low Level</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flood</td>
<td>Outside CTC</td>
<td>Catastrophic</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Low Level</td>
<td>I ndex Level</td>
<td>Yes Level</td>
<td>Low Level</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Flood</td>
<td>Outside CTC</td>
<td>Catastrophic</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Low Level</td>
<td>I ndex Level</td>
<td>Yes Level</td>
<td>Low Level</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Flood</td>
<td>Outside CTC</td>
<td>Catastrophic</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low Level</td>
<td>I ndex Level</td>
<td>Yes Level</td>
<td>Low Level</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flood</td>
<td>Outside CTC</td>
<td>Catastrophic</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Low Level</td>
<td>I ndex Level</td>
<td>Yes Level</td>
<td>Low Level</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
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<td>Outside CTC</td>
<td>Catastrophic</td>
<td>Severe</td>
<td>Low Level</td>
<td>I ndex Level</td>
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<td>Low Level</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
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<td>Outside CTC</td>
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<td>Critical</td>
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<td>I ndex Level</td>
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<td>Flood</td>
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<td>Low Level</td>
<td>I ndex Level</td>
<td>Yes Level</td>
<td>Low Level</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Essential</td>
<td>Low Level</td>
<td>I ndex Level</td>
<td>Yes Level</td>
<td>Low Level</td>
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### Threat/Emergency Risk Management Plan

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</table>
| Bomb             | Good housekeeping. ERT familiarity through training, rapid ERT response and DMT set-up. High ratio of staff trained as first aiders. Staff trained in the issues associated with injuries sustained in an explosion/blast | Evacuate to safe secondary muster point (Brothers St Brendans). Complete communications/events log in real time. Consider issues of mustering by carparks (secondary explosions). Consider also explosive devices at secondary muster points. First aid response based on primary injuries. Finding a bomb/suspect parcel.  
  - Do not open  
  - Do not immerse in water  
  - Do not put in confined space e.g. filing cabinet  
  - Do not carry through congested area  
  - Carry to isolation area. This is the TRAW. Evacuation from building 1 & 2 required. | Secure area for forensic services, instigate Business Continuity Plan, close precinct as required. Write up incident report including full record of observations. Consideration for counselling. Engage Access (CTC's Employee Assistance Scheme) Review adequacy of procedures and revise as necessary. Provide staff training and incorporate in exercises. |

**Risk Assessment:** High
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bomb Threat CODE PURPLE</td>
<td>Good housekeeping. Well prepared procedures for dealing with threats. Use the ABDC guidance.</td>
<td>Assess the threat. Call Police 000. Consider the threat source:</td>
<td>Write-up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Telephone. Use the Code Purple approach in the Emergency Instructions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Written threat can be in writing, email, text etc. When in writing do not photocopy and do not over-handle paper. Save emails and print out.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Establish the rapid deployment of the Emergency Control Room.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Activate the ECO network for searching for the bomb.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Use Hot-Up principle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>H – is the item Hidden?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>O – obviously a bomb?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>T – typical of its environment?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>U – has there been unauthorised access?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>P – has there been Perimeter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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Risk Assessment: Moderate
### Threat/Emergency

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Personal Threat CODE BLACK</th>
</tr>
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### Mitigation

- Staff able to de-escalate potentially volatile situations. Lone worker protocols.

### Actions During Emergency

- Police called immediately.
- CTC put into lockdown mode communicated through ECO network.
- Rapid mobilisation of ECR.
- Threat assessment undertaken.
- CTC's Security company called (Waterloo)

### Actions After Emergency

- Deploy Access EAS as required.
- Write up incident report as it may be needed for Police investigation.

---

**Risk Assessment:**

Moderate

---

**breach?**

Establish a search plan
Establish a safe evacuation plan.
Consideration to be given as to alternative primary muster points. If approximate size of bomb is known use guide to provide safe minimum distance for evacuation.
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<tr>
<td>Chemical Incident</td>
<td>Good housekeeping and safe handling practice. Allocation of spill kits through the Precinct. Staff trained in use of spill kits</td>
<td>Immediate deployment of spill kit especially bunding to ensure that chemical does not get into drains/waterways. Soak-up with spill kit contents. Call Veolia for advice if required. Call for help early if spill looks like it will overwhelm CTC resources and/or spill kit contents.</td>
<td>Advise Dept as soon as practicable. Write incident report for review.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Risk Assessment: Acute
### Emergency Preparedness & Disaster Management Plan

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<tr>
<td>Chemical Incident (Deliberate)</td>
<td>Spill kits through Precinct.</td>
<td>Call Police. Evacuate. Consideration to be given to how long the ECR should remain in situ. Close Precinct. More likely that any chemical incident will be toxic industrial chemical (TIC) rather than chemical warfare agent (CWA). Where the issue is based on a threat then ECO to follow same approach as bomb threat.</td>
<td>Shut Precinct as required to allow forensic investigation and for any contamination clean-up. Call in experts to ensure Precinct is safe to re-occupy. Engage Access EAP as required. Write-up Incident Report.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Risk Assessment:

**High**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil Unrest</th>
<th>Rapid mobilisation of ECR and</th>
<th>Call Police.</th>
<th>Engage Access EAP as</th>
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## Emergency Preparedness & Disaster Management Plan

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<tr>
<td>Pandemic</td>
<td>Well planned procedure and system for mass text advice. Use SMS Australia 1300 667 405. Gather text of staff and precinct staff when Pandemic is escalating. Activation of the DMT. Staff provided with inoculation (where available) paid by CTC.</td>
<td>DMT to meet to decide what action to take. Take advice and lead from Queensland Health and Chief Medical Officer. CEO to close Precinct as required. Deploy precinct closure notices and lock Precinct</td>
<td>Implement Business Continuity Plan. Re-assign roles based on survival of personnel. Immediate concern is data recovery/integrity and HR planning. Provide Access EAP as required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arson</td>
<td>Adequate and well maintained</td>
<td>Treat as Fire and Evacuation.</td>
<td>Detailed notes taken and</td>
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## Emergency Preparedness & Disaster Management Plan

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<tr>
<td>Risk Assessment: High</td>
<td>Treat as Personal threat if escalation. Police called if person does not leave.</td>
<td>Incident Report written as will be required for Police.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Trespass</td>
<td>Good housekeeping, maintenance of key equipment. Maintained register of notifiable plant. Rapid deployment of ECR, First Aid training for staff. Consideration for treating primary injuries.</td>
<td>ECO network activated. Treat as Evacuation. Consideration to be given to secondary explosions.</td>
<td>Incident Report written. Mandatory reporting to WHS. Ensure site is preserved for investigation. Instigate Access EAP as required.</td>
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<td>Risk Assessment: Low</td>
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<tr>
<td>Explosion</td>
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<td>Risk Assessment: High</td>
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<tr>
<td>Suspect parcel</td>
<td>Good housekeeping. Exercise</td>
<td>Follow protocol on back of door</td>
<td>Write incident report. Instigate</td>
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<td>Well-rehearsed. Well-known</td>
<td>leading to lunch room. Sound Evacuation call.</td>
<td>Access EAP as required.</td>
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<tr>
<td>location of isolation area.</td>
<td>Consideration to be given to decontamination of staff member/s (in Disabled</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>If threats made previously mail</td>
<td>Toilet Ground Floor of IBB which has shower).</td>
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<tr>
<td>opening will be in agreed</td>
<td>Action depends on whether contents suspected as explosive or</td>
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<tr>
<td>screening area. (default is</td>
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<td>TRAW unless otherwise determined).</td>
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**Risk Assessment:**

- **Moderate**

| Suspect Mail                     | As per Suspect parcel                                                      | Treat as Suspect parcel                                                                  | As per Suspect parcel                  |

**Risk Assessment:**

- **Moderate**

| Person trapped in Confined       | Good housekeeping,                                                         | Immediately contact Fire                                                                  | Write up incident report.              |

**Risk Assessment:**

- **Moderate**
### Emergency Preparedness & Disaster Management Plan

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<td>Space</td>
<td>identification of confined space areas.</td>
<td>Service and Ambulance. Call/go to SateTSolutions (54246335) who provide training in this area. They have access to breathing apparatus. Attempt rescue only if competent and confident. Take First Aid box, Defib and Oxygen to area for rapid deployment as necessary. Hand over to Emergency services when they arrive.</td>
<td>Undertake root cause analysis and implement changes as necessary. Notification to WHS as required.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Heart Attack</td>
<td>Trained staff in CPR, Defib machine and staff comfortable in deploying.</td>
<td>Go to victim and apply CPR as required.</td>
<td>Write up Incident Report and Complete First Aid Treatment Form. Instigate Access EAP as required.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Motor Vehicle Accident</td>
<td>Road rules for Precinct, clearly visible signs with appropriate</td>
<td>Treat as per First Aid protocols.</td>
<td>Write up Incident Report. Note that scene may have to be</td>
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**Uncontrolled when printed**
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<tr>
<td>Stroke</td>
<td>Trained First Aid staff. Ability to identify symptoms</td>
<td>Treat as per First Aid protocols. Call Ambulance and stress the Stroke and FAST acronym. <strong>F</strong>- Face <strong>A</strong>- Arm <strong>S</strong>- Speech <strong>T</strong> - Treatment</td>
<td>Complete First Aid Treatment Form</td>
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**Risk Assessment:** High
## Threat/Emergency

### Theft

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<tr>
<td>Security and monitoring company employed, good housekeeping, secure by</td>
<td>Call Police. Where this occurs during the day provide</td>
<td>Burn CCTV footage for provision to Police. Incident Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>design thinking, common sense e.g. expensive items out of sight.</td>
<td>description to Police.</td>
<td>written. Consideration to be given to tightening security</td>
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**Risk Assessment:**

High

### Fire and Smoke

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<tr>
<td>Good housekeeping, responsive and well trained ECO, regularly maintained</td>
<td>As per Fire and Evacuation Plan</td>
<td>Incident Report and Business Continuity Plan. Contact insurer</td>
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<td>detection and fire-fighting capability.</td>
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<td>as required.</td>
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**Risk Assessment:**

Acute
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<td><strong>Hail</strong></td>
<td>Watchful eye on weather forecasting and use local radio and BOM where indicated.</td>
<td>Where possible valuable outdoor assets to be secured and preferably stored inside. Access vacant areas of tenants.</td>
<td>Assess and involve insurer. Photos to be taken as required.</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Cyclone</strong></td>
<td>Good housekeeping, particularly in the lead up to the stormy season. Structural engineering reports on any vulnerable buildings/structures. Board/Tape up windows as required Secure items that may become airborne</td>
<td>Activate the ECR as required. Consideration to be given to Precinct closure based on BOM information. Initiate lockout as required.</td>
<td>Re-open precinct as required. Comprehensive walk around Centre checking buildings and damage. Initiate Business Continuity plan. Engage Insurance company. Take photos as soon as safe to do so. Get feedback from tenants. Undertake structural assessments as required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Risk Assessment:</strong></td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Risk Assessment:
High
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat/Emergency</th>
<th>Mitigation</th>
<th>Actions During Emergency</th>
<th>Actions After Emergency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Earthquake</td>
<td>Good housekeeping. Earthquake awareness sessions to include what to do when an earthquake strikes (shelter beneath desks or door jams if desks not available).</td>
<td>Initiate the ECR and DMT. Evacuate staff as required. Need to be clear of buildings and glass in particular. Secondary muster to Brothers St Brendans if required. Initiate ECO network. Key will be roll calls so rescue crews know where to concentrate their efforts in the event of building collapse. In the event of the quake ceasing and no visible damage be aware of after shocks. Re-occupy when safe to do so. Be aware that items, especially those stored overhead may well have become dislodged. Listen to Brisbane 612 and access BOM if possible for consideration of Tsunamis and safe routes home for staff.</td>
<td>Re-open precinct when safe to do so. Structural assessments may be necessary. Initiate the Business Continuity Plan. Involve insurer as required.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Risk Assessment: High
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat/Emergency</th>
<th>Mitigation</th>
<th>Actions During Emergency</th>
<th>Actions After Emergency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Severe Weather/Storm Damage</td>
<td>See as for Cyclone</td>
<td>See as for Cyclone</td>
<td>See as for Cyclone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Risk Assessment:</strong> High</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flood</td>
<td>Good housekeeping, ensuring Creek kept clear of debris especially at the pinch points of the railway bridge and the culvert. Ensure bunds/levees are kept intact. BOM and Brisbane 612 for information.</td>
<td>Initiate ECR and DMT as required. Move important assets to higher ground. Ensure all vehicles driven to safe location. If in doubt park up by Nyanda State High School by Telecoms Training Area. Before removing server take photos of connections to allow re-connection to CTC’s infrastructure. Use CTC’s Shed by Building 8 as required. Consider closure of Precinct as required. Where no power the default is to close the Precinct. Consider the role CTC may play in immediate post flood recovery.</td>
<td>Initiate the Business Continuity Plan. Re-open Precinct as necessary. Precinct walkabout to assess damage. Photos taken as necessary and Insurance company involved. Re-connect IT as required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat/Emergency</td>
<td>Mitigation</td>
<td>Actions During Emergency</td>
<td>Actions After Emergency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
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<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsunami</td>
<td>Good housekeeping, access to higher ground.</td>
<td>Treat as per flood. The south of the precinct is ***** above sea level. The likelihood of a Tsunami affecting CTC are very limited given the geography off the coast of Brisbane. There may be a storm surge effect and this should be regarded as a flood event more so than a direct threat to human life. Initiate the ECR and DMT and undertake threat assessment. Listen to Brisbane 612 for up to date information. Evacuate staff from lower lying parts of the Precinct as required. (i.e. from Northern and the northern part of the Central Precinct).</td>
<td>As per flood.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Risk Assessment: Moderate
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat/Emergency</th>
<th>Mitigation</th>
<th>Actions During Emergency</th>
<th>Actions After Emergency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poisonous Animal</td>
<td>Use of PPE (chaps) and trained first aid staff.</td>
<td>Main risk is snake bite. Treat as per First Aid protocol.</td>
<td>Write up the First Aid Treatment Form.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• calm casualty and lie them down</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• NO SUCKING VENOM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• NO washing of the site</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Apply broad pressure to the area ASAP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Apply compression bandage.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Bandage up as far up the limb as possible</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Immobilise with splint if possible to immobilise the patient</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Ensure circulation once bandaged with capillary refill method.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Call for medical help/ambulance.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• If possible note the snake to assist in the identification process for selection of anti-venom</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• DO NOT try to catch the snake.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Risk Assessment: Moderate
## Threat/Emergency

### Hazardous Substances
- **Mitigation:** Good housekeeping, comprehensive and up to date register of hazardous substances on the precinct.

### Industrial Incident
- **Mitigation:** Good housekeeping, regular checks of electrical safety, installation of RCDs, safety culture, regular checks on tools, equipment and plant.

### Risk Assessment:
- **Acute**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat/Emergency</th>
<th>Mitigation</th>
<th>Actions During Emergency</th>
<th>Actions After Emergency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structural Instability</td>
<td>Regular walkabouts checking facilities, structural survey on older buildings especially roofing and cladding (GHD 33163000).</td>
<td>Establish ECR and cordon off area. Call in structural engineer (GHD 33163000).</td>
<td>Review report from structural engineer and take action based on report. Facility re-opens once repair/solution has been signed off by the structural engineer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk Assessment: Moderate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport Incident</td>
<td>Road rules for Precinct, clearly visible signs with appropriate speed limits. Don't walk by approach to speeding motorists.</td>
<td>Deal with casualties as per RTA. Deploy towing services to remove vehicles. Vehicles may be a fire risk so after risk assessment call QFRS. Police may also be called if the accident is major. The issue of private land needs to be taken into account and jurisdictional issues may need to be worked through.</td>
<td>Write up Incident Report and review to see whether any changes to procedures is needed as a result.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk Assessment: Moderate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat/Emergency</td>
<td>Mitigation</td>
<td>Actions During Emergency</td>
<td>Actions After Emergency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toxic Emission</td>
<td>Good housekeeping, regular updates of hazardous materials</td>
<td>Rapid deployment of the ECR and DMT. Immediate lock-down with windows and doors closed. Call QFRS and follow their instruction. Turn off HVAC as appropriate.</td>
<td>Incident Report. Reporting to WHS as necessary. Wash-down areas as required. Provide information to tenants about when it is safe to emerge from lock-down.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk Assessment: High</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Electrical Failure</td>
<td>Have emergency generator capacity available to CTC Precinct management Office. Stored in TRAW with adequate supply of diesel.</td>
<td>Retrieve generator from TRAW and establish minimal power to CTC to run the ECR. Call Energex on 136262 to report outages and 131962 for electrical emergencies. Close the Precinct depending on the time anticipated before re-supply. Increase security patrols by Waterloo given that the alarm system back-up batteries are likely to diminish to zero.</td>
<td>Consideration to be given to the battery re-charge and/or replacement in both emergency lighting, the FIP and the alarm system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk Assessment: High</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Emergency Preparedness & Disaster Management Plan

#### Threat/Emergency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat/Emergency</th>
<th>Mitigation</th>
<th>Actions During Emergency</th>
<th>Actions After Emergency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Communications Failure</td>
<td>Staff have mobile phones and there is a 4xtwo way radio system. Regular (monthly) updating of the ECO mobile contact list.</td>
<td>The total loss of comms is likely to be associated with another event and it is likely to be a lower priority issue. Dealt with through the DMT. Telstra to be contacted and await their advice. For emergencies in this time use mobile phone contacts.</td>
<td>Comms testing to ensure that phones/internet has been re-established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk Assessment: Low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Complete Data Loss

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat/Emergency</th>
<th>Mitigation</th>
<th>Actions During Emergency</th>
<th>Actions After Emergency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Complete Data Loss</td>
<td>Back-ups done through tape taken home daily and off-site remote backup through LCIT.</td>
<td>Maintain paper records as necessary. Where possible store files on C Drive and then load to G Drive when system restored.</td>
<td>Restore files from back-up and off-site. Check for data loss especially in mission critical systems (email) and MYOB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk Assessment: Moderate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat/Emergency</td>
<td>Mitigation</td>
<td>Actions During Emergency</td>
<td>Actions After Emergency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
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<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Servo on Fire</td>
<td>Servo has its own emergency plan and safety procedures.</td>
<td>Evacuate as necessary. Muster in this circumstance should be to rear of the Precinct where there is danger from smoke and fire associated with the incident that emans move to either muster points or the default muster point is dangerous. The location of the fall-back secondary muster point is included under Bombs in this plan. Note that there will be an issue of PEEPs to consider given the travel to the muster point.</td>
<td>Re-occupy Precinct when safe to do so. Write up Incident Report and review any learnings from doing this. Of interest here will be the efficacy of the mustering through to Assembly park.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Risk Assessment:**

**High**
### 43. Timeline and Template – Insurance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timeline</th>
<th>Actions</th>
<th>By Whom</th>
<th>Indicative Completion Date/Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upon discovering the 'loss'/damage</td>
<td>Contact the Finance &amp; Risk Manager and discuss what has happened. This will ensure the correct insurers are notified of a potential claim</td>
<td>Staff/Finance &amp; Risk Manager</td>
<td>As soon as practicable after identifying the 'loss'/damage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploring the full extent of the loss/damage</td>
<td>Start an inventory including make, model, and age (where possible). Also take pictures where you can. An incident report to be written as appropriate.</td>
<td>Varies</td>
<td>Within 2 hours of identification of loss/damage. Must be safe to do so however.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upon notification by CTC staff member or tenant</td>
<td>Notify JLL (insurance brokers)</td>
<td>Finance &amp; Risk Manager/Insurance broker</td>
<td>Within 24 hours of noting the loss/damage depending on whether the emergency situation has settled. In the event of an unfolding emergency the notification should happen after the emergency has been resolved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As soon as advised by insurer/loss adjuster</td>
<td>On appointment of loss adjuster and contact details advise staff to be aware of visit and by whom</td>
<td>Finance &amp; Risk Manager</td>
<td>As per the visit of assessor/loss adjuster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When able to gain full access to facility</td>
<td>Discuss with insurer need for urgent repairs, clean-ups etc.</td>
<td>Finance &amp; Risk Manager</td>
<td>As soon as safe after the reporting of the damage/loss.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effecting the spend</td>
<td>Allocation of a budget and account numbers to be used will be agreed. This account must be used to track and recover all associated costs.</td>
<td>Finance &amp; Risk Manager</td>
<td>Within 1 business day of the purchase order being written</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
44. Setting Up the Control Room

EMERGENCY CONTROL ROOM (ECR)

INCIDENT EVENT LOG

Aide Memoire

- In the event of an incident that requires activation of the ECR do the following:
  - Use the contents of the Emergency Control Room Box;
  - Identify who is in the Control Room and who is undertaking which roles.
  - Identify the Facility Manager
  - Identify the Deputy Facility Manager
  - Identify ECO personnel and what roles they are assigned
  - Issue two-way radios as required (CTC has 4)
  - Note the time of commencement
  - Keep a detailed communications log (included in the Emergency Control Room Box)
  - Log actions, observations and times and the details of who is involved.
  - Remember that at the end of the incident, Incident Reports may need to be written and follow-up actions taken.
  - A Post Incident Review may be necessary to identify learning points etc., that need to feed into the Emergency Preparedness and Emergency Management Plan; and
  - The Emergency Control Room Box and other supplies used during the incident may need to be replenished.

Note the Emergency Control Room Box contains a radio. The Control Room has a television which can run off the generator GPO. In order to activate this the generator needs to be started. It needs to be collected from the TRAW. If necessary fuel is available within the TRAW.
45. International Alphabet Codes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Letter</th>
<th>Code word</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Alpha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Bravo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Charlie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Delta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Echo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Foxtrot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Golf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Hotel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>Juliet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>Kilo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>Lima</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>Mike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>November</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O</td>
<td>Oscar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>Papa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q</td>
<td>Quebec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>Romeo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>Sierra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>Tango</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U</td>
<td>Uniform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>Victor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>Whiskey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>X-ray</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Yankee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z</td>
<td>Zulu</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(hyphen) Dash
46. Protocols for Use of Two-Way Radios

CTC has four long-range digital two-way radios. We own the exclusive license for a 5 km radius so there is unlikely to be interference (particularly from local CB radio). With digital radio the message either gets through or it doesn’t; there is not the distortion associated with analogue handsets. The units are set up such that they are all pre-set for CTC’s channel regardless of where the channel switch is set. To operate there is just the volume button and the push to talk button and release to hear the other party.

- **Command and Response** – repeat back a request to ensure it has been heard properly i.e. responder says.
- **‘Copy that’** - Response to the Command and Response i.e. requestor says.
- **Person A to ‘Person B Are you There Come Back’** - Connecting with a person for a conversation since last completed conversation.
- **‘Over’** - completion of what you have to say but conversation on going.
- **‘Over and Out’** - finish of conversation.
- **‘Receiving You 5x5’** – This indicates the strength and clarity of the signal. The 5 x5 is shorthand for the international SINPO code. Each is cored out of 5 giving a perfect score of 25 or 5x5. SINPO is an abbreviation for:
  - S - Signal
  - I - Interference
  - N - Noise
  - P - Propagation
  - O – Overall
47. Critical Phone Numbers

- State Emergency Services (SES) 132 500.
- Police (local Moorooka) 3426 7122
- Fire (local Moorooka) 3362 9992
- Veolia 24/7 Emergency Line
- Alarm Industries 3941 9999
- Waterloo Security 3725 9999

48. Evacuation of Alternatively-Abled Persons

In the event of an emergency it is important that those persons with a disability or a condition that may cause them to make it safely to a muster point are appropriately catered for. CTC deals with this in the following way:

1) Wardens have training in assisting persons that are disabled;
2) CTC collects a list of PEEPs (see attached) and reviews these. This may require a response by CTC on a case by case basis. With the exception of its own staff PEEPs are completed by the person for whom the PEEP applies and their management (i.e. they are provided by the Tenant to CTC) and retained for their own records to assist Floor and Area Wardens in effecting a successful evacuation;
3) CTC’s file clipboard which is taken by the Chief Warden to the FIP contains information identifying where those with PEEPs in place are normally stationed;
4) Provision of an evacuation chair for the Ian Barclay Building from 1 September 2012 (the only two story building under direct CTC management);
5) A regular email (monthly) of tenants is sent to remind them to submit any new PEEPs or that existing PEEPs need to be deleted;
6) The importance of PEEPs is reinforced at ECO meetings.
• **Who is Categorised as Disabled?**
  The official definition of a disabled person, while helpful in determining who should have a PEEP, may not cover the full range of personnel for whom effective evacuation may be compromised. Obese personnel and those with an illness or injury that is not chronic or permanent may also need assistance in the event of an emergency. Consideration must be given in times of emergency as to the additional resource required to handle both known PEEP holders and persons for whom effective evacuation may prove problematic.
PERSONAL EMERGENCY EVACUATION PLAN (PEEP)

Personal Details
Occupant's Name: _______________________________________
Phone number/s in facility ________________________________
Email address in facility ________________________________

Location
Building Number/ Name: _____________________________________
Room Number / Location on Floor: ________________________________

Is an Assistance Animal Involved? (tick)
Yes ( ) No ( )

Are you trained in the emergency response procedures including the evacuation procedures? (tick)
Yes ( ) No ( )

Preferred method of receiving updates to the emergency response procedures: e.g. text, email, Braille etc.

Preferred method for Notification of Emergency
Please circle e.g. audible alarm, visual alarm, personal vibrating device, SMS,
Other Specify ____________________________
Type of assistance required:
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________

Equipment required for evacuation:
_______________________________________________________________________________

Egress procedure:
1. _____________________________________________________
2. _____________________________________________________
3. _____________________________________________________
4. _____________________________________________________
Designated assistant/s and contact details:
Name/s: ____________________________________________________________
Phone: _____________________________________________________________
Mobile: _____________________________________________________________
Email: ______________________________________________________________
Location: _________________________________

Are your designated assistants trained in the emergency response procedures (including the evacuation procedures)? *(tick)*
Yes (    ) No (    )

Are your designated assistants trained in the evacuation equipment? *(tick)*
Yes (    ) No (    )

Diagram of preferred route for assisted evacuation (where different from Fire and Evacuation Diagram):

Office Use Only: CTC Equipment provided:
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
49. **Business Continuity**

Getting the business up and running after an emergency is important to ensure that the financial impact of the event is kept to a minimum. It is also important to ensure the continuation of employment for staff. In the event that there is a financial impact and staff are not required then legal advice should be sought about the process for standing staff down without pay. Importantly for morale, having the staff assist in getting the business back up and running can be a positive benefit for both parties. Business continuity is covered by a specific policy [PRO-COM-102 Business Continuity Management](#). (See attached).
APPENDIX A – BUSINESS CONTINUITY PROCEDURE

1. PURPOSE
This procedure provides guidance for maintaining the continuity of the business through a range of disasters including environmental disasters.

2. SCOPE
This procedure refers to the entire CTC precinct and to off-site programs only in relation to factors under CTC control i.e. natural disasters in an offsite program are not the responsibility of CTC, whereas pollution or environmental damage caused by CTC action is.

3. APPLIES TO
This procedure applies to all:
- Management
- Employees
- Sub-Contractors
- Tenants where it applies to the precinct or relevant parts thereof

4. DEFINITIONS
Natural disaster – a catastrophic event caused or the underlying cause of which is as a result of extreme weather.
Major disaster – a catastrophic event caused or the underlying cause of which is as a result of factors not attributable to the weather.
Disaster - An event that causes a major breakdown or functioning of the Centre or part of the Centre which may affect all or part of the following:
- The IT system
- The phone system
- The Alarm System
- Electricity outage
- Storm damage to building
- Fire
- Flood
- Public Health Disease e.g. SARS
- A combination of the above
- The precinct environment including the Creek and associated waterways.

Coding system
- Code purple – Bomb threat
- Code brown – External disaster
- Code red – Fire
- Code orange - Evacuation
- Code yellow – Internal disaster
- Code black – Personal threat
- Code Green – All clear

A copy of these codes is found in the Crisis Cupboard.
Business Continuity Management (BCM) – is a whole of business approach to ensure critical business functions can be maintained, or restored in a timely fashion, in the event of material
disruptions arising from internal or external events. Its purpose is to minimize the financial, legal, reputational and other material consequences arising from the disruption.

5. RESPONSIBILITIES
Chief Executive Officer – The CTC CEO has overall responsibility for the implementation of this procedure.
Employees – Employees are responsible for addressing the mitigation, repair or evacuation associated with the event.
Emergency Planning Committee (EPC) – Responsible for devising and overseeing plans.
Emergency Control Organisation (ECO) – Responsible for deploying to address emergency situations particularly the issues associated with the immediate fighting of fire and evacuation of premises.
Disaster Management Team (DMT) – Where a selected team is established to address emergencies outside of the ECO framework they will address issues as tasked by CTC Management.

6. PROCEDURE

6.1 IT System
Like most businesses CTC places a significant emphasis on its IT system for the smooth functioning of the office and the business as a whole. Loss of CTC data is possible in a number of ways:
- Malicious action by an individual
- Fire or other damage to the premises
- Viruses or other external threats
- Power surge and power loss
- Computer failure

In each and every event CTC is protected by a daily back-up which backs-up not only within the Office but also offsite meaning that the maximum exposure to lost data is around 8 hours. This data is recoverable through recourse to the hard-copy information where available. Data older than this is recoverable from the off-site back-up.

In order to reduce the likelihood of lost data the following measures are in place:
- Installation of a firewall on the server;
- Virus protection and firewalls installed on each PC which is regularly updated and kept in license;
- Installation of surge protection and an UPS for the server;
- Provision of a vapourising liquid fire extinguisher to use in the event of fire within CTC offices to protect vulnerable computers;
- Restricted access to the server (electronically) and admin password security maintained.

CTC has an arrangement with an IT company that provides support for the CTC system and is able to back-up from the external back-up should this be required.
6.2 Phone System
The phone system is maintained by Telstra and is unlikely to cause business continuity problems itself. The availability of mobiles held by staff members means that communication within the team and with the rest of the site is easily maintained.

6.3 The Alarm System
While an outage with the alarm system creates a security issue it does not of itself cause business continuity issues. Tenants are notified of alarm outages and they have the opportunity of implementing additional security measures should they wish. Alarm Industries the company responsible for the alarm system is contacted to effect immediate repairs and the mobile patrol service (Hoffman Security) to conduct additional patrols as required.

6.4 Electricity Outage
The precinct has one main sub-station so it is feasible that a break-down at this point could result in a major power-loss to the site. In this event the supplier Origin is contacted to address the issue. It is more likely that parts of the precinct will be unavailable and the determination of what is unavailable for the purposes of reduced rent payments is made by the CEO after consultation with the Manager – Training and Facilities who will measure any partial availability. Decisions around rent reduction can only take place after close scrutiny of the lease agreement to ensure that decisions taken are congruent with this. The Chairman will be advised at the time of the outage and of the impact of availability/rent reductions. The matter will also be reported to the next Board to bring the issue to the attention of the Directors. A forecast of the financial impact is calculated when the extent of the outage and availability deductions are known.

6.5 Storm Damage to Building
An assessment of storm damage will be made following storms and prioritisation of repairs made depending on what is found from inspection. The insurance claim is based on the assessors opinion, the amount of the deductible and the degree of loss. Matters relating to insurance are covered dealt with through CTC’s brokers JLL. Their contact details are included in the list of Precinct Emergency Contacts FOR-ASM-222.

6.6 Fire
Fire is dealt with by the Fire Team and the advice of the Fire Service is followed in terms of what is safe to re-enter and what areas need to be quarantined. Matters relating to fire are covered in the PRO-ASM-129 Emergency Evacuation.

6.7 Environmental Disaster
In the event of an environmental disaster immediate actions will be taken to mitigate the extent of the disaster through appropriate measures. These include:

- Application of immediate measure to contain or prevent harm to persons and/or waterways through deployment of the various spill kits located around the precinct. This is only contemplated once a risk assessment has been conducted and it is safe (including the provision of adequate PPE where required) to do so including the skills necessary to deploy the measures required;

- Calling in of the relevant organization/agency to provide advice – most often the EPA;
APPENDIX A – BUSINESS CONTINUITY PROCEDURE

- Calling in of the relevant organization/agency to assist in mitigation and/or remediation – most often the EPA;
- Calling the relevant emergency services as required;
- Calling in Oxley Creek Catchment Association for matters relevant to the Creek;
- Calling in Brisbane City Council as required and particularly in matters relevant to the Creek;
- Advising the appropriate authorities to ensure compliance with all regulatory requirements;
- Advice and updates to the CISC Pty Ltd Board as required;
- An action plan to address on-going issues that extend beyond the initial disaster management period will be drawn up.
- On-going measurement of the longer-term environmental impacts may be necessary and if so these measurements will be reviewed on a periodic basis in conjunction with an appropriate environmental science organization.

6.8 Disaster Management Team

In the event of a major disaster the Disaster Management Team (DMT) will establish itself with the view to managing the disaster where this is deemed more effective than the ECO. The delivery of the response to the emergency/disaster will most likely be through the Emergency Response Team (ERT). This may because the response is required to be sustained for a period longer than the immediate emergency response. The DMT comprise the members of the Executive Team i.e.:
- CEO
- Precinct Maintenance Manager
- Programs Manager
- Tenant personal as seconded in

Others will be co-opted to this as required which may include Directors as available.

The management of the disaster will be conducted from a Control Room established within the CTC or at another convenient location if the CTC offices are not available (most probably the Hugh Hamilton Conference Room). The priority of the DMT will be to:
- Protect life;
- Maintain safety;
- Protect assets;
- Ensure security; and
- Maintain or return business continuity.

Contact with the relevant agencies will be maintained.

6.9 Disaster Mitigation and Recovery

The DMT will also be responsible for disaster mitigation and disaster recovery. The primary mass disaster potential for the precinct is fire and water damage. Fire has an immediate response that can be delivered by CTC staff (PRO-ASM-129 Emergency Evacuation) but is otherwise dealt with after the immediate response by Queensland Fire and Rescue Service (QFRS). In terms of water damage this can occur via storm damage to roofs and/or flooding. In these instances access to tarpaulins and sand bags are critical. The Crisis Cabinet details where both can be procured in an emergency. Coordination of these efforts is through the DMT.
APPENDIX A – BUSINESS CONTINUITY PROCEDURE

CTC uses its usual suppliers in terms of carpet cleaning, water extraction and blower/dryer systems.

6.10 Insurance

Key to the management of any disaster is having adequate insurance in place to:
- Reduce the loss in terms of assets if a disaster happens; and
- Reduce lost income in the event that the facility becomes unavailable or partly unavailable.

As part of its annual review of insurance CTC ensures that there is adequate cover for both these risks balancing risk with both the cost of the cover and the size of the deductible. Details of who to contact immediately after a disaster (CTC’s brokers) are included in the Crisis Cupboard and listed on FOR-ASM-222 Precinct Emergency Contacts.

6.11 Closure of Precinct

Only the CEO may close the precinct and in his absence this is delegated to the Precinct Maintenance Manager to close the precinct for a maximum of 24 hours. In the event this is required to be extended beyond 24 hours, the CTC CEO must give authorisation, in accordance with FOR-COM-010 Authorities Matrix. Evacuation procedures will be implemented and a sweep of the buildings undertaken to ensure all personnel have left. Once an area is clear this is reported to the Control Room where it is marked off. All gates are locked except that which enables the retreat from the precinct of the DMT. DMT members will only remain on the precinct where it is safe to do so. The security patrol company and the alarm monitoring company will both be alerted to any precinct closure.

Where areas of the precinct are unavailable due to safety or other reasons these are cordoned off using safety tape or barrier fencing as appropriate. Signage will be secured in plain view to ensure people know not to enter and the severity of the risk.

Where the entire site is evacuated all entrances are locked and the locking mechanisms (stored in the TRAW) deployed. This is particularly important given the number of tenants who have keys to the main gates. The point at which the precinct may be re-entered will depend on the DMT undertaking a risk assessment. In many cases this will require referral and advice from various agencies e.g.
- Police
- Fire Service
- Structural engineers;
- State Emergency Service Personnel
- Queensland Health (In the case of a public health risk)
- Environmental Protection Agency

6.12 Managing Reputation

The most effective way of maintaining reputation through a period of disaster or loss of services/availability is to restore normal function as soon as possible. Where reputational loss is considered at the time, through risk assessment, to be both highly likely and highly significant the consideration will be given by the CEO to the engagement of CTC’s media relations
company to manage the frontline issues and devise a tactical response to the reputational aspects of the situation.

7. RELATED DOCUMENTS
All The Construction Training Centre’s procedural, plans and policy documentation.
PRO-ASM-129 Emergency Evacuation
PLN-ASM-308 Emergency Preparedness and Disaster Management Plan
FOR-ASM-222 Precinct Emergency Contacts
FOR-COM-010 Authorities Matrix

8. RELATED RECORDS
All The Construction Training Centre’s relevant records.
FIRE & EVACUATION PLAN

High Occupancy Building

Note: This Fire and Evacuation Plan is intended to provide compliance with the Building Fire Safety Regulations 2008 and does not necessarily comply with other legislation or requirements.
# APPENDIX B – FIRE & EVACUATION PLAN

## Building Information

| Building Name:                  | The Construction Training Centre |

## Fire Safety Adviser

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name:</th>
<th>Phil Diver</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phone Number:</td>
<td>0423282542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Email:</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Phil.diver@ctc.qld.edu.au">Phil.diver@ctc.qld.edu.au</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brief description of qualification held:</td>
<td>Fire Safety Adviser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered training organisation that issued the above qualification:</td>
<td>NSCA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date qualification issued:</td>
<td>09/09/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building Address:</td>
<td>460-492 Beaudesert Road Salisbury</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Building Owner:

| Owner Address:                | 460-492 Beaudesert Road Salisbury |
| Owner Phone Number:           | (07) 32166711                     |
| Email:                        | phil.diver@ctc.qld.edu.au        |

### Building Occupier:

| Occupier Address:             | Various as per attached diagram (hierarchy) |
| Occupier Phone Number:        | 460-492 Beaudesert Road Salisbury 4107 |
| Email:                        | As per appended list                |

### Building Classification:

| Building Classification:      | As per attached sheet and as per front entrance affixed notices |

### Building Construction:

| Floor Area:                  | 20,661m²                                      |

## Persons responsible for administering the Building's Fire and Evacuation Plan

- CISC Pty Ltd but each occupier responsible for their own area for which Fire & Evac Plan must be produced.
- Phil Diver – Fire Safety Adviser in role as Chief Fire Warden and Tony Kavanagh – Fire Safety Adviser and Deputy Chief Fire Warden

## Person responsible for giving General & First Response Evacuation Instruction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fire and Evacuation Instructors</th>
<th>Dates for Instruction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phil Diver – FSA &amp; Tony Kavanagh</td>
<td>Various</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phone Number:</td>
<td>0423282542 &amp; 0407330121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Email:</td>
<td><a href="mailto:phil.diver@ctc.qld.edu.au">phil.diver@ctc.qld.edu.au</a> &amp; <a href="mailto:tony.kavanagh@ctc.qld.edu.au">tony.kavanagh@ctc.qld.edu.au</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Evacuation Coordinator and Communications Officer

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commencement Date:</th>
<th>25/5/2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name:</td>
<td>Tony Kavanagh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phone Number:</td>
<td>0423282542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Email:</td>
<td><a href="mailto:tony.kavanagh@ctc.qld.edu.au">tony.kavanagh@ctc.qld.edu.au</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Persons responsible for carrying out the Evacuation Coordination procedures *(Responsible Persons)*

As per attached list

### Fire & Evacuation Plan annual review

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reviewed By</th>
<th>Date of Review</th>
<th>Changes made?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phil Diver as part of IMS</td>
<td>7th July 2010</td>
<td>N/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phil Diver</td>
<td>19th Sept 2011</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phil Diver</td>
<td>21st Sept 2012</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phil Diver</td>
<td>22nd August 2013</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Evacuation Coordination procedures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commencement Date:</th>
<th>1/06/09</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Procedure for using communication devices.**

In the event of a fire or other emergency the alarm is sounded from either manual system (break glass) or from CTC’s automatic fire detection system.

**Procedure for contacting fire service**

Using the phone the relevant person will dial 000 and ask for the fire service. Provide details of the fire or other emergency and the building address:

The Construction Training Centre
460-492 Beaudesert Road in Salisbury

**Persons with special needs**

CTC staff or area wardens will assist those with special needs

**Checking that all persons have been evacuated**

Area wardens will ensure all have evacuated and rolcall at assembly point as required. Conference leader/meeting chair of casual hire areas will take attendance register for rolcall at assembly point. For those not able to be identified as evacuated there details will be advised to Chief or Deputy Chief Fire Warden

**Inform the evacuation coordinator (Chief or Deputy Chief Fire Warden) for the building.**

Inform the evacuation coordinator (Chief or Deputy Chief Fire Warden) of number of persons not accounted for. Meet the fire service on arrival; provide as much information as possible.
As the CTC precinct is a multi-occupier site it is necessary to have a well-defined Fire Hierarchy which is attached. Fundamentally the precinct is under the control of the Chief Fire Warden when a fire or fire-related emergency (including drill) is underway. The authority of the Chief Fire Warden is only subordinated to the QFRS. The strategic body for designing the overall strategy and making strategic changes is the Emergency Planning Committee (EPC) and the over-arching body to effect these changes is the Emergency Control Organisation (ECO). The roles, frequency of meeting and membership are outlined overleaf.

FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF DOUBT ALL KEY PERSONNEL FROM CTC MOVE TO THE FIP IN THE EVENT OF A FIRE ALARM SOUNDING. FROM THERE SPECIFIC TASKING OCCURS.

In the event of a shortage of personnel or key persons are not available the most senior person takes the Cubby Hole 1 role and retrieves Cubby Hole 1 contents. This cascades then through Cubby Hole 2 down through the numbers.

Emergency evacuation procedure
**APPENDIX B – FIRE & EVACUATION PLAN**

**In the event of fire, or hazardous material emergency**, occupants should evacuate the building and gather at a predetermined assembly area.

In the event of the fire, staff will:

- Investigate the fire situation.
- If there is any doubt regarding whether there is a fire situation, the Fire Service should still be called.
- Ensure the safe evacuation of all occupants from the building.
- Account for all occupants at the assembly area.
- Ensure occupants do not attempt to re-enter the building until it is safe to do so.
- Meet the Fire Service and advise them of any information relevant to the emergency.

The CTC Fire Personnel have designated roles.

**Chief Fire Warden will:**

- Go to panel and identify location of fire alarm;
- Task staff accordingly from that point;
- Act as the Communications Officer and keep the necessary log;
- Accompany QFRS officers to the location of the alarm;
- Lead the CTC response to the fire in the event that the QFRS have not yet responded;
- Be the main liaison between the QFRS and the precinct personnel.

**Deputy Chief Fire Warden will:**

- Accompany the QFRS to the location of fire;
- Be in touch with the various muster points;
- Ensure that the Ian Barclay Building is evacuated and that all are accounted for by liaising with the Area/Floor Wardens if the fire is located there;

In the event of absence of staff the next level of CTC Management will act up in the role. In order to assist this ‘Aide Memoire’ cards are located in the Cubby Holes where all necessary PPE is located. The cards relate to fire and also Dangerous Goods Classifications.

**In the event of a fire being located, or hazardous material emergency staff, will:**

- Ensure the evacuation of the building – alert all occupants without further compromising life and assist those which are persons with special needs.
- Attempt to extinguish the fire if safe to do so –
  - If the fire is small enough, a nearby fire extinguisher or hose reel may be used to control and extinguish the fire. No fire will be fought where:
    - *The person has not been trained or instructed in using a fire extinguisher*
    - *The person does not know what’s burning*
    - *The fire is spreading rapidly*
    - *The person does not have the proper equipment*
    - *The person finds themselves with their back to an exit*
    - *The fire might block their means of escape*
    - *The person might inhale toxic smoke*
    - *The person’s instincts tell you not to do so*
  - If the first attempts to put out the fire do not succeed, the building must be evacuated
CTC has a fire sheet that is a useful aide memoire of what to do when encountering a fire.

**Method of operation of fire fighting equipment**

**Fire Extinguishers**

1. Select appropriate extinguisher for type of fire.
2. Pull pin from squeeze handle.
3. Test extinguisher by squeezing handles briefly.
4. Approach fire aiming nozzle at base of fire.
5. Squeeze handles and operate extinguisher in a sweeping motion.

**Hose Reels**

1. Hose reels are used on fires involving wood, paper and textiles only, they are not to be used on live electrical appliances or flammable liquids.
2. To release the hose reel, turn the valve on this will charge the hose and release the nozzle (if fitted with a nozzle release lock).

3. The hose can then be pulled out to the fire, the nozzle operates like a garden hose in most cases by twisting the nozzle, and the nozzle can be adjusted to give a spray pattern or a straight jet.

**Procedure for Induction – CTC Personnel Only**

For new employees:
On first day of induction for any new employee the Fire Safety Adviser (Phil Diver or Tony Kavanagh) will give **General Evacuation Instructions** and **First Response Instruction**. A record of this instruction is maintained.

- The delivery of this instruction is to be recorded in the appropriate register.
- **NOTE** The BFSR require general evacuation instructions to be given within 2 days and first response instructions within a month of starting work in the building, both sets of instructions may be given at the same time.

Existing employees

- **General Evacuation Instructions** will be given annually and **First Response Instruction** bi-annually.
- Instruction will be given by the Fire Safety Adviser (Phil Diver or Tony Kavanagh) and recorded in the appropriate register.

Responsible person – evacuation coordination procedures:

- Nominated staff will receive evacuation coordination procedures *one month* prior to taking on this role and annually after that.
- Evacuation coordination procedures will be given by the Fire Safety Adviser (Phil Diver or Tony Kavanagh) and recorded in the appropriate register.

Each tenant as occupier is required to have their own plan that dovetails to the overall plan. To assist CTC has provided each Floor/Area Warden with the helmet and high viz vest. The helmet has included a small crib sheet to assist those who infrequently perform their role or for those who have to act up into it.

Documentation:

- Relevant building approval documents
- Evacuation signs & diagrams are included in each relevant area
Storage of documentation is as follows;
  1) The hard-copy is kept in the Crisis Cupboard;
  2) The Secure copy is kept on the common G Drive under Risk Management – Fire which is backed up to disk for recovery purposes and a back-up maintained off-site for security from fire and theft.

Evacuation Diagrams
CTC has supplied Evacuation Diagrams to tenants.

Relevant ‘Building Approval’ documents

Due to the planning process of the site there are three ONLY Form 11 Building Classification documents. These are displayed at the front of the Ian Barclay Building as required by law and included in the Appendices. Copies are attached.

Fire Equipment
CTC uses a reputable competent company for the maintenance of its fire equipment. Details are as follows:

  Fire Pro (Steve Bell 3807 9988 or Janine Horrocks 0408874045)

As part of CTC’s Focus System there is a regular review of vendors to ensure they are meeting CTC’s requirements.
28 July 1997

Our Ref: BA970242

Phillips Smith Conwell Architects
P O Box 479
FORTITUDE VALLEY QLD 4006

Attention: Ian Conwell

Dear Sir

CONSTRUCTION TRAINING CENTRE
460-492 BEAUDESERT ROAD, SALISBURY
BUILDINGS 1, 2, 3 & 4
BUILDING ACT COMPLIANCE

Receipt is acknowledged of your application regarding the above project. Compliance with the Building Act 1975 is acknowledged subject to the following conditions:

A. BASIS OF REVIEW

Classification: Class 8
Siting: 18m to nearest building (in accordance with Building Code of Australia Clause C2.3)
Rise: Single-storey
Type of Construction: Type C
Terrain Category: T.C. 3, Region B
Floor Area: 13000m²

B. DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

- Building Application Form dated 7 May 1997.

- Drawings numbered:
  - Architectural: 4400/14 to 4400/28 inclusive
  - Civil: ABCSTD BC1 & BC2
  - Structural: 97006/S0, 97006/S3 to 97006/S8 inclusive
  - Mechanical: 10506 - M01 & M02
  - Electrical: 10506 - E01 to 10506 - E05 inclusive
  - Hydraulic/Fire: 745 - H01 to H04 inclusive
PROJECT SERVICES

10 November 1997

Our Ref: BA970242

Phillips Smith Conwell Architects
P O Box 479
FORTITUDE VALLEY QLD 4006

Attention: Ian Conwell

Dear Sir

CONSTRUCTION TRAINING CENTRE
460-492 BEAUDESERT ROAD, SALISBURY
STAGE 2 - BUILDING 6
BUILDING ACT COMPLIANCE

Receipt is acknowledged of your application regarding the above project. Compliance with the Building Act 1975 is acknowledged subject to the following conditions:

A. BASIS OF REVIEW

Classification: Class 8
Siting: 10m to Boundary (see special condition)
Rise: Single-storey
Type of Construction: Type C
Terrain Category: T.C. 3, Region B
Floor Area: 6086m²

B. SPECIAL CONDITION

Fire separation suitable to the risk is to be provided at such time in the future as either of the following occurs:

i) the nature of the occupancy changes such that the fire load increases; or

ii) the risk from the adjacent property changes.

C. DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

- Drawings numbered:
  - Architectural: 4400/30 to 4400/45 inclusive
  - Civil: 7784-C25 to C30 inclusive
  - Structural: 97074/S2 to S10 inclusive

BS70113 SIM
APPENDIX B – FIRE & EVACUATION PLAN

FORM B

QUEENSLAND FIRE & RESCUE AUTHORITY
FIRE SAFETY

ASSESSMENT OF SPECIAL FIRE SERVICES [S B I. Section 2.4(1)]

ADVICE FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT
For Building Application
PROJECT SERVICES

Local Govt area of

Local Government B/A No
97/0242

Address of building
or structure
STAGE 2
460-492 BEAUDESERT ROAD
SALISBURY

Name of Owner
THE CONSTRUCTION TRAINING CENTRE

This is to certify that the proposed special fire service provisions for the above building or structure, as noted in the attached schedule pages. Have been assessed for compliance with the requirements of the Queensland Standard Building Law (which includes the Building Code of Australia) and:

[X ] Complies with the assessment requirements of special fire services

[ ] Does not comply with special fire service criteria (see attached assessment sheet/s).

[ ] Does not require any special fire services All fees paid should be refunded.

Signature of Authorised
Fire Officer for Chief Commissioner
Graham Hanlon District Officer 20th October 1997
Name and Rank (Print) Date

Inspections of these Special Fire Services will be in accordance with SBL Part 5 - Duties and Inspections Section 5.1 Notice to Inspect and Section 5.2 Fire Authority to Inspect Special Fire Services.

In the opinion of the Queensland Fire & Rescue Authority, the following items for which the local government is responsible does not appear to comply with the Building Code of Australia;

STAGE 1 BA 97/0242
STAGE 2 UNDER SAME B/A
28 July 1997

Our Ref: BA970242

Phillips Smith Conwell Architects
P O Box 479
FORTITUDE VALLEY QLD 4006

Attention: Ian Conwell

Dear Sir

CONSTRUCTION TRAINING CENTRE
460-492 BEAUDESERT ROAD, SALISBURY
BUILDINGS 1, 2, 3 & 4
BUILDING ACT COMPLIANCE

Receipt is acknowledged of your application regarding the above project. Compliance with the Building Act 1975 is acknowledged subject to the following conditions:

A. BASIS OF REVIEW

Classification: Class 8
Slab: 18m to nearest building (in accordance with Building Code of Australia Clause C2.3)
Rise: Single-storey
Type of Construction: Type C
Terrain Category: T.C. 3, Region B
Floor Area: 13000m²

B. DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

- Building Application Form dated 7 May 1997.

- Drawings numbered:
  - Architectural: 4400/14 to 4400/28 inclusive
  - Civil: ABCSTD BC1 & BC2
  - Structural: 97006/S0, 97006/S3 to 97006/S8 inclusive
  - Mechanical: 10506 - M01 & M02
  - Electrical: 10506 - E01 to 10506 - E05 inclusive
  - Hydraulic/Fire: 745 - H01 to H04 inclusive
10 November 1997

Our Ref: BA970242

Phillips Smith Conwell Architects
P O Box 479
FORTITUDE VALLEY QLD 4006

Attention: Ian Conwell

Dear Sir

CONSTRUCTION TRAINING CENTRE
460-492 BEAUDESERT ROAD, SALISBURY
STAGE 2 - BUILDING 6
BUILDING ACT COMPLIANCE

Receipt is acknowledged of your application regarding the above project. Compliance with the Building Act 1975 is acknowledged subject to the following conditions:

A. BASIS OF REVIEW

Classification: Class 8
Siting: 10m to Boundary (see special condition)
Rise: Single-storey
Type of Construction: Type C
Terrain Category: T.C. 3, Region B
Floor Area: 6088m²

B. SPECIAL CONDITION

Fire separation suitable to the risk is to be provided at such time in the future as either of the following occurs:

1) the nature of the occupancy changes such that the fire load increases; or
2) the risk from the adjacent property changes.

C. DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

• Building Application Form dated 23 September 1997.
• Drawings numbered:
  - Architectural: 4400/30 to 4400/45 inclusive
  - Civil: 7784-C25 to C30 inclusive
  - Structural: 97074/S2 to S10 inclusive

BS70113.SBM
# APPENDIX B – FIRE & EVACUATION PLAN

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**Form 11 – Certificate of Classification**

*Standard Building Regulation Sections 98 and 99*

**CERTIFICATE OF CLASSIFICATION NO:** 2886  
**PROJECT NO:** 9702144

**APPLICATION FOR CODE ASSESSMENT**
**OF BUILDING WORKS NO:** BA970242

---

1. **Owner**

   **Name:**
   CISC Pty Ltd. ACN. 067 097 625

   **Postal Address:** 460-492 Beaudesert Road
   Salisbury Qld  
   **Postcode:** 4107

2. **Property description**

   **Building:** Construction Training Centre
   **Street address:** 460-492 Beaudesert Road
   Salisbury Qld  
   **Postcode:** 4107

   Lot 3 on RP175530, Lot 2 on RP 86648, Lot 1 on RP 58549, Lot 1 on SL 7108,
   Lot 11 on SL 7106, Lot 2 on SL 7103

3. **Classification**

   The building or part thereof, described herein, is classified as follows in accordance with Part A3 of the Building Code of Australia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Building/Part</th>
<th>Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Building 1</td>
<td>Whole of Building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building 2</td>
<td>Whole of Building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building 3</td>
<td>Whole of Building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building 4</td>
<td>Whole of Building</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total floor Area = 1300m²**

Restrictions on the use or occupation of building (Standard Building Regulation S.98(5)(c): Nil.

**Date:** 04 July 2000

M.J. Bulanston  
A/Chief Building Surveyor

If the applicant is dissatisfied with this decision, an appeal to a Building and Development Tribunal may be made under the provisions of The Integrated Planning Act Section 4.2.9. An appeal must be started within twenty business days after the decision is given to the applicant.

---

[Contact Information]
## APPENDIX B – FIRE & EVACUATION PLAN

### Certificate of Classification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name:</th>
<th>Signature Projects Pty Ltd</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contact person</td>
<td>Phone no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Gannon</td>
<td>3276 8777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fax no.</td>
<td>Mobile no.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 2. Property description

- **Street address:** 460 - 492 Beaudesert Road, Salisbury
- **Lot & plan details:** Lot 5, RP 175530
- **In which local government area is the land situated?** Brisbane City Council

#### 3. Classification

**Building description**

- **Part Office Fit-out (CTC)**

**Class of building**

- 5

#### 4. Building Certifier

- **Name of building certifier (in full):** Toby Spencer
- **License No.:** A1064976
- **Signature:**
- **Date:** 25 September, 2007

#### 5. Building certifier reference number

- **Building certifier reference number:** 07/0998

#### 6. Restrictions on the use or occupation of the building

1. The building owner or Body Corporate is to maintain the fire & life safety systems in accordance with relevant Acts, Australian Standards, and codes. Refer to the Building Code of Australia Part I.
2. Building works and use of premises to comply with the Local Authority's Town Planning Scheme, Local Laws, & Policies.
3. The building owner & occupier are to ensure all path of egress and exit doors are appropriately maintained.

#### 7. Performance Standards

- **Performance standards:** N/A

#### 8. Rights of appeal

If you are dissatisfied with a decision relating to the inspection of building work, owners may appeal to the Building and Development Tribunal to have this decision reviewed. An appeal must be started within 20 business days after the decision is given to the applicant. Appeal forms are available on the Department's website www.qld.gov.au.
APPENDIX B – FIRE & EVACUATION PLAN

BUILDING SURVEYING PROFESSIONALS P/L
PO Box 3619, South Brisbane BC Q 4101
Email adminbris@bspqld.com.au

Form 11 - Certificate / Interim Certificate of Classification

1. Type of Certificate
   Certificate of Classification
   (Building Act 1976 section 103, For building occupied in stages see section 103A)
   Interim Certificate of Classification

2. Owner details
   Name: Construction Skills Qld
   Phone no.: 3848 8700
   Fax no.: 3848 5067
   Owner's Address: PO Box 3294, South Brisbane 4104

3. Property description
   Street address (include no., street, suburb/locality, postcode)
   480 Beaucesart Road, Sallabury 4107
   Lot no.: 3
   RP no.: 178550
   In which local government area is the land situated
   Brisbane City Council

4. Classification
   Building description
   Tenancy fitout of
   offices
   (Be Constructive)
   Class of building: 5

5. Building Certifier
   Name of building certifier (in full): STUART ANDREWS
   Licence no.: A81048
   Signature
   Date: 26/06/2008
   Postal address: PO Box 3619, South Brisbane BC Q 4101
   Email: adminbris@bspqld.com.au
   Phone: 07 3255 0377
   Fax: 07 3255 0090
   Mobile: 0417 547 936
   Building certifier reference number: 2008/4465

6. Building certifier reference number

7. Restrictions on the use or occupation of the building - N/A
   If the building work uses a building solution within the meaning of SCA, restricting the use or occupation of the building, state the restriction. For example the maximum number of people to be accommodated will affect the dimensions of exits and paths of travel.

8. Performance Standards - N/A
   If the building work uses a performance based solution, list the performance requirements used.

9. Rights of appeal
   If you are dissatisfied with a decision relating to the inspection of building work, owners may appeal to the building and Development Tribunal to have this decision reviewed. An appeal may be started within 20 business days after the decision is given to the applicant. Appeal forms:

   LOCAL GOVERNMENT USE ONLY

   DATE

   REFERENCE NUMBER: A002052718
Construction
Structure: 9 metre high triangular web steel frame with steel and timber trusses used for training in both workshop and classroom format. The attached office area is of a single level height with aluminium door and window frames, suspended grid ceiling with recessed lighting and ducted air conditioning.

Floors: Concrete slab on ground to the workshops with overlays to the classrooms, offices and amenities.

Walls: Colorbond and part height concrete block external walls to the workshop and rendered concrete block external walls to the attached office. Plasterboard to the internal walls of the attached offices.

Roof: Colorbond with wire meshing and some translucent panels to the workshop. Colorbond roof to the office.

Services: Fire hoses and extinguishers throughout, mercury vapour lighting to the workshop.

Accommodation
Building 1 is an open plan workshop that is currently divided into 3 sections comprising two defined workshop-style training areas, a two-storey training classroom, a single-storey training centre for simulation and an open plan section to the frontage currently used for ad hoc storage. Building 1 has 6 classrooms attached in its current configuration and has one amenity block to the rear of the single-storey buildings attached to Building 1.
Construction
Structure: 10 metre high, triangular web steel frame with timber trusses used as a training workshop. The attached office area is of a single level height with aluminium door and window frames, suspended ceiling grid ceiling with recessed lighting and ducted air-conditioning.

Floors: concrete slab on ground to the workshop with tile overlays to the classrooms, offices and amenities.

Walls: Colorbond and part height concrete block external walls to the workshop and rendered concrete block external walls to the attached office. Plasterboard to the internal walls of the attached offices.

Roof: Colorbond with wire meshing and some translucent panels to the workshop. Colorbond to the office.

Services: Fire hoses and extinguishers throughout, mercury vapour lighting to the workshop.

Accommodation
Building 4 has an open plan workshop area used for training purposes with access via an 8x8 metres high roll steel shutter. Accommodation reads the same for Building 3 with the same mix of tenancies. The area is distinguished by the attached classrooms/offices attached as well as amenities. Adjacent to Building 4 is an covered eating area paved to brick with an umbrella shade covering.

Construction
Structure: A high bay (10 metres to eaves) web steel portal frame. The attached office area is of a single storey with aluminium door and window frames, suspended grid ceiling with recessed lighting and ducted air-conditioning.

Floors: concrete slab on ground split over two levels with tile overlays to office areas and other overlays to the office block attached to the north facing elevation.

Walls: metaldeck and corrugated iron external walls to the workshop and rendered concrete block external walls to the office area. Plasterboard walls to the internal office area.

Roof: corrugated iron.

Services: mercury vapour lighting. The building has a gantry crane that operates in the front 2/3rds.

Accommodation
Building 6 is separated between two tenants on a roughly 1/3rd 2/3rd split. The accommodation to the rear of the building is superior and has attached classrooms/offices similar in architecture and quality to those in Buildings 1 and 4. The front 2/3rds until recently had an incomplete concrete slab and has poor quality external cladding in some places. The steel portal frame structure remains sound. This block shares amenities to the rear of the front tenancy for men's toilet and this is in particularly poor condition with replacement due in the near future. It is currently a demountable. There is a significant area of cleared land to the south of the building.

Construction
Structure: High bay, timber frame and trusses.

Floors: concrete slab on ground.

Walls: Corrugated iron external walls.

Roof: Corrugated iron.

Services: Mercury vapour lighting.

Accommodation
A high bay igloo shaped workshop with open plan internal area and access via a 4x6 meters high roll steel shutter (manually operated). A two level office component exists at the rear of the building. There is a covered eating area and partially covered area with weatherboard affixed as part of training. The toilets are externally housed under a covered walk-way and are in an average condition.

This area is occupied by Master painters Queensland and will be subject to a Skill Centre grant that will improve the quality of this accommodation.
Construction
Structure: a single level building used for classroom and workshop training for the Skill-Build program.
Floors: concrete slab on ground.
Walls: concrete block external walls. Note that the Asbestos Register identifies the presence of asbestos in the ceiling construction material. This is scheduled for imminent removal.
Roof: metal deck roof and timber ceiling.
Services: fluorescent lighting.

Accommodation
There are works currently underway in this building including conversion of the internal toilets and partitioning up of the workshop into training bays.

Construction
Structure: an architecturally designed 3 level (lower ground, ground and upper level) built in 2000.
Floors: concrete slab on ground with suspended concrete to upper levels.
Walls: rendered masonry external walls and plasterboard internal walls.
Roof: Colorbond and metal deck.
Services: Hose reels and fire extinguishers, suspended grid ceilings with recessed lighting and ducted air conditioning.

Accommodation

Building B is situated at the rear of the property and is in poor condition with corrugated iron external cladding. The floors are compacted soil and the building has a gantry crane. It has five main entry points four of which are on the side elevation enabling through vehicle passage. This building has been fully depreciated and the area is let on the basis of the land.

Half way down the property is a corrugated iron shed built by a tenant that will be dismantled on their departure. It stands on a concrete slab that will remain. The Brisbane City Council Flood Report indicates that land levels across Rocky Water Holes Creek range between 6.5 metres AHD (Australia Height Datum) and 15.4 metres AHD with the highest defined flood level reaching 12.4 metres AHD from Rocky Water Holes Creek and the Brisbane River. The 20 year ARI (Average Recurrence Interval) is set at 4.5 metres AHD and the 50 year ARI is predicted to reach 6.7AHD. Therefore this area is expected to receive some inundation in the event of a 50 year storm surge.
Operating Instructions for the Generator

1. Plug lead into Generator Socket on wall.

2. Plug other end of lead into outlet on Generator.

3. Turn on AC Breaker

4. Pull Out Choke. (under

5. Turn on fuel (under this label)

6. Pull starter rope
APPENDIX E – ACTIVE SHOOTER GUIDELINES FOR PLACES OF MASS GATHERING

ACTIVE SHOOTER GUIDELINES
FOR PLACES OF MASS GATHERING

AUSTRALIA-NEW ZEALAND COUNTER-TERRORISM COMMITTEE
APPENDIX E – ACTIVE SHOOTER GUIDELINES FOR PLACES OF MASS GATHERING

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Introduction

Places of mass gathering (PMG) can pose a broad range of security challenges for their owners and operators. They have been specifically identified—both nationally and internationally—as attractive targets for religious and political extremists, as well as disgruntled or mentally impaired individuals. Armed offender attacks have occurred and continue to occur in crowded places such as sporting, transport and entertainment venues. Government and private sector stakeholders must work cooperatively to ensure that integrated and effective plans and arrangements are in place to prevent or reduce the impact of such incidents.

These guidelines are intended to increase understanding of the threat that active shooter incidents pose to PMGs. In particular, they seek to illustrate the key role that private sector stakeholders can play in developing and implementing appropriately informed prevention, preparedness, response and recovery arrangements to reduce the risks posed by such a threat. The guidance material has been developed by the Mass Gatherings Advisory Group on behalf of the Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee (ANZCTC), with input from the Mass Gatherings Business Advisory Group. It should be read in conjunction with the National Counter-Terrorism Committee’s National Guidelines for the Protection of Places of Mass Gathering from Terrorism (2011).

Purpose

These guidelines aim to increase stakeholder awareness of this particular type of dynamic threat, while also providing guidance on the issues and options that may be considered during risk mitigation and contingency planning activities. The National Guidelines (2011) set out several broad guiding principles that public and private sector stakeholders should consider to reduce their vulnerability to the threat of terrorism. These active shooter guidelines aim to supplement and build upon some of those broad areas of focus, with particular emphasis on the following two principles:

- Prevention and preparedness arrangements should be underpinned by an intelligence-led, risk management approach.
- Security arrangements for places of mass gathering should account for the dynamic nature of the threat and be responsive to changes in the security environment.

Gaining a better understanding of the risk environment and options for preventing and dealing with active shooter incidents will enable private sector stakeholders to more effectively contribute to the collective national efforts to manage this threat to PMGs. It is intended that this knowledge will lead to the development of ‘contingency’ or sub-plans that will supplement existing emergency response plans and arrangements at facilities and venues.
Glossary of terms

Active shooter: A person armed with a firearm(s) who is actively engaged in killing or attempting to cause serious harm to multiple people in a populated location.

Emergency management: The plans, structures and arrangements that are established to bring together government, voluntary and private agencies in a coordinated way to deal with emergency needs, including prevention, response and recovery.

Evacuation: The process of relocating people from dangerous or potentially dangerous areas to safer areas. The purpose of an evacuation is to use distance to separate people from the danger created by the emergency.

Mitigation: Measures taken before, during, or after a disaster (emergency) to decrease or eliminate its impact on society (people) and the environment (places).

Places of mass gathering (PMG): Are characterised by having a large concentration of people on a predictable basis, and include a diverse range of facilities and sites such as sporting venues, shopping/business precincts, public transport hubs and tourism/entertainment venues.

Police first responder: The general-duty, uniformed police that often provide the initial policing response to calls for police assistance.

Police Tactical Group (PTG): A highly trained police unit that tactically manages and resolves high-risk incidents, including terrorist incidents.

Rapid deployment: The swift and immediate deployment of emergency services personnel to an ongoing situation where delayed deployment could result in serious injury or death.

Situational awareness: The ability to quickly recognise and interpret an event, make sound decisions based on those interpretations, and establish early, effective and continuous lines of communication between the incident site and the controlling agency in order to provide ongoing accurate information about the situation to responders.

Terrorist act: An act or threat committed with the intention of advancing a political, ideological or religious cause, and which is intended to coerce or intimidate an Australian government, a foreign government, or sections of the public, which causes serious physical harm or death to a person, endangers a person's life, causes serious damage to property, creates a serious risk to the health and safety of the public, or seriously interferes with, seriously disrupts, or destroys, an electronic system.
Threat context

Terrorist propaganda continues to promote the efficacy of ‘stand-alone’ attacks, encouraging individuals, particularly those based in Western countries, to conduct attacks at home rather than traveling to conflict zones. The bombings that occurred in Boston on the afternoon of 15 April 2013, close to the finish line of the Boston Marathon, demonstrate the threat this type of ‘home-grown’ terrorism poses to PMAG.

The Anders Breivik attack in Norway in July 2011 demonstrates that terrorist attacks can occur without forewarning and security services cannot guarantee visibility of all terrorist attack planning. It is also a reminder that although al-Qaeda, its affiliates and Islamist extremists supportive of its ideology continue to pose a significant threat to Australia, attacks may also be inspired by a non-Islamic ideology and be driven by local issues.

Notwithstanding the threat posed by improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, international experience indicates that firearm attacks continue to be one of the more common strategies adopted by violent extremists, particularly in Western countries where firearms are often readily accessible. Within the Australian context, while access to firearms is well regulated in comparison, their use is still considered to be one of the most likely methods of attack.

Historically, Australia and New Zealand have not been immune from active shooter events. Several significant incidents have occurred at government buildings, shopping centres, universities and public spaces over the past 25 years. The Port Arthur, Heddon Street, Strathfield, and Queen Street incidents in particular demonstrate that active shooter mass casualty attacks in Australia remain a real and persistent threat to the community.

In August 2009, police arrested four men in association with a terrorist plot targeting the Holsworthy Army Barracks in NSW, where several Australian Defence Force units involved in overseas deployments are based. The perpetrators planned to infiltrate the barracks and shoot as many people as possible.

These guidelines provide specific advice on the active shooter threat. Guidance material on the threat posed by IEDs will form the basis of a separate set of ANZCTC guidelines.

The current security context assessment is contained at Appendix A.

Characteristics of active shooter incidents

The typical active shooter will attempt to kill as many people as possible within a short period of time. This is why they generally target places where they can achieve the greatest impact—i.e. crowded places. The rapid development of active shooter incidents often means the police first responders will be uniformed, general duties police.

An active shooter incident does not generally include a hostage situation, but can potentially transition into one, particularly during the resolution phase.

General features

Research to-date has not identified any significant trends regarding active shooter incidents, particularly in the Australian – New Zealand context. In fact, most incidents vary greatly from one attack to another. The following general features, however, are common elements of active shooter incidents:

- Incidents often occur in confined or controlled areas of high target concentration.
- Incidents often involve ‘soft targets’ such as shopping centres, schools and other PMAG.
- Most incidents evolve rapidly and are often over within 10–15 minutes.
- Many active shooters will continue to attempt to harm victims until confronted by law enforcement personnel or another type of intervention, or they commit suicide.
Most incidents are generally not resolved through negotiation or other peaceful means.

Weapons
Historically, Australian active shooter incidents have involved the use of long arm weapons (rifle and shotgun) although the use of handguns has become more prominent over the past ten years. Firearm ownership restrictions introduced by the government following the Port Arthur massacre significantly reduced the number of semi-automatic weapons in the community. Each year, however, many firearms are stolen from licensed firearm owners and could potentially fall into the wrong hands. Potential active shooters may therefore be able to access a wide variety of firearms, either legitimately or through criminal activities or connections.

Primary objectives
In most incidents, active shooters need freedom of movement and ready access to victims in order to achieve their objective. Therefore, minimising the offender’s access to potential victims should be the primary objective of any plans or strategies. This is most likely to be achieved through the following activities:

- Initiating immediate response activities
- Minimising the duration of the incident
- Restricting the offender’s movements
- Moving people from danger
- Preventing people from entering the scene
- Helping police to locate and contain the shooter

TIME = FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT = INCREASED CASUALTIES

Australia’s strategic approach to counter-terrorism recognises the need to prevent, prepare for, respond to and recover (PPRR) from terrorist acts. The PPRR concept does not represent a consecutive set of activities and many elements of PPRR will often occur concurrently. Owners and operators of PMGs and event organisers are strongly encouraged to ensure their own prevention, preparedness, response and recovery arrangements and activities align with those of emergency service agencies. The following sections provide guidance and considerations on how to achieve this, particularly in relation to active shooter situations.

Prevention
Not all risks or emergencies can be prevented, so the concept of prevention needs to have a much broader meaning, and should encompass activities that may reduce the severity or impact of the emergency event. General prevention-related activities can include gathering and analysing intelligence, developing strategies to reduce the impact on life/property and identifying or eliminating vulnerabilities at potential target sites. For most types of hostile attacks, prevention activities should aim to:

- Deter a would-be attacker – by providing physical and electronic security measures, coupled with good management practices
- Detect an intrusion – by providing alarm and visual detection/recording systems
- Delay or limit the intrusion for a sufficient period to allow a response force to attend – by putting in place physical security measures.

For active shooter attacks, additional prevention-related activities (specifically aimed at mitigating or reducing the severity of the incident) should also be considered. The main focus of these activities should be on restricting the movement of the offender whilst reducing their access to further victims. How to achieve this will depend on many variables, such as the physical design and security features of the venue, the movement of the offender and the opportunities for escape.

Not all venues and events will share the same risk profile or have similar vulnerabilities, so the principle of ‘proportionality’ should generally be applied to any prevention-related activities. This means that protective security measures not only need to be proportionate to the level of assessed risk, but should also try to strike a balance between the threat to public safety and the protection of civil liberties. However, when measuring proportionality
it should be recognised that prevention and mitigation activities related to a specific threat may also provide broader crime prevention and public safety benefits.

**Preparedness**

Activities associated with preparedness include emergency planning, resource, capability development and testing of preparedness arrangements. These arrangements and activities are generally focused on known or expected incidents, threats or emergency events. However, for generally unexpected and dynamic events, such as active shooter incidents, PMG owners and operators should adopt a ‘contingency planning’ approach.

**Contingency planning**

The aim of contingency planning is to counter emerging threats and respond when unexpected situations arise. Contingency plans generally supplement or complement general emergency response plans and arrangements, and are often designed as sub-plans. Some of the basic features of contingency plans are outlined below.

Combined and coordinated management:
Contingency plans should be based on a multi-stakeholder approach. They should consider and, where possible, integrate existing venue procedures and local emergency response plans and arrangements.

Assessment: Factors to consider when designing contingency plans include the characteristics of the location and the potential consequences of an attack at that location. Information and intelligence relevant to the likelihood of a particular target being subject to that type of threat should also be considered during the risk assessment process.

Response: Contingency plans should provide a range of options and scenarios to deal with specific issues. There is no one model to respond to every emergency, so responses need to be flexible and varied according to the nature and effects of the crisis. However there are some common objectives that characterise most emergency responses.

These include:
1. saving and protecting life
2. facilitating the evacuation of those at risk
3. containing the incident or threat
4. supporting emergency response and investigation activities.

Contingency plans should form part of overall emergency planning and briefing arrangements. All emergency plans should be tested and reviewed on a regular basis to ensure they are well understood, contemporary and effective.

Guidance for initial response considerations for venue management is contained at Appendix B.

**Response**

**Initial response**

Because of the dynamic and unpredictable nature of active shooter incidents there is no best practice or recommended response action that PMG owners and operators can build into their plans, arrangements and training activities. As previously mentioned, the primary objective of any initial response planning should be to minimise the offender’s access to victims. Therefore owners and operators should develop and practice strategies aimed at evacuating or isolating people or the offender.

The US Department of Homeland Security has developed an Active Shooter: How to Respond guide that is widely used internationally and outlines three key areas of focus.
Evacuate: Building occupants should evacuate the facility if safe to do so. Evacuees should leave behind their belongings, visualize their entire escape route before beginning to move, and avoid using elevators. Maintaining concealment or cover while moving is also important.

Hide: If safely evacuating the venue is not possible, occupants should seek to hide in a secure area where they can lock the door, blockade the door with heavy furniture, cover all windows, turn off all lights and remain silent. Mobile phones should also be turned to silent.

Take action: If the option of hiding in place is adopted, individuals may also need to consider options to disrupt and/or incapacitate the active shooter in the event they are located. This can include using or throwing available objects or using aggressive force when confronted. Such action should only be taken as a last resort and in order to protect the life of the individual or others in that area.

Transition considerations
Responsibility for implementing and coordinating initial response activities will, in most instances, be assumed by the venue/facility management or security staff until emergency responders are able to take over that responsibility. A critical aspect of managing that response and transitioning responsibility will be the ability to gain ‘situation awareness’. Establishing early, effective and continuous lines of communication from the incident site to the responding police agency will be critical in order to accurately inform them of the present situation and its subsequent development. Knowing or understanding the expectations of law enforcement responders will also enable a more effective transition of incident control. Planning and staff capability/training activities should include:

- Developing strategies that allow designated staff to safely maintain situational awareness of the incident and relay any new information to police first responders
- Training staff and occupants in how to respond when law enforcement arrives on scene.

The preferred response when police arrive may vary slightly across Australian states and territories, so PMG owners and operators should consult with local law enforcement agencies when developing their plans.

Guidance for initial response considerations for affected staff and occupants is contained at Appendix C.

Police response
Each jurisdiction has systems and inter-agency arrangements that provide the basis for emergency management and critical incident response. These procedures and arrangements have been tailored to meet the specific needs, capacities and capabilities in each jurisdiction’s operating environment. Commonalities across Australian and New Zealand police jurisdictions include:

- Operational response strategies, including incident and emergency management models
- A use of force model supported by operational principles, skills and tactics training.

Despite many similarities, there remain a number of differences in emergency management arrangements, processes and terminology across the states and territories. It is therefore critical that PMG and major event stakeholders develop a firm understanding of the emergency service plans and arrangements that apply to the jurisdiction that they are operating in.

Due to the dynamic nature of active shooter incidents, highly trained and equipped police tactical group operators may be unable to respond to a scene in a timely manner. As such, uniformed, general-duty police officers will generally respond to most active shooter situations and potentially manage them to their conclusion.
While the specific tactics, policies and training of police first responders may vary across jurisdictions, it is expected that the following objectives will guide their initial response activities.

**Mission:** The main objective of the police first responders in an active shooter incident is to save lives and prevent further loss of life or injuries. This will generally be achieved through a rapid deployment strategy.

The focus of a rapid deployment strategy should be to reduce or suppress the threat posed by the active shooter as quickly as possible. Traditional cordon, contain and negotiate strategies are unlikely to be effective in reducing the time a shooter has to achieve their desired outcomes, or limiting their freedom of movement. The most appropriate response to an active shooter incident will also depend on other factors, including available police resources, the incident setting and the tactics or weapons involved.

**Locate and isolate:** Once the decision to rapidly deploy has been made, the focus will generally be on how to reduce the offender’s area of operation and access to potential victims. This is best achieved by quickly locating the offender and containing the threat. To achieve this, first responders may initially need to keep moving and panicked people to try and contain the threat as quickly as possible.

**Command and control:** Any response to a major emergency or incident should be managed by an appropriate command, control and coordination structure. In active shooter situations, however, this might not be achievable in the first instance as it may delay any rapid deployment activities. The need to establish effective command and control of the incident, including coordination with venue management, may therefore become a secondary priority that is delegated to other responding units.

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**Recovery**

To ensure a smooth transition from response to recovery, arrangements that commenced during response should be gradually devolved and integrated. This will include aspects such as media and information management, impact assessment, rehabilitation of the built environment and restoring community and staff confidence. While many recovery-related matters will be similar for the majority of emergency events, significant or traumatic events such as terrorist acts or active shooter incidents may add extra complexity to normal recovery procedures.

Key recovery considerations following an active shooter incident may include:

- public information and community confidence
- scene preservation and investigation activities
- business continuity challenges.

**Public information**

Media or public information activities must support operational policies and actions. To achieve this, public messaging should be developed in coordination with the relevant operational and media/public relations managers. This is particularly important in situations where an offender has been taken into custody or charged with offences relating to the incident, as issues of sub-jure may arise. Information should be provided regularly to keep the public informed and should only be restricted in the interests of safety and/or operational security. Information issues relating to consequence management, such as providing assistance to victims, should be clearly identified as separate from the actual incident or security issue. As a general rule:

- an agency must only release information for which it has responsibility
- a log of all public information activities and decisions should be maintained.
The National Security Public Information Guidelines provide a framework for the Australian Government and state and territory agencies relating to national security issues and incidents. They are available at www.nationalsecurity.gov.au.

Crime scene and investigation activities

Police will conduct some form of major investigation for all active shooter incidents. This could involve criminal and forensic investigations in relation to potential criminal offences (including acts of terrorism), as well as coronial investigations on behalf of the coroner. These investigation processes will need to be extremely thorough and may often be protracted, particularly where the incident has occurred over a broad geographical area, or involves significant forensic challenges. During the investigation phase the police may also seek assistance from management at the location to help identify potential sources of evidence or witnesses. This could include CCTV footage, and radio, telephone or decision making logs. Recovery or business continuity plans should identify a suitable liaison officer that can work with the police to help facilitate these types of requests.

Business continuity

How quickly and painlessly owners and operators return to business-as-usual following a terrorist attack or other disaster depends on how effectively they can devise and implement their business continuity management arrangements. Through their contact with investigating police, the nominated liaison officer will generally be in a position to obtain information about the likely duration of the scene examination, allowing the venue to start implementing their business continuity arrangements. While the actual process may not change significantly, the amount of time it takes often will.

Useful links

Australian national security: www.nationalsecurity.gov.au

Australian emergency management: www.em.gov.au

ASIO Business Liaison Unit: www.blu.asio.gov.au


UNICRI (United Nations): www.unicri.it/ab

Version control

This document is endorsed by the Australia-New Zealand National Counter-Terrorism Committee (ANZCTC) and maintained by the National Security Resilience Policy Division (NSRDPD) of the Attorney-General’s Department.

The Attorney-General’s Department is responsible for the version control of this document.

To preserve the integrity and currency of this document:

- major amendments must be endorsed by the ANZCTC
- minor amendments, for example to correct spelling or grammar, should be documented and forwarded to the NSRDPD to be implemented and then a revised version sent to the Mass Gatherings Advisory Group (MGAG) to be endorsed before it is distributed.
Appendix A

Current security context

The main terrorist threat to Australia emanates from al-Qaeda (AQ) and Islamist terrorists inspired by AQ's world view. The public statements of AQ figures and other extremists continue to criticise Australia, and identify Australians and Australian interests as legitimate targets.

Despite international counter-terrorism efforts, AQ retains the intent and capability to conduct terrorist attacks and to operationally influence like-minded terrorist networks to undertake attacks. The threat to Australian interests domestically and overseas from AQ like-minded groups will endure for the foreseeable future.

Critical infrastructure and places of mass gathering feature prominently in terrorist attacks linked to AQ and its affiliates—characterised by their symbolic nature, concentration of people in enclosed spaces and economic and social importance. Terrorist attacks have targeted government buildings, diplomatic and consular offices, commercial buildings including hotels and other tourist facilities, residential compounds, commercial and military shipping, aviation, oil and other energy and transport infrastructure. The aviation sector remains a particular focus for AQ and its affiliates.

AQ and like-minded terrorists have considered, trained for and attempted a range of attack methodologies, including using improvised explosive devices (IEDs), armed assault, or a combination of such tactics. IEDs have been used in suicide attacks and remote detonations, and have been used with a variety of delivery vectors, including persons, cars, trucks and boats.

Terrorist attacks often feature opportunistic weapon selection dependent upon the perpetrator’s access. In some instances terrorists have undertaken reconnaissance or surveillance of targets when planning attacks.

Australian Security Intelligence Organisation

November 2012
Appendix B

Firearm attack - initial action advice for management

Response priorities: During an active shooter incident the primary response objectives and the potential actions for achieving them may include:

1. Saving and protecting life
   a. Appoint an incident manager to coordinate activities until police arrive.
   b. Use the built environment to restrict or deny access.
   c. Commence CCTV surveillance and track the offender(s).
   d. Communicate appropriate cover and concealment options to those present.
   e. Identify and establish a safe medical triage/first aid location.
   f. Restrict further vehicle access to the site (bollards, gates, road closures, etc).
   g. Restrict physical access to the site or general vicinity.

2. Facilitating the evacuation of those at risk
   a. Notify key staff of the incident through prearranged messages/codes and methods.
   b. Appoint an evacuation manager and ensure they have situational awareness.
   c. Provide guidance on safe routes for those that are self-evacuating.
   d. Assess the suitability and potential safety of normal evacuation routes.
   e. Evaluate the safety of standing evacuation muster points and change if necessary.
   f. Identify potential safe places or strong holds for those unable to evacuate.

3. Containing the incident or threat
   a. Consider using electronic or mechanical isolation systems to constrain the movement of the offender or restrict access to potential victims.
   b. Identify and establish a perimeter.
   c. Use the existing built environment to best advantage for safety and containment action.
   d. Consider restricting escape options for the offender if these may endanger others.

4. Supporting emergency response and investigation activities
   a. Identify and communicate safe access routes/form up points for emergency services.
   b. Consider using CCTV and other remote methods where possible.
   c. Commence incident and decision-making logs.
   d. Nominate a suitable emergency services liaison officer to meet/interact with the police.
   e. Ensure access to site plans and CCTV footage (where possible).
   f. Clearly identify when incident management has transitioned to the police.
   g. Provide ongoing support to the emergency response action as requested.

It is important to regularly practice these and any additional initial response actions so that key managers and staff clearly understand the priority actions and are able to perform these actions in a high-stress and dynamic environment.
Appendix C

Firearm attack - initial action advice for individuals

Attacks involving firearms may be infrequent but it is important to be prepared to respond to such an incident. The advice below will help with planning a response.

ESCAPE

Under immediate gunfire – Take cover initially, but attempt to leave the area as soon as possible if safe to do so. Try to confirm that your escape route is safe.

Nearby gunfire - Leave the area immediately, moving away from the gunfire if this can be achieved safely.

- Leave your belongings behind.
- Do not congregate at evacuation points.
- Try to maintain cover (see below).

Cover from gunfire
- substantial brickwork or concrete walls
- engine blocks of motor vehicles
- base of large live trees
- earth banks/hills/mounds

Cover from view
- internal partition
- car doors
- wooden fences
- curtains

SEE

The more information you can pass on to police the better, but NEVER risk your own safety or that of others to gain it.

If it is safe to do so, think about obtaining the following information:

- details of any firearms being used or possessed
- exact location of the incident
- whether the perpetrator is stationary or moving in any particular direction
- number of casualties
- number of other people in the area
- number and description of offenders
- their motives or intent (if known or apparent)
- what else they are carrying.

TELL

- Ring police immediately on 000 and give them the information shown under ‘See’.
- Stay on the line and provide any other information or updates the operator requests (if safe to do so).
- Use all the channels of communication available to you to inform staff, visitors, neighbouring premises, etc of the danger.

IF YOU CAN’T ESCAPE...

ACT

- Secure your immediate environment and other vulnerable areas.
- Keep people out of public areas, such as corridors and foyers.
- Consider locking/barcoding yourself and others in a room or secure area.
- Try to choose a room where escape to a more secure area may be possible.
- Move away from the door, remain quiet and stay there until told otherwise by appropriate authorities, or you need to move for safety reasons.
• Silence mobile phones and other devices that may identify your presence.

• Consider (only as a last resort) options for arming yourself with improvised weapons to defend yourself if you are located.

**Police response**

In an attack involving firearms a police officer’s priority is to protect lives. In an active shooter scenario, this usually means locating the offender as quickly as possible, even if it means initially moving past people who need help.

**Please remember:**

• At first police officers may not be able to distinguish you from the gunman.

• Police officers may be armed and could point guns in your direction.

• They may initially move past you in search of the gunman.

• Avoid quick movements or shouting and keep your hands in view.

• Promptly follow any instructions given.

Be aware that police may enter your location at some stage to secure the building and locate people that have hidden from the threat.
In the case of an emergency, dial 000.
For all other enquiries, contact your local police jurisdiction:

**ACT Policing**
Emergency Management and Planning
(02) 6226 7777
ACT-EM&P@dfp.gov.au

**South Australia Police**
Critical Infrastructure Support Group
(08) 7322 3622
sapol.sics@police.sa.gov.au

**New South Wales Police**
Counter Terrorist Business Contact Unit
(02) 9919 9278
bcu@police.nsw.gov.au

**Tasmania Police**
Special Response and Counter-Terrorism Unit
(03) 6233 02500
SRCTU@police.tas.gov.au

**Northern Territory Police**
131 444 (in NT)
Cisecurity@nt.gov.au

**Victoria Police**
Counter-Terrorism Coordination Unit
(03) 9247 0066
CTCU-INFO-OIC@police.vic.gov.au

** Queensland Police**
Intelligence, CT & Major Events Command
(07) 3406 3670
Counter.Terrorism@police.qld.gov.au

**Western Australia Police**
Counter-Terrorism & Emergency Response
(08) 9370 7207
cter@police.wa.gov.au
GLOSSARY

ATTEMPTED BOMBING
An incident involving the use of one or more improvised explosive devices (IEDs) which have failed to function because of an assembly or design defect, component failure or a successful countermeasure procedure.

BOMB
A device of any size or shape which can look obvious or be concealed, may vary in its sophistication, and may not necessarily explode (i.e., incendiaries, weapons/nuclear substances, mines, animals/chemical). Referred to as an IED.

BOMBING
An incident involving the detonation of one or more IEDs. (This definition includes illegally used military explosive ordnance.)

HOAX DEVICE
An item that is placed, designed, or manufactured in a manner intended to cause another person to believe the item is an IED.

IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE
A device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, explosive, pyrotechnic or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harm, or disrupt. It may incorporate military items but is normally devised from non-military components. Referred to as an IED.

MAIL BOMB
An IED sent through the postal system.

SUSPECT ITEM
An item considered to be suspicious by response personnel (police, military or civilian) and requiring further investigation or specialist inspection. The term 'suspect' applies only to those items that are eventually declared safe and innocuous.
INTRODUCTION

...Bomb threat... It is to the community's benefit to take an interest in the problem, as an ambulance, fire engine or police officer tied up at a location may easily cost the life of others elsewhere..."  — Stoffel1

Stoffel identified the need for the community at large, including government and private organisations, to be involved in self-determination when dealing with a bomb threat. The Australian Bomb Data Centre (ABDC) has produced this handbook for security officers and managers with this principle in mind.

The handbook contains procedures and recommendations derived from the experiences of national and international policies and security and law enforcement agencies. It aims to provide managers with clear guidance on how to develop in-house policy and strategies to counter bomb threats. Further, it aims to:

• examine the threat
• briefly describe different types of IEDs
• introduce liaison with police
• advise how to handle threats if and when they occur

Bomb Threat Countermeasures

BOMBS — LARGE AND SMALL

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are easily disguised. They can be any shape or size ranging from open and obvious to concealed and sophisticated. A simple open device may comprise a rock of explosives initiated by a burning fuse and detonator or by a simple electronic means of initiation. Alternatively, a determined terrorist or fanatical may pack large quantities of explosives with sophisticated methods of operation into an array of seemingly innocent or inoffensive items.

Bomb threats don’t necessarily involve ordinary or firebombs. They are designed to create a chain reaction culminating in a devastating fire. Incendiary devices can be small enough to fit into a portable pouch and be concealed in a ‘bomber’ for some time. Shops and stores are at high risk from incendiary attack as an offender can leave a relatively small device at the target site, walk away undetected and achieve quite spectacular results.

High on the devastation scale is the car bomb capable of massive and indiscriminate death and destruction. Finally, there is the postal device or ‘mail bomb’ which is disarmable in that it is generally designed to activate when opened by the target victim.

NOTE: Remember there are far more bomb threats perpetrated than actual placement of devices. The overall theme of this publication therefore is in keeping with the provision of a BOMB THREAT STRATEGY.

APPENDIX F BOMBS – DEFUSING THE THREAT

BOMB THREAT STRATEGY

ASSESSING THE THREAT

Threat assessment is a logical appraisal of the risk of a written or verbal warning against an individual or organisation. How best can the threat be interpreted? Ideally, a person appointed by an organisation to oversee security or emergency management should be delegated the responsibility to assess threat situations, and to make and implement decisions on behalf of management where such incidents arise. Sufficient power to issue plans and directions and to conduct adequate training and rehearsal of bomb threat procedures is essential.

EMERGENCY CONTROL ORGANISATION/WARREN STRUCTURE

Where an organisation is large and its personnel are spread over many floors or buildings, an Emergency Control Organisation (ECO) using the existing Warren structure might fulfil the requirement. However, for the purposes of this handbook, the delegate will be referred to as the ‘coordinator/supervisor’. A deputy must also be appointed to act in the coordinator’s absence.

NOTE: The coordinator/supervisor should control all search and evacuation activities and establish a suitable control centre with good communications. All personnel must know the location of the control centre.

COORDINATOR/SUPervisor’s RESPONSIBILITIES

Seven main responsibilities rest with the coordinator/supervisor and their deputy:
- Device and maintain an effective search plan
- Device and maintain a safe evacuation plan
- Assess the long and short term threat
- Contact police, consider the decision to evacuate
- Make the decision to evacuate
- Make the decision to recovery
- Schedule/report staff training and security drills.

HOT-UP

HOT-UP is a term used to describe a process for making an initial assessment about an unattended, doubtful or suspicious item. The HOT-UP philosophy originated in the UK during the 1970s and was used by the British army to address the Irish Republican Army’s bomb threats. It has since been used extensively in Australia for the evaluation of police, voluntary and employee personnel during significant events, including the 2000 Olympic Games in Sydney.

HOT-UP is an assessment tool to be used by the coordinator/supervisor in conjunction with local public safety and other emergency services to help determine a course of action. Meeting HOT-UP considerations does NOT necessarily mean the item is an IED but warrants further investigation. If the suspect item fails any of the HOT-UP questions it should be classified as a hazardous material/chemical/physical and/or other specific, additional and/or specific information. For example:

- Has it moved?
- Does it have a hidden or easily concealed entry point?
- Is there a gas leak, fire or smoke?
- Is there any unusual noise or smell?
- Is there any unusual activity around the area?

HOT-UP is a comprehensive assessment that might describe the type and placement of a device, the reason or motive and/or additional specific information. For example:

- There is a bomb in the shop and it's going off at 11.45.
- There is a bomb in the shop and it's going off at 11.
- There is a bomb in the shop and it's going off at 12.
- There is a bomb in the shop and it's going off at 2.

ASSESSMENT OF ACTUAL/IMPESSIBLE THREATS

The attack assessment is derived from the threat message, its source and conduct. Statistically, the threat will most probably come directly by telephone, however, it is possible it could be intercepted by another agency (e.g. police or military) and subsequently relayed.

THREAT MEDIA

Threats or warnings can be communicated in written or verbal form. A written threat would include the use of email, fax machines, Short Message Service (SMS) text messaging, and/or hand or typed notes. The most popular medium for the oral threat is the telephone, other oral media may include electronic recording equipment and face-to-face or relayed verbal messages.

THE WRITTEN THREAT

On receipt of a written threat, regardless of the medium used, immediate steps must be taken to maintain the integrity of the document. These are:

- Place the threat document in a sealed envelope or folder to preserve the condition and prevent contamination.
- DO NOT photostate – this process could destroy useful information.
- Restrict access – the document is physical evidence and should be surrendered to police.
- If received by electronic means, take steps to secure the information such as saving and printing.

THE TELEPHONE THREAT

The person who answers the telephone has a critical role to play when a threat call is received and must be prepared to effectively gather all relevant information. They must remain calm and extract details that are crucial to assist the coordinator/supervisor to make decisions, help locate a device, and assist in the ultimate prosecution of an offender.

A telephone bomb threat checklist is an invaluable tool to threat assessment. A suggested format is provided in Appendix A.

LONG-TERM THREAT/STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT

Long-term threats are strategic assessments of threats from an intelligence management perspective—judging the susceptibility of the enterprise, its employees and associates to internal/external threats. It also examines the interaction of the enterprise with the community at large—in short, why the organisation might be targeted by terrorists or criminals. Effective liaison with local police is essential in building up a threat and outcome history to support assessment processes.
**POINTS TO REMEMBER**

Don’t hang up — it might be possible to turn the call.

Use a Telephone Bomb Threat Checklist — see Appendix A.

Write down the information accurately — don’t rely on memory.

Try to attract another person to listen in — it may help to recall or confirm key information later on. It’s possible to get answers to the following:

- **Where is the bomb?**
- **What time will it go off?**
- **What does it look like?**
- **What kind of bomb is it?**
- **Why are you doing this?**

Also try to assess:

- **The caller — were they male or female?**
- **Speech — was it articulate, rambling, rational, accented, was it accompanied by a distinctive impediment, language?**
- **Distractions — saw the call made from a private, coin-operated or mobile telephone?**
- **Background noise — was there any noise such as laughing, traffic, music, or any other sound that could indicate the caller’s location?**

**NOTE:** Some advice has been given in the past in relation to the tape recording of telephone threats. As the legality and advisability of taped evidence differs between jurisdictions, organizations/operations should check with their State police service regarding the tape recording of telephone conversations.

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**EVACUATION STRATEGY**

**THE DECISION TO EVACUATE**

The biggest decision to be made by management in the event of a bomb threat is whether to evacuate the building. In many cases, this decision may have already been made during the development of the bomb threat incident plan. Management may implement a policy that in the event of a bomb threat, total evacuation will be afforded immediately. This decision avoids any calculated risk and demonstrates a concern for the safety of personnel in the building; however, it can result in costly loss of time. Before any decision is made, all the facts in relation to the threat should be assessed to ensure the response is relative to the threat.

**THE ASSESSMENT AND DECISION TO EVACUATE SHOULD BE CONDUCTED IN CONSULTATION WITH LOCAL POLICE/EMERGENCY SERVICES.**

**EVACUATION OPTIONS**

Basically, there are three alternative courses of action when faced with a bomb threat:

1. **Assess and discount the threat**

   Disregarding the threat completely without any assessment can cause problems. If employees believe bomb threats have been received and disregarded, it could result in morale problems and have an adverse effect on business. However, the possibility that the bomb threat caller feels they are being ignored, they may go beyond the threat and actually place a bomb. However, providing the threat has been given a proper assessment and subsequently determined to be a hoax, no further action may be an option.

   **NOTE:** While statistically, not many bombs threaten are credible, it should not be overlooked that bombs may have been located in connection with threats.

2. **Assess and evacuate immediately**

   Evacuating immediately after a bomb threat is received may be the preferred option. However, there are negative circumstances with this approach too. The obvious result of immediate evacuation is the disruption of work. If the bomb threat is a credible threat, the business will need to be closed. An employee knowing the policy is to evacuate immediately may try to do the threat to get out of work. A suspect may use a bomb threat to avoid a class or miss a test. Similarly, a bomb threat wishing to cause serious injuries could place a bomb near an event normally used to evacuate and then call in the threat.

3. **Assess, search and evacuate**

   Initiating a search after a threat is received and evacuating a building after a suspicious package or device is found is the third and probably the best approach. It is certainly not as disruptive as an immediate evacuation and will satisfy the requirement to do something when a threat is received. If a device is found, the evacuation can be accomplished quickly while at the same time avoiding the potential danger areas of the bomb.
APPENDIX F BOMBS – DEFUSING THE THREAT

EVACUATION

An evacuation/search team should be selected and trained in conjunction with the development of a bomb threat incident plan. The team should be trained in how best to evacuate and search the building during a bomb threat. It is important to note that the evacuation and search team should only be trained in evacuation and search techniques.

Evacuation routes should be searched and cleared of any obstacles prior to use by the general public. If a suspect item or device is located, all relevant information should be recorded, i.e. physical characteristics (shape, dimensions – width, length, height), construction, marks and inscriptions, position of the item, and characteristics of the place in which it is located. Also, a sketch of the area would help the recording bomb unit. Staff should not expose themselves to excessive risk by spending too much time near the suspect item but leave the area as quickly as possible and then make notes of what was observed once they are in a safe location.

DO NOT TOUCH OR DISTURB THE ITEM.

IMPORTANT NOTES

Evacuation routes and assembly areas must be searched to ensure personnel are not unnecessarily exposed to danger during the evacuation.

In areas where bomb threats are received, the coordinator/supervisor should immediately inform police and advise what actions were taken.

EVACUATION PLANS

Evacuation plans, similar to search plans, should depict clear routes to be taken, especially when there are several exits. Because:

- It may be necessary to use elevators urgently when there is no time to search first.
- There may be other emergency possibilities and alternative evacuation routes that are not exposed to the threat area. For instance there may be four possible exit routes namely A, B, C and D but when intelligence, search or other information indicates a suspect item or device is close to D, the coordinator can evacuate via routes A, C, and D only.

NOTE: Trained staff should be used in evacuation marches in public areas such as shops and cinemas to minimize confusion and panic. Figures 12 to 15 depict examples of search sectors and evacuation routes for shops and cinemas. Alternatively, a general direction to vacate the shop/cinema should suffice and reduce alarm.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

There are several other aspects to consider in the evacuation planning process, namely:

- Designate a ‘safe’ assembly area – well away from the threatened structure, out of line-of-sight of the building and well clear of windows. A minimum distance of 150 meters is recommended.

NOTE: Never assemble personnel in front of or directly below glass areas.

- Employees and visitors should take their personal belongings to eliminate superfluous “suspect objects” and to reduce the number of items to be checked.
- Select safe and functionally accessible assembly areas the evacuation may be waiting for considerable periods.
- Avoid car parks as assembly areas – be mindful of the potential for car bombs.
- Account for all evacuees — check to ensure everyone has evacuated and install special procedures for people with disabilities.
- Install procedures to ensure empty/excavation routes and assembly areas are clear. Suitable routes and assembly areas must be searched before evacuation.
- As evacuees depart the building, it is timely and appropriate, consider checking open the doors they passed through.
- Implement a procedure for machinery shutdown. This can include plant and equipment, electronics and computer equipment as well as ensuring fire and correspondence.

BIOLOGICAL INCIDENTS

INTRODUCTION

Biological agents are bacteria, viruses and toxins that can cause disease or death in humans. Biological agents can cause diseases including anthrax and plague, while viral agents can cause diseases such as smallpox and influenza. Bacteria and viruses as biological weapons are the potential for the disease to spread from person to person over a wide population.

Biological toxins are naturally occurring substances produced by an animal, plant or microbe. Toxins can be used as biological weapons include botulinum and ricin, which can be lethal but are not spread from person to person.

The most effective way of disposing a biological weapon is to cause widespread disease in an infected form. Other methods include contamination of food and water supplies.

BIOLOGICAL INCIDENT INDICATORS

- Unusual number of sick and dying — casualties may occur hours to days after exposure to toxins for bacteria or viruses, after an incident has occurred. The time elapsed before symptoms are observed depends on the agent used.
- Unhindered and unusual spray — especially those during periods of darkness, or near ventilation systems.
- Abnormal handling of fluids — devices are unlikely to have distinct odours.
- Suspicious substances on white powders that cannot be easily accounted for, particularly in areas with high population traffic.

HOW TO RESPOND TO A CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL INCIDENT

Biological and chemical agents can be determined in a variety of ways, including placement within letters or packages. If a letter or package suspected of contamination is received, follow these procedures:

- Do not handle the package unless absolutely necessary.
- If you need to handle the package, do so with care. Do not shake or bump it.
- Isolate the package or mail.
- Place the package/envelope in a sealed secondary container.
- Shut down the air conditioning or ventilation system.
- Do not open, smell, taste or touch the package.
- Avoid contact with clothing.
- Remove any labelled clothing.
- Remove clothing and place it in a plastic bag as soon as possible (removal of clothing can rob about 80 per cent of the contaminant).
- Inspect all people who handled the package wash their hands with soap and water.
- Shower with soap and water. Do not use bleach or other disinfectants.
- Make a list of all the people who had contact with the substance or package and give it to the investigating authorities.

This advice applies even if the agent is disseminated by other means, for example through a裡面ization system or some other dispersal method such as an aerosol.

(Source: Australian Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Data Centre, 2008)
CHEMICAL INCIDENTS

INTRODUCTION
Toxic chemicals are being used by extremist or terrorist organizations in conjunction with IEDs. The more traditional chemical warfare agents (CWAs) are more difficult to acquire or manufacture and therefore toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) such as chlorine or sulfuric acid are more likely to be used to conduct attacks against urban populations in Australia.

Examples of TICs and traditional CWAs include:
- nerve agents such as sarin or VX which are fast-acting, extremely toxic and evaporate quite rapidly
- choking agents such as chlorine gas that cause coughing and choking
- blister agents such as sulfur and nitrogen mustard
- smoke agents which are usually liquid and evaporate more slowly — some symptoms of exposure to mustard include reddening of the skin and blistering
- blood agents such as cyanogen chloride and hydrogen cyanide, which are inhibitory gases (some symptoms of exposure to cyanogen chloride include flushing face with red lips, choking at the mouth, unconsciousness and death).

CHEMICAL INCIDENT INDICATORS
- Dead animals/fish — numerous animals dead in the same area
- Blister victims — numerous individuals experiencing unexplained water blisters, burns (like bee stings) and/or rash
- Mass casualties — health problems including nausea, disorientation, difficulty in breathing, convulsions and death
- Patterns of casualties — casualties will likely be distributed downwind, or if indoors, by the ventilation system
- Unusual liquid droplets — a number of surfaces exhibit oily droplets/film. Water surfaces may also have an oily film
- Dead/washed vegetation — trees, bushes, food crops and/or lawns that are dead, decoloured or withered without drought conditions
- Unexplained odours — odours ranging from fruity to flowery, sharp/pungent, garlic/licorice at lake levels
- Abnormal animals — all animals will be completely out of character for the surroundings
- Live/lying dead — unusual live/lying dead and log-like conditions

(Source: VicPol Police, Security Advice for Hotel and Entertainment Industry, 2002; Australian Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Data Centre)

RADIOLOGICAL INCIDENTS

INTRODUCTION
Ionising radiation is an energy emitted from atoms in the form of either electromagnetic waves (gamma radiation) or particles (e.g., alpha, beta, neutrons). It is called ‘ionising’ as it has sufficient energy to strip electrons from atoms — an effect called ‘ionisation’. Atoms emitting ionising radiation are called radioactive atoms; material containing radioactive atoms is called radioactive material.

SOURCES OF RADIATION IMPACT
Radioactive materials can be used to harm people and the environment through radiation, contamination or both. Radiation occurs when a person or organism is exposed to ionising radiation but is not in physical contact with the radioactive material. Radioactive material is in physical contact with a person or organisms (which becomes contaminated). Contamination may be internal or external. Internal contamination occurs when radioactive material is deposited inside an organism as a result of any or all of the following external inhalation of airborne radioactive material, ingestion of foodstuff contaminated by radioactive material, or through wounds or broken skin

A Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD), known as a ‘dirty bomb’, is an effective way to deposit radioactive materials. If the radioactive material is positioned around an explosive device, detonated and becomes dispersed. The resulting radioactive fallout causes radioactive contamination of the affected area. An unexploded RDD can be the source of an irradiation, rather than contamination, especially when gamma radiation (for example) is being emitted from the radioactive material contained within the RDD.

Potential radiological impact from an unexploded RDD on its surroundings would be localised, and permanently limited to gamma irradiation of the personnel handling the RDD. Such irradiation might be significant if an RDD contained sufficient quantities of gamma-emitting radioactive material, for example cobalt-60 (Co-60), caesium-137 (Cs-137), radium-226 (Ra-226) or radon-192 (Rn-192).

When an RDD detonates, the radioactive material is dispersed into a large volume of air. This results in a drastic decrease of the concentration of the material leading to a drastic decrease in the levels of radiation exposure from gamma radiation, and therefore a marked decrease in the resulting external dose to exposed personnel.

(Radioactive Dispersal Devices: Risks and Mitigation, 2009)

RADIATION PROTECTION MEASURES DURING A RADIOLOGICAL INCIDENT
External gamma irradiation could be drastically reduced by keeping distance from the radioactive material contained in an unexploded RDD, by limiting the time of contact with the material (NPOE radiation exposure), or both.

The third protective factor, heavy shielding, could also be used although in many cases this would be impractical to apply in field conditions. Internal contamination from the radioactive material dispersed after the explosion could be eliminated by the use of protective clothing and respiratory protection devices.

In addition to the above measures, personnel should be monitored for gamma radiation exposure, preferably by using them with a personal electronic dosimeter. On completion of field duties all personnel involved must be discontaminated in the same way as personnel exposed to chemical or biological incidents. The measured personal radiation doses should be assessed and subsequently recorded for each monitored individual.

(Source: Australian Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Data Centre, 2009)
BUILDING SEARCH PLANS

The prime objective is to ensure a coordinated search is conducted in a safe, thorough, timely and effective manner. The search must be planned and rehearsed in advance. Remember, a complete and systematic search takes time.

Responsibilities should be divided into sectors manageable by two searchers. Divide the enterprise into sectors, for example, a set of offices, a department store, including checkout, mailroom, corridors, and especially evacuation routes and assembly areas.

Personal information has been recorded on a plastic-covered building plan with non-permanent markers. Record useful details such as sector information, search team composition and other search progress during an incident.

WHAT TO SEARCH FOR – KEY INDICATORS (UFHO)

- Unusual in appearance
- Foreign to a given setting
- Hidden from view (this does not discount obvious items)
- Ominous or origin questionable

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

- Package is labeled suspicious
- Similar to package described in a threat
- Foreign to premises
- Questionable as to origin
- Suspicious in size, shape, weight and sound
- Signs of fingerprint, scrimp or
- Presence of pieces of wire, tape, wire, or explosive wrappings
- Furniture or fittings tampered with

WARNING

IF A SUSPICIOUS OBJECT IS FOUND, FOLLOW THE GOLDEN RULES:

- DO NOT TOUCH
- CLEAR PEOPLE AWAY FROM THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY (ABCD RECOMMENDS A MINIMUM DISTANCE OF 25 METRES FOR ANY ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION)
- INFORM COORDINATOR/SUPERVISOR
- INFORM POLICE
- SECURE THE AREA
- INITIATE EVACUATION AS APPROPRIATE.

The person who discovers a suspicious object should be immediately available for interview by the coordinator and police. A diagram or sketch of both the object and its position should be prepared as soon as possible to assist bomb disposal personnel.

Detailed below are examples of actual bomb threats/incidents. Consider the costs associated with uncontrolled evacuation, loss of productivity, equipment downtime, disruption to services and stress on staff and customers.

SEARCH PROCEDURES

TYPES OF SEARCH

Essentially there are three methods for conducting a search: by supervisors, occupants or special search teams. Each has advantages and disadvantages as detailed below.

Supervisory search

Discretionary undertaken by supervisory staff without alerting other staff members to the threat. Each supervisor searches his own area of responsibility; however, for a large building, it is effective if a team of supervisors search one portion of the building.

Occupant search

Generally, occupant staff are best qualified to search their respective work areas and should be readily able to assess items that do not belong. This type of search is relatively fast and efficient and may overcome problems, but may require additional staff training. Some staff may balk at the risk of searching if not adequately trained and instructed. However, the form of search is quite time consuming and is 80-90 per cent effective.

Trained team search

Trained and experienced search teams are usually more effective. The team trains and learns to recognize suspicious packages and to approach such items in a safe and methodical way. The primary advantage of this method is that of time and materials cut back.

NOTE: Regardless of the method used, a thorough search does take time. Failure or loss of concentration can adversely affect progress so that search is not broken or rotation of staff/search teams to maintain an effective search.
APPENDIX F BOMBS – DEFUSING THE THREAT

SEARCH PROCEDURES

INITIATING SEARCH

There are several methods to initiate search, namely by sending a message over the public address system which can be recorded to all personnel and unannounced by: using a 'telephone cascade system' to contact three people who in turn contact another three and so on; or use of a decentralized Emergency Control Organization (ECO) communication system. Direct personal contact is also an option.

REHEARSING SEARCH PROCEDURES

Rehearsal helps the staff for what teams are searching for. Routinely, it is difficult to plan for every conceivable possibility, so in broad terms, searches must be alert to items/objects that:
- should not be there
- cannot be accounted for
- are out of place
- are similar to the original threat description.

Search is largely a team event which relies on local knowledge. Regardless of the chosen search method it is imperative the team is legible, thorough and ensures no area is left unchecked. A plan is invaluable in ensuring all evacuation routes, car parks, perimeters and other vulnerable areas are satisfactorily and systematically covered.

NOTE: It may be necessary to meet with other relevant building management to ensure areas are not overlooked within individual and collective responsibilities.

EXTERTIER SEARCH

Ideally, individual search teams should be assigned to search each building in the complex. Where there are sufficient personnel, one or more exterior search teams should search each building in sequence. Exterior search is especially important because the exterior provides initial contact or access for the bomb.

Suggested exterior search patterns are shown at Figures 1 to 3. Search begins at ground level and radiates outwardly to approximately 10 metres and to a clearly defined border such as a kerb or rail. Common sense must prevail in all instances of search and if it is necessary to search out to 20 metres or more then do so. During the phase, close attention must be given to piles of leaves, shrubbery, entrances, other access, manholes, rubbish bins, other extraneous containers and parked vehicles. Complete the ground level search to a height accessible to a bomber—this may include window ledges and air conditioning. If roof areas are accessible by fire escape or other external means, the exterior search must also include them.

PUBLIC AREA SEARCH

When an area is accessible to the public it follows that a bomber has equal access. Personnel assigned to public areas must concentrate on areas that might attract the bomber's eye. A suggested search pattern is depicted at Figure 4. Reception rooms, lobby, stairwells and toilets are frequently targeted areas and should be closely screened. Search should flow systematically upward as illustrated at Figure 5, commencing at the lowest level and progressing upward floor by floor.

NOTE: Mark areas that have been searched on the building plan to eliminate duplication, omissions. When all public access areas of each level have been searched, the detailed room search may proceed. The sequence continues until the entire structure is searched.
SEARCH PROCEDURES

SEARCH AND EVACUATION PLANS

There are many building, floor and facility designs; it is impossible to depict all scenarios in this publication; so four typical plans are illustrated. Each plan is treated in two ways: firstly as search sector areas, and secondly as evacuation schemes; anticipating theoretical device placement; the planner has a basis for adopting local input to cater for specific circumstances.

The following plans are depicted:

Figure 8. Bank or building society – Office Search Sectors
Figure 9. Bank or building society – Office Evacuation Routes
Figure 10. Hotel – Search Sectors
Figure 11. Hotel – Evacuation Routes
Figure 12. Supermarket – Search Sectors
Figure 13. Supermarket – Evacuation Routes
Figure 14. Cinema – Search Sectors
Figure 15. Cinema – Evacuation Routes

NOTE: Cinemas/theatres and similar places of entertainment cannot be searched while patrons are present – this applies specifically to the auditorium. Public access areas must be searched as soon as a threat is assessed to ensure safe passage for existing patrons and staff.

FIGURE 8. OFFICE SEARCH SECTORS
SEARCH PROCEDURES

FIGURE 9. OFFICE EVACUATION ROUTES
An example showing the different evacuation routes for staff and customers should the suspect bomb be discovered at location 1 or location 2.

BOMB 1
People in the refreshment area and immediate adjacent area (the toilets and stair) should be directed to leave the building by exit B. All other people on the ground floor should be evacuated via exit A. People on the upper floor should be directed to leave via the staircase leading to exit C, and avoid the staircase leading to exit B.

BOMB 2
In this instance all occupants on the ground floor in the public area and those offices adjoining the public area should leave by exit A, but once outside be prevented from passing in front of the office containing the suspect device. Staff in the toilet section and the rooms behind should leave using exit B. People on the upper floor should be evacuated via the stair on exit B, and avoid the stair at exit C.
SEARCH PROCEDURES

FIGURE 11. HOTEL EVACUATION ROUTES
An example showing the different evacuation routes for staff and customers should the suspect bomb be discovered at location 1, location 2 or location 3.

BOMB 1
In this instance the suspect bomb is outside the building, but to evacuate through the main entrance would place people in danger. Accordingly everybody should be evacuated using all exits except A and be prevented from passing in front of that part of the building.

BOMB 2
All people between the suspect bomb and entrance B should leave by B. Other people should leave using the nearest appropriate exit, other than B.

BOMB 3
All occupants would be evacuated using the nearest exit, but be prevented from passing in front of the Coffee Grill.

SEARCH PROCEDURES

FIGURE 12. SUPERMARKET SEARCH SECTORS

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APPENDIX F BOMBS – DEFUSING THE THREAT
SEARCH PROCEDURES

FIGURE 13. SUPERMARKET EVACUATION ROUTES

An example showing the different evacuation routes for staff and customers should the suspect bomb be discovered at location 1 or location 2.

BOMB 1
All customers and staff between the suspect bomb and exit C would be evacuated via exit C.
The customers and public in the remainder of the sales area should leave through the main entrance A. Staff in the private storage areas (mail, mop, cold room etc) should leave via exit B.

BOMB 2
Anyone in the lobby between the suspect bomb and the entrance A should leave via exit A. All other people should leave by the nearest appropriate exit B, C or D.

SEARCH PROCEDURES

FIGURE 14. CINEMA SEARCH SECTORS
APPENDIX F BOMBS – DEFUSING THE THREAT

SEARCH PROCEDURES

SEARCH OF PERSONS OR VEHICLES ENTERING PREMISES

The ABOC has obtained the following advice on personal search from the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department:

1. The occupier of premises has a common law right to impose conditions of entry. This may include requiring a person wishing to enter to submit to a search on entering or leaving. Refusal to comply entitles the occupier to deny entry to the person or to require the person to leave the premises. It does not constitute a non-intrusive search, even where the person has in fact entered the premises. This is equally applicable to vehicles entering private carparks..."

Liaison with local police should provide the coordinator/supervisor with the appropriate avenues from Commonwealth and/or State Legislation as to affects search and the rights of people/vehicles entering premises.

NOTE: Searching people in this context refers to search of baggage/belongings and the like, NOT personal body search. The use of walk-through or hand held metal detectors could be considered.

FIGURE 15. CINEMA EVACUATION ROUTES

BOMB 1
People in the auditorium would be evacuated through entrance A (using door B at the front of the auditorium) and exit C. People in the foyer and basements would be evacuated through entrance A. Once outside, everyone should keep away from exit B.

BOMB 2
People in the auditorium would be evacuated through exits B and C. People in the foyer and toilets would be directed through door E into the auditorium and evacuated through exits B and C. Once outside everyone should be kept away from entrance A.
VEHICLE SEARCH PLAN

INTERNAL SEARCH

Once the external search is complete and where the vehicle is unlocked or the keys are available and permission to search is obtained from the owner/driver, open the vehicle and start the internal search paying attention to the:

- Floor — first check under the seats and mats and then lift coverings to inspect the floor.
- Seats — examine arm/headrest, associated spaces/recesses, magazine holders and ashtray stowage.
- Fittings — check under the dashboard and in air conditioning/heating ducts. Pay attention to tightness, rattle and gawk. Examine light fittings and carefully feel headlining and trim.
- Bonnet and boot — inspect each in detail taking note of spaces that may house accessories, spare wheels, tool kits etc.

NOTE: Vehicle searches are made easier if the owner or driver is available. It is vital to question them to confirm the vehicle’s history and eliminate suspect items/accessories.

REMEMBER THE GOLDEN RULE:

Where a device is located, or suspicious circumstances suggest the possible presence of a bomb, DO NOT TOUCH.

Clear people away from the immediate vicinity, secure the area and inform the coordinator who will initiate assessment/evacuation and inform police.
APPENDIX F BOMBS – DEFUSING THE THREAT

VEHICLE SEARCH PLAN

FIGURE 17. VEHICLE SEARCH – HEAVY GOODS VEHICLE

FIGURE 18. VEHICLE SEARCH – CAR
Systematic search is essential. Search the vehicle in five ways:
- Outside
- Underside
- Interior
- Inside boot
- Engine compartment

Check any large box sections or double skin areas to which access can be obtained with minimum modification.
REOCCUPATION

After an evacuation the decision to reoccupy has to be made. Where a suspicious object has been located and police have attended, the scene will remain under their control until the area is declared ‘safe’ and control is restored to the coordinator for subsequent reoccupation.

**NOTE:** As a ‘crime’ is a criminal offense, the building may become a police crime scene for considerable time.

Where the threat stipulates a ‘time to expiration’ but it does not extend, **ALLOW AN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM OF TWENTY MINUTES** to elapse before reoccupation, commencing or continuing the search. Obviously where evacuation was ordered without search, then search must be undertaken before reoccupation. Regardless of the scenario, search results should guide the decision to re-occupy the premises.

**NOTE:** Experience has shown that controlled count back of staff and occupants into premises reduces the incidence of threat situations.
EQUIPMENT

There are many security firms which provide equipment to detect IEDs and mail bombs. Often such devices are expensive and not appropriate to the assessed level of threat. The AVSEC has technical and in many cases practical information relating to equipment available on the open market, but it does not endorse any particular security product.

INTRODUCTION

The possibility of increased worldwide terrorist mail bomb activity presents a substantial challenge to security and law enforcement authorities. The various book and envelope bombs discussed before have been used in one form or another in the Middle East since 1947 (Palestine) and are likely to continue and spread. Over time extremists have simply added to the list of construction variations and modifications to deliver their bombs to the intended targets. A change in political atmosphere, a new cause, or a new wave of social unrest, is all that is needed to inspire fresh waves of mail bomb activity.

Over the years Australia has witnessed a number of mail bomb attacks both criminal and politically motivated, directed at government and private individuals. In some cases on opening the recipient has suffered serious injury.

Mail bombs are a preferred tool of terrorist groups in the UK and Europe. In 2003 the head of the European Union’s Executive Commission was unharmed when he opened a badly Chapel (envelope) triggering it to ignite. In 2006 two European Members of Parliament were targeted with letter bombs which burst into flames in the hands of secretaries opening them.

Responsible authorities have seen to realize mail bombs pose a continuing and serious threat to public safety. The National Crime Authority bombing in Adelaide in 1996 and the ‘Outback’ tax office mail bomb campaign in 1998 prove the potential for highly organized and effective mail bomb campaigns is not confined to overseas countries. More recently, Australia has experienced numerous more mail devices.
RELEVANT LEGISLATION

This handbook aims to assist public safety authorities concerned with the development of mail bomb countermeasures. The Criminal Code Act 1995 contains some of the offences and penalties that may apply when a mail bomb is sent through the post. These include:

Section 471.10 Hoaxes—explosive and dangerous substances
(1) A person is guilty of an offence if:
(a) the person causes an article to be carried by a postal or similar service; and
(b) the person does so with the intention of inducing a false belief that:
(i) the article consists of explosives or contains an explosive or a dangerous or harmful substance or thing; or
(ii) the article, or a dangerous or harmful substance or thing, has been or will be left in any place.
Penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years.

Section 471.13 Causing a dangerous article to be carried by a postal or similar service

Offence
(1) A person (the first person) is guilty of an offence if:
(a) the first person causes an article to be carried by a postal or similar service; and
(b) the person does so in a way that gives rise to a danger of death or serious harm to another person; and
(c) the first person is reckless as to the danger of death or serious harm.
Penalty: Imprisonment for 10 years.

TYPES OF MAIL BOMBS

INTRODUCTION
Mail bombs normally fall into three distinct categories:
- Explosive—designed to inflict injury, death, or cause damage through blast or fragmentation.
- Incendiary—designed to inflict injury, death, or cause damage through incendiary effects.
- Noxious—designed to cause injury death or create a nuisance effect through a variety of toxic means, e.g., gases.

Mail bombs are principally built to function when opened or when an article is removed from an envelope or package. They target individuals who would normally open mail. Most mail bombs are designed to remain in the postal system for a period of time and are robust enough to survive the rigours of the system.

Generally speaking, mail bombs are about the size of a normal business envelope. However, their only size limitation is the size enforced by postal authorities. In Australia, mail bombs have varied in size from small envelopes to a package which contained sufficient explosives to destroy a four-door family car. Regardless of size, mail bombs have the potential to be lethal.

DEFENCE AGAINST MAIL BOMBS

Figure 19 outlines the passage of mail through a recommended security screening system. The first line of defence at stages 1 and 2 places the responsibility for the initial detection of mail bombs with the recipient or mail registry. Detection at this stage occurs in two ways:
- Visual—performed by the recipient
- Detection equipment—used to detect ferrous and non-ferrous metals and other components

Small objects are also used during the first stage; however, personnel should treat the suspect item with caution when handling it. See Figure 19.

As a result of experiences in Australia and overseas, current visual recognition points (Figure 20) have been developed to assist in the initial detection of mail bombs.

Obviously, it would not be necessary for a mail bomb to have all these recognition points; however, exhibiting a combination would be a good indicator of a mail bomb.

The most commonly occurring recognition points in Australia have been:
- Excessive weight
- Excessive covering material
- Unknown source
- Laminated or unbroken envelope
- Prominent wires
- Visible packaging

After initial screening by visual means (stage 1 and 2), two processes will be evident. Firstly, the mail does not exhibit any mail bomb characteristics and will be forwarded to the recipient, or there will be certain recognisable characteristics and the presence of abnormal amounts of metal. Specialist police bomb technicians or military IED disposal personnel will then carry out the fifth and subsequent stages. See Figure 19.
APPENDIX F BOMBS – DEFUSING THE THREAT

FIGURE 19. FLOWCHART OF MAIL RECEIVING AREA

- MAIN ARRIVAL POINT
  - REGISTRY, FRONT DESK, INDIVIDUAL, MAIL CENTRE ETC

- SCREENING AREA
  - VISUAL AND/OR DETECTION EQUIPMENT
  - CONTACT ADDRESSEE OR SENDER

- SUSPECT
  - PLACE IN SAFE ISOLATION AREA
  - CONSIDER EXPLOSION
  - CONTACT SUPERVISOR
  - CONTACT POLICE

- NOT SUSPECT
  - DELIVER TO ADDRESSEE

- SPECIAL EQUIPMENT
  - POLICE BOMB TECH

- RENDERED SAFE

- COLLECTION OF EVIDENCE FOR INVESTIGATION

FIGURE 20. MAIL BOMB RECOGNITION POINTS

- EXCESSIVE SECURING MATERIAL
- EXCESSIVE WEIGHT
- PROTRUING WIRES OR TIN FOIL
- OPSIDED OR UNEVENLY WEIGHTED
- OILY STAINS AND DISCOLOURATION
- THICK OR RIGID ENVELOPE
- IS PACKAGE EXPECTED
- VISUAL DISTRACTIONS
- EXCESSIVE POSTAGE

- PROPER NAMES AND TITLE NOT OR INCORRECTLY USED
- ADDRESS - HANDWRITTEN OR INCORRECTLY TYPED
- RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS E.G. 'CONFIDENTIAL'
- COMMON WORDS MISSPILT
- EITHER UNUSUAL OR FOREIGN ORIGIN
- LACKS ADDRESS OF SENDER

- DON’

- EVACUATE IMMEDIATE AREA

- FOLLOW LOCAL PROCEDURES
SCREENING FOR MAIL BOMBS

ESTABLISH A SCREENING POINT
The precise location in the flow of mail where screening should occur will vary with the size and function of each organization. In order to determine the mail screening point, a detailed study of the internal mail distribution system and risk assessment must be conducted. The assessment must take into account those areas where mail opening and sorting are carried out, where the public have direct access, and where mail bombs could be introduced unnoticed.

The receipt, handling, sorting, distribution, and mail opening procedures of each office or area must be observed, not only from a mail viewpoint, but also a personnel viewpoint. Employees screening mail should be mature, responsible, emotionally stable, motivated and cautious enough in their actions to guarantee a high level of efficiency.

The workflow or processing of incoming mail in any organization usually follows a common pattern. Bags or bundles of mail as well as incoming packages and parcels are generally delivered to the mailroom.

If the centralized receiving procedure is not currently in operation, steps should be taken to ensure it.

On receipt, the mail is sorted in one or more ways:
- Business letters are sorted and separated from personal letters, and the mail is sorted for each section or branch in the organization. Letters marked personal are generally not opened in the mailroom but are sorted into the sections or branch delivery boxes.

In large organizations, the receiving mailroom may simply sort by section or branch and send the mail along in bulk to a section or branch mailroom for opening, sorting, and individual delivery. Packages and parcels are also generally delivered to the unit or division unopened.

Mail rooms initially receiving incoming mail generally employ more than one person to sort the mail into the various unit or division delivery boxes.

With proper knowledge and training, effective initial screening can be achieved by the visual/manual process. It should be emphasized, however, that initial screening procedures are by no means foolproof. A change in terrorist tactics, packaging, or mail patterns may render certain elements of the screening process invalid. It is unlikely, however, that the basic types of mail bombs will change significantly.

ESTABLISH A SUSPECT MAIL BOMB ISOLATION AREA
The visual/manual screening process should identify or 'flag' the majority of mail items processed through the screening point. When a suspect item of mail is detected during the initial screening, it should be carefully transported to a safe holding or isolation area.

The isolation area should be remotely located from the screening point and provide for the safety of employees and minimum damage to buildings should the suspect mail item suddenly function. Remember, the visual process is only the first level in the defensive system.

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSE
Once placed in the isolation area, the police should be called in to examine the suspect mail item further. As a general rule, police should be notified at once to be sure. Requests for police assistance should only originate from one designated individual in any organization in order to eliminate duplication and confusion.

VISUAL AIDS FOR EMPLOYEES
Each organization should ensure all key personnel are familiar with visual screening processes and trained with visual mail bomb recognition points. In addition, large mail room areas should prominently display posters such as the ABCD (Suspicious Mail Bomb Handling Point) throughout the mail screening point warning of the dangers of handling suspect mail.

HANDLING SUSPECT MAIL
If an item is considered suspect for whatever reason the following steps should be taken to ensure personnel safety:

- Confirm the item has come through the postal system. An item that has come through the postal system will normally have the same degree of sophistication as a device that has been placed or delivered, for example, by a courier or express delivery.

- Check with the addressee if they are expecting the item. If a return address is on the article, check with the originator.

- Isolate the article. Place the suspect mail bomb in a safe isolation area such as an empty room, or leave the item where it is and advise the building manager/supervisor.

- Evacuation should always be considered in the event of a potential bomb threat. The extent of the area evacuated is purely relative to the size of the item and the degree of the threat.

- Obtain as much information as possible (without handling the suspect item) for the bomb technician in relation to dimensions, markings, history of threats, type or construction of the package and its exact location.

- UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES should any attempt be made to open the item—this generally this action that will cause the device to function.

- The suspect item MUST NOT be immersed in WATER as this may-seed it to function.

- Suspect items should not be placed in confined spaces such as filing cabinets or safes as this will only increase the blast effect if detonates.

- Suspect items should not be transported or carried through congested areas as this could expose people to unnecessary hazards.

- Contact the police.
## SUMMARY

Emergency procedures and training are possibly the best methods of ensuring personnel are protected against mail bombs, and in fact protected against themselves. The ability to follow safety procedures enables people to concentrate on the problem at hand rather than trying to think of what should be done.

Those organizations, institutions and individuals, who believe they have become targets of national or international criminal/extremist mail bomb attacks, should institute mail screening programs immediately — not wait until such attacks are launched and then try to develop countermessages overnight. With reasonable advanced planning and thoughtful implementation, mail bomb countermessages can become part of normal everyday routine, rather than emergency defensive measures. Through routine usage, weaknesses in the security system can be detected and eliminated.

The simplest, most expeditious and cost-effective method of guarding against the threat of mail bombs appears to be the establishment of visual/manual screening procedures with follow-up screening of mail items with other detection equipment. This system is certainly not foolproof, but it does provide a very high degree of protection.

Adequate training for personnel who handle, deliver or open mail and the purchase of one or more detection units, represents a low-cost investment in proportion to the protection desired. Implementing mail screening procedures does not seriously impede the flow of routine correspondence, nor substantially increase operating costs.

## CONCLUSION

The mail bomb threat in Australia is always present. Training of personnel in the recognition of mail bombs, implementation of emergency procedures, and above all personal vigilance, are among the most effective countermessages.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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Data Centre

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### Appendix A: Phone Bomb-Threat Checklist

**PHONE BOMB-THREAT CHECKLIST**

**Remember to keep calm**

**Important questions to ask**

- Where did you see it?
- What does it look like?
- What was it doing?

**Exact wording of threat**

**Think**

**General questions to ask**

- How does it look to you?
- How was it placed?
- How could it have been removed?

**Bomb threat questions**

- What type of bomb is it?
- What is it doing?
- What would make the bomb explode?

**Chemical/biological threat questions**

- What kind of substance is it?
- How much of the substance is there?
- How will the substance be treated?
- Is the substance a liquid, powder or gas?